















A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy  
of The Australian National University 
 
 
Department of International Relations 
Coral Bell School of Asia-Pacific Affairs 
Australian National University 






© Copyright by Richard Louis Salmons 2018 
All Rights Reserved  
  
I declare that this thesis has been composed solely by myself and that it has not been  
submitted, in whole or in part, in any previous application for a degree. Except where 
stated otherwise by reference or acknowledgment, the work presented is entirely my 
own. 
 
This research is supported by an Australian Research Training Program (RTP) 
Scholarship. 
 




I would like to first thank my supervising panel in the Department of International 
Relations at ANU – Dr Benjamin Zala, Professor Ian Hall (now at Griffith University) 
and Dr Feng Zhang, plus Dr Andrew B. Kennedy of the Crawford School of Public 
Policy. This provided an outstanding cross-section of expertise on the themes of the 
thesis, ranging from country specialties on India and China, to interpretive approaches, 
arms control and power transitions and order-building. Ben Zala came into the 
Department mid-project, but his role as Chair of Panel was indispensable. His feedback 
was both friendly and abundant, especially in the final stages of assembling this thesis. 
 
I would also like to thank the other faculty of the IR Department, including Dr Matt 
Davies and Dr David Envall who respectively provided overall research degree 
guidance and useful advice on fieldwork in Japan, while Professor Bill Tow lent his 
wealth of experience and provided excellent support. Early in the thesis I received great 
ideas on Japan research from Dr Amy Catalinac (now NYU). I would also like to thank 
everyone in the faculty who attended and provided feedback during my Thesis Proposal 
Review presentation and my final seminar. Among professional staff, Mary-Louise 
Hickey ordered countless books at my suggestion ostensibly for the Departmental 
library. 
 
Also at ANU, I am grateful for the help and guidance of many members of the Strategic 
and Defence Studies Centre during my candidature. Dr Amy King, Professor Brendan 
Taylor, Dr Helen Taylor and Dr Nina Silove all expressed great confidence by 
employing me as a teaching assistant. I did not miss the opportunity to question them 
about aspects of my project, and their advice was incorporated throughout the thesis. A 
special thanks goes to Dr Shunichi Ikeda of the School of Culture, History and 
Language, for his help arranging Japanese language studies. 
 
Appreciation and high regards go to my fellow doctoral candidates within ANU’s 
Hedley Bull Building: Carly Gordyn, Ruji Auethavornpipat, Jennifer Canfield, Natalie 
Sambhi, Teresa Kobelkova, Sophie Saydan and Kerri Ng to name a few. I congratulate 
Dr Iain Henry and Dr Gail Ma on the recent award of their PhDs, and likewise Ben Day 




	 goes to family: To my parents John and 
Leonie Salmons, who supported me unstintingly and proof-read the manuscript in 
forensic detail, while not missing the chance to question me on completion plans; and to 
my wife Kate Stevenson, whose love and belief in me proves the truth of Berlin’s 




International Relations widely assumes that states pursue status, which may provide 
both emotional and strategic benefits. However, IR’s existing status literature frequently 
renders the desire for status as a constant that cannot explain varying policy outcomes, 
and in many cases is overly focused on the connection between status concerns and war. 
The importance of status as a causal factor in IR may be better understood by 
considering that if states normally aspire to valued status roles, then threats to those 
roles can cause states to change policy settings to protect them. States with aspirations 
to the most prized status roles, notably major power status, should be especially prone 
to this.  
 
This thesis considers three case studies involving major power aspirants, where key 
foreign policy decisions have been widely attributed to status concerns. As the epicentre 
of today’s power transition, the Asia-Pacific region is the focus of the empirical 
analysis. The cases all take place during the immediate post-Cold War period, where the 
realignment of international polarity threw into question many established status roles. 
These were: Japan’s 1992-93 bid for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council; 
China’s 1996 signing of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty; and India’s 1998 
Pokhran II nuclear tests. The project involved interviews with experts with close 
knowledge of the cases in each of the three countries, with a view to assessing 
leadership self-perceptions regarding national status at the moments in question. 
 
The thesis outlines a three-phase approach to understanding status concerns and 
advances the central argument that the middle “status crisis” phase acts as the causal 
driver of policy change. There is generally a phase of normal status-seeking, during 
which a state accumulates prestige to win recognition for valued status roles; 
unexpected events may cause a status crisis, forcing a revaluation of the state’s status 
position; and the state embarks on a phase of enhanced prestige-building, narrowing and 
intensifying its status ambitions. In short, changed status perceptions due to a status 
crisis can cause change to status-seeking policies, which become more provocative or 
risky than before. The case studies highlight examples of status-seeking involving 
material power, legitimacy, and institutional roles.  
 
The thesis makes two contributions to the literature. First, the argument extends existing 
theories of status by better operationalising the concept. It adds to social identity theory 
by explaining the circumstances when states may adopt specific strategies to win status 
recognition, and it reinforces arguments that efforts to gain status recognition need not 
be conflictual or disruptive to the status quo. Second, the research enriches our 
understanding of the historical cases, some of which are mired in long-running debates 
about causal factors, and it offers ways for IR scholarship to account for the role of 
status in these episodes. With ongoing power shifts in the Asia-Pacific and beyond, 
status will continue to be a key concept in IR and this thesis provides us with new ways 
of understanding the relationship between status concerns and policy change. 
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Setting the Scene 
 
The power shifts that are reshaping world politics are also driving national aspirations to 
status and recognition. China’s President Xi Jinping has declared that it is time for 
China and the United States to build “a new type of great power relationship.”1 In India, 
Narendra Modi’s Hindu nationalist BJP calls for a resurgent India “to play its destined 
role in the comity of nations.”2 And in Japan, cabinet ministers speak of Japanese 
responsibility in contested regions such as the South China Sea as “it is natural for a 
great power like Japan to play a responsible role for the region.”3 All of these 
statements reflect the way that politicians and peoples alike believe their states ought to 
hold special status in the international system. This thesis explores how and when those 
beliefs affect the way that states behave. 
 
The moment of writing this thesis matters, because global power transitions are making 
the issue of status more relevant to core questions in International Relations. This power 
transition has seen the world move from a “unipolar moment” to a period in which not 
only China, but India, Brazil and other emerging economies are increasing their share of 
global production at the relative expense of the established developed powers.4 There is 
                                                
1 Quoted in the New York Times, 28 May 2013. 
2 Bharatiya Janata Party 2014 election manifesto, available at: 
http://www.bjp.org/images/pdf_2014/full_manifesto_english_07.04.2014.pdf (accessed 24 July 2017). 
3 Japanese Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera, quoted in the Wall Street Journal, 11 July 2014, 
https://search-proquest-com.virtual.anu.edu.au/docview/1544435603?accountid=8330 (accessed 24 July 
2017). 
4 A chart forecasting the economic growth of major Asian economies, and comparing them with Western 
economies, may be found at p. 53 of the Australian Government’s Australia in the Asian Century white 
paper, available online at: 
http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/2013/docs/australia_in_the_asian_century_white_paper.pdf. For 
an expression of the “unipolar moment”, see: Charles Krauthammer, ‘The Unipolar Moment,’ Foreign 
Affairs 70, no. 1 (1990). For a post-unipolar overview, see: Fareed Zakaria, The Post-American World 
(New York: W.W. Norton, 2008). 
 2 
an active debate about whether this is inherently disruptive to global order. Some 
scholars argue that the United States could manage the transition and continue to 
promote a “hierarchical order with liberal characteristics,”5 but others contend that 
rising powers will try to carve out forms of hegemony “informed by their own histories, 
cultures, and social norms,” making harmony elusive, however materially attractive the 
US-led order has been.6 What seems likely is that the power shifts will at least make 
international order less cleanly defined than before. It is not necessary to adopt Richard 
Haas’ term “nonpolarity” (which he uses to describe a post-unipolar world), to concur 
with his broad point that: “A nonpolar world not only involves more actors but lacks the 
more predictable fixed structures and relationships that tend to define worlds of 
unipolarity, bipolarity, or multipolarity.” In this real-world context, the relative status of 
states is an ever more important topic of inquiry.  
 
Status is important to current international relations debates because it helps explain 
whether or not power shifts will lead to conflict. Many perspectives illustrate this. 
Translating scholarly debates about power transitions for a contemporary and popular 
audience, Hugh White says of Sino-American rivalry that “the main motor for 
disagreement is not the substantive issue, but the way each side sees it as a test of 
relative status in the Western Pacific.”7 Or, putting matters in the language of scholarly 
IR, “if a rising power can be integrated within international institutions, it is possible to 
avoid the conflicts that anarchy’s premium on hedging against vulnerability might 
otherwise induce.”8 This is why, in a notable book on regional order-building, Evelyn 
                                                
5 G. John Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World 
Order (Princeton University Press, 2011), 6, 343-5. 
6 Charles A. Kupchan, ‘The Normative Foundations of Hegemony and the Coming Challenge to Pax 
Americana,’ Security Studies 23, no. 2 (2014): 224. 
7 Hugh White, The China Choice: Why America Should Share Power (Collingwood, Victoria: Black 
Incorporated, 2012), 122. 
8 Avery Goldstein, ‘Power Transitions, Institutions, and China's Rise in East Asia: Theoretical 
Expectations and Evidence,’ Journal of Strategic Studies 30, no. 4-5 (2007): 646. 
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Goh argues that “processes of rank competition, assurance and integration will present 
the most important sources of order renegotiation in East Asia.”9 To summarise the 
issue, one recent study notes that “the ongoing scholarly and public discussion reveals a 
level of anxiety about rising powers and world order that is hard to explain if people 
only care about economic prosperity and basic national security.”10  
 
The renewed interest in status has prompted a wave of scholarly publishing on the 
topic.11 But the puzzle for scholarly IR is that while status is widely accepted to be 
important, research to date still gives us little guidance on how the idea of status 
connects to states’ decisions and policies. In other words, how and when does status act 
as a variable in policy outcomes? Even including very recent work,12 the existing 
literature does little to provide an operational theory or causal chain between status and 
state behaviour. Among the key themes in the literature, explored in more detail in the 
literature review chapter, some scholars see the desire for prestige as a constant, which 
cannot explain varying outcomes. Others develop the main theoretical approach in this 
topic, social identity theory (SIT), yet this theory’s causal basis in the psychological 
attachments of people to their social group is difficult to translate to IR’s sphere of 
                                                
9 Evelyn Goh, The Struggle for Order: Hegemony, Hierarchy, and Transition in Post-Cold War East Asia 
(Oxford University Press, 2013), 225. 
10 Deborah Welch Larson, T. V. Paul, and William C Wohlforth, 'Status and World Order,' in Status in 
World Politics, ed. T. V. Paul, Deborah Welch Larson, and William C Wohlforth (Cambridge University 
Press, 2014), 3. 
11 In order of publication, recent works of interest include: William C. Wohlforth, ‘Unipolarity, Status 
Competition, and Great Power War,’ World Politics 61, no. 1 (2009); Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei 
Shevchenko, ‘Status Seekers : Chinese and Russian Responses to U.S. Primacy,’ International Security 
34, no. 4 (2010); Thomas J. Volgy et al., eds., Major Powers and the Quest for Status in International 
Politics : Global and Regional Perspectives (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011); Reinhard Wolf, 
‘Respect and Disrespect in International Politics: The Significance of Status Recognition,’ International 
Theory 3, no. 1 (2011); Steve Wood, ‘Prestige in World Politics: History, Theory, Expression,’ 
International Politics 50, no. 3 (2013); Allan Dafoe, Jonathan Renshon, and Paul Huth, ‘Reputation and 
Status as Motives for War,’ Annual Review of Political Science 17 (2014); T. V. Paul, Deborah Welch 
Larson, and William C. Wohlforth, eds., Status in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2014); Joshua Freedman, ‘Status Insecurity and Temporality in World Politics,’ European Journal 
of International Relations 22, no. 4 (2016); Jonathan Renshon, ‘Status Deficits and War,’ International 
Organization 70, no. 3 (2016). 
12 Jonathan Renshon, Fighting for Status : Hierarchy and Conflict in World Politics (Princeton University 
Press, 2017). 
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defined and unequal states.13 In addition, much research about status in IR focuses on 
whether a desire for greater status recognition leads to conflict, yet this limits the 
concept of status to dealing with only a narrow range of IR situations.14  
 
This chapter outlines the research project and explains its methodology. The outline 
explains that the topic of status is important to IR not only because of international 
power shifts, but because these shifts are largely toward Asia, where international status 
hierarchies have played a longstanding role. Noting that the main gap in the literature 
concerns the causal function of status, the aim of this thesis is to fill the gap by building 
a working model of decision-makers’ status concerns and their effect on policy. This 
leads up to the central argument of the thesis, which is that in normal periods states 
cautiously accumulate prestige, but when faced with a crisis in their perceptions of 
national status, they will embark on a bolder phase of enhanced prestige-building. The 
second main section of this chapter explains why the project is built around a 
comparison of three empirical case studies (covering post-Cold War episodes in Japan, 
China and India) and uses a broadly interpretivist approach. Overall, this means the 
project takes an interpretivist approach that makes use of pluralist methods and has a 
strong resonance (especially given the subject matter of the thesis) with the neoclassical 
                                                
13 A point made by Wohlforth: Wohlforth, ‘Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War,’ 36. 
For key works in IR that draw on SIT, see: Jonathan Mercer, ‘Anarchy and Identity,’ International 
Organization 49, no. 2 (1995); Rawi Abdelal et al., ‘Identity as a Variable,’ Perspectives on Politics 4, 
no. 4 (2006); Anne L. Clunan, The Social Construction of Russia's Resurgence: Aspirations, Identity, and 
Security Interests (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009); Larson and Shevchenko, ‘Status Seekers.’ For 
a review of major social psychology literature on SIT (pre-2000, but influencing recent IR scholarship on 
this topic), see: Rupert Brown, ‘Social Identity Theory: Past Achievements, Current Problems and Future 
Challenges,’ European Journal of Social Psychology 30, no. 6 (2000). 
14 Some notable recent works that focus on status and conflict include: Wohlforth, ‘Unipolarity, Status 
Competition, and Great Power War.’; Dafoe, Renshon, and Huth, ‘Reputation and Status.’; Allan Dafoe 
and Devin Caughey, ‘Honor and War: Southern US Presidents and the Effects of Concern for 
Reputation,’ World Politics 68, no. 2 (2016); ibid.; Renshon, ‘Status Deficits and War.’; Renshon, 
Fighting for Status. 
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realist research agenda.15 A third section concludes this introduction with an outline of 
the whole thesis. 
 
 
Overview of the thesis 
 
At the centre of this thesis are three case studies involving major power aspirants, where 
major foreign policy decisions were widely attributed to status concerns. These are: 
Japan’s 1992-93 bid for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council; China’s 1996 
signing of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty; and India’s 1998 Pokhran II 
nuclear tests. The fieldwork involved interviews with experts with close knowledge of 
the cases in each of the three countries, with a view to assessing leadership self-
perceptions regarding national status at the moments in question. The remainder of this 
introduction explains the case selection and the project’s conceptual and theoretical 





While the literature review chapter deals with definitions and their place in the literature 
in more detail, it is important to the main argument of the thesis to distinguish prestige 
and status. Prestige is a general belief that an actor has positive qualities. The belief is 
“general” or “higher-level” in the sense that actors believe that most other actors 
                                                
15 As outlined in Chapter 3, key works in the neoclassical realist research agenda include: Gideon Rose, 
‘Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,’ World Politics 51, no. 1 (1998); Steven E. Lobell, 
Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy 
(Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Norrin M. Ripsman, Jeffrey W. 
Taliaferro, and Steven E. Lobell, Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics (New York, NY: 
Oxford University Press, 2016).  
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attribute the positive qualities to the relevant actor. It may therefore be seen as a social 
perception or as public recognition. It has the important implication that an actor may be 
perceived as prestigious even among observers who do not themselves consider the 
actor to have a good reputation.16 This thesis argues that actors acquire prestige in the 
expectation of receiving status recognition – in other words, status is a product of 
prestige. Status is likewise a general belief, but specifically about an actor’s position in 
a social hierarchy. Once this status position is recognised by others, an actor may gain 
rights, respect, and patterns of deference from its status. One reason states seek status 
recognition is because they believe that it informs expectations that members of a group 
will generally defer to higher-status actors.17 
 
Making this distinction between prestige and status helps to reveal the underlying 
mechanism at the centre of this thesis. The existing literature tends to blur the two 
concepts, referring for example to states that are insecure about their status embarking 
on policies to conspicuously boost their prestige.18 These kinds of arguments imply an 
important connection that needs to be explored. The connection is that prestige is 
directly linked to activity, while status is an asset that is built up by that activity. This 
opens up a useful way of explaining the role of status in events, and allows a greater 
degree of precision in analysing when and how status in particular influences policy 
choices. This thesis argues that for reasons of history, culture or necessity, states put 
value upon certain roles that are generally recognised as carrying high status. States will 
then engage in prestige-earning activity in order to gain recognition for those status 
                                                
16 The best single explanation of prestige as a general belief is given by O’Neill: Barry O'Neill, Nuclear 
Weapons and National Prestige (Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1560) (Cowles Foundation 
for Discussion in Economics, 2006).  Renshon, ‘Status Deficits and War,’ 518-19; Larson, Paul, and 
Wohlforth, 'Status and World Order,' 16; Dafoe, Renshon, and Huth, ‘Reputation and Status,’ 364. 
17 For a discussion of status recognition as a general belief, see: Dafoe, Renshon, and Huth, ‘Reputation 
and Status,’ 375. 
18 Xiaoyu Pu and Randall L Schweller, 'Status Signalling, Multiple Audiences and China’s Blue-Water 
Naval Ambition,' in Status in World Politics, ed. T. V. Paul, Deborah Welch Larson, and William C 
Wohlforth (Cambridge University Press, 2014). 
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roles. Prestige-building is the means, subject to policy decisions, while status is the 
ends, the ultimate valuable asset or pay-off. The key here is that just as there are many 
different status roles that might be valuable, there will be equally many kinds of 
prestige-earning activities. Once this distinction is made, then we can start to identify 
connections between status concerns and state behaviour. 
 
Opening up the status agenda in IR 
 
Over the past decade, the study of status has become increasingly topical in IR 
scholarship for two reasons. First, power shifts away from United States hegemony 
have given a fresh lease of life to the study of rising powers and power transition.19 
Second, the rise of China and the changing role of Japan has renewed the interest of 
scholarly IR, including IR theorists, in the East Asian region.  
 
Just as the prospect of global power shifts has increased interest in rising powers and 
power transitions, this area of study has also witnessed an increase in scholarly attention 
given to questions of status in IR. This is because conditions of power transition involve 
the threat of conflict over dissatisfaction with both material and non-material benefits in 
the international system. As one review of China’s rise and power transition notes, the 
distribution of international benefits includes “control over territory, spheres of 
influence, access to resources, or status in the system.”20 An implication of this, as 
William Wohlforth notes, is that in many cases “the motivation driving decisions for 
war is relative satisfaction with the global or regional hierarchy.”21  
                                                
19 See for example the edited volume: G. John Ikenberry, Power, Order, and Change in World Politics 
(Cambridge University Press, 2014). 
20 Taylor Fravel, ‘International Relations Theory and China's Rise: Assessing China's Potential for 
Territorial Expansion,’ International Studies Review 12, no. 4 (2010): 506. 
21 Wohlforth, ‘Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War,’ 28. 
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Another implication of shifting power redistributing international benefits is that states 
such as China and Russia are more likely to participate in institutions of global 
governance if their status aspirations are recognised: “Chinese and Russian foreign 
policies since the end of the Cold War have been motivated by a consistent objective—
to restore both countries’ great power status.”22 As David A. Lake writes: “It will be the 
interaction between the quest for status by rising powers and the granting of status, 
largely by the United States, that will determine whether states are integrated into the 
existing order or choose to challenge it.”23 Thus, while power shifts have led to 
increased interest in status, this in turn could be seen as simply refocusing scholars on 
some of the foundational concerns of IR. As T.V. Paul, Deborah Welch Larson and 
Wohlforth ask in their recent book on status, key questions in IR include: why rising 
powers seek status, what are the mechanisms of status adjustment and accommodation, 
and whether status aspirations can be accommodated without violence.24 These all point 
to how the study of status can be useful to power transition debates. 
 
It is also timely to take a fresh approach to status in IR because IR scholarship itself is 
increasingly focused on East Asia. Scholars have been particularly interested in the 
question of whether the culture and history of East Asia inclines the region toward a 
more hierarchical vision of international politics than was normally the case in the 
periods of European history that previously laid the groundwork for IR theorising.25 
                                                
22 Larson and Shevchenko, ‘Status Seekers,’ 66. 
23 David A Lake, 'Great Power Hierarchies and Strategies in Twenty-First Century World Politics,' in 
Handbook of International Relations, ed. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A Simmons 
(London: SAGE Publications, 2013), 563. 
24 Paul, Larson, and Wohlforth, Status in World Politics. 
25 See: David C Kang, ‘Getting Asia Wrong,’ International Security 27, no. 4 (2003); David C Kang, 
‘The Theoretical Roots of Hierarchy in International Relations,’ Australian Journal of International 
Affairs 58, no. 3 (2004); Alastair Iain Johnston, ‘What (If Anything) Does East Asia Tell Us About 
International Relations Theory?,’ Annual Review of Political Science 15, no. Journal Article (2012); 
Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, ‘Why Is There No Non-Western International Relations Theory? An 
Introduction,’ International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 7, no. 3 (2007). 
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Whereas core concepts in IR such as the balance of power derived from European 
history, East Asian history for long periods involved a Sinocentric international 
hierarchy. While some scholars have argued that East Asia’s lack of a balance of power 
will lead to instability,26 David Kang points out: “Many scholars are increasingly 
arguing that the international system is actually characterized by inequalities and 
differentiation, not sameness. In this new literature, states are differentiated according to 
functions, specializations, and degrees of authority among them.”27 Kang has argued 
that hierarchy involves a system of international politics based around a central power 
involving shared expectations of rights and responsibilities for both the central and 
subordinate powers. The argument is that shared expectations, experiences and history, 
rather than a balance of power, offset the security dilemma. He says:  
Asian international relations conform more to a pattern of hierarchy than to a pattern of 
balancing. Hierarchy is more stable than realists have allowed, and in international 
relations it is often the absence of hierarchy that leads to conflict.28 
This approach is said to explain real-world situations. For example, Japan does not 
further re-arm to balance China, China and the United States have very different 
approaches to Taiwan, and Vietnam and Korea do not obviously balance China.29 
 
In addition to the two contemporary themes above, status is important to IR because it is 
so useful to key theoretical approaches. One reason why status is, in Jason Davidson’s 
words, “one of the most sought after goods in international politics,”30 is because it is 
often a recognised marker of a state’s power. Indeed status’ “stickiness” saves states the 
                                                
26 Aaron L. Friedberg, ‘Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia,’ International Security 
18, no. 3 (1993). 
27 David C Kang, ‘International Relations Theory and East Asian History: An Overview,’ Journal of East 
Asian Studies 13, no. 2 (2013): 183. 
28 Kang, ‘The Theoretical Roots of Hierarchy in International Relations,’ 339. 
29 David C Kang, 'Hierarchy and Stability in Asian International Relations,' in International Relations 
Theory and the Asia-Pacific (2003), 177. 
30 Jason Davidson, The Origins of Revisionist and Status-Quo States (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2006). 
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need to constantly reaffirm their power.31 On specific theories of realism, the 
fundamental passions involved in the “prestige motive” help explain the fear that 
motivates the security dilemma. As David Markey explains: “Adding the prestige 
motive to the realist security dilemma framework provides a spark behind international 
competition—an underlying reason for the fear which is tragically magnified by an 
inability to achieve lasting security.”32 This helps to explain why a state of war could 
continue even under the defensive realist paradigm of plentiful security.  
 
Constructivist approaches benefit from the use of status to explain how states identify 
themselves and engage with international norms. States can seek various forms of status 
such as membership of valued groups, whether on the grounds of power and wealth or 
of political, economic or cultural affinity. Anne Clunan gives the examples of the 
former such as “ranks of the great powers” or the “developed nations,” and examples of 
the latter include being a “civilized country,” a “market economy,” a member of the 
“Islamic nation,” “Big Brother to all Slavs,” or “the leader of the free world.”33 Status is 
also a driver of norm adoption. Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink give the 
example of Japan being open to endorsing international norms about refugees because it 
is “insecure” about its international political role. They note: “If states seek to enhance 
their reputation or esteem, we would expect states that are insecure about their 
international status or reputation to embrace new international norms most eagerly and 
thoroughly.”34 Using the definitions of this project, that is to say that a state might 
embrace norms in order to build up its general reputation or esteem, which is to say its 
                                                
31 Larson, Paul, and Wohlforth, 'Status and World Order,' 19. 
32 Daniel Markey, ‘Prestige and the Origins of War: Returning to Realism's Roots,’ Security Studies 8, no. 
4 (1999): 165. 
33 Clunan, The Social Construction of Russia's Resurgence, 31. 
34 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,’ 
International Organization 52, no. 4 (1998): 906. 
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prestige (once established as a general belief); the state would then aspire to recognition 
as, say, a “moral exemplar”.35 
 
The significance of investigating status lies in its role in explaining power transitions, in 
IR’s increased interest in the Asia-Pacific region, and in its contribution to core 
questions of IR theory. Yet, as one recent study noted, the concept of status “remains 
murky”, especially in terms of how it becomes recognised.36 Likewise, a review of the 
topic concluded that status “seems to be understudied.”37 As a result, for such an 
important concept as status, it is necessary to turn to the many gaps in the scholarship 
on the issue. 
 
Gaps in the scholarship – unresolved puzzles 
 
Despite the growing importance and prominence of the topic, the IR literature leaves 
key puzzles about status unsolved. Critically, while recent work has highlighted the 
significance of status to IR, there is still very little literature on how status actually 
functions. Broadly speaking, status in IR has been increasingly theorised, but remains 
poorly explained – recent scholarship has aimed to show causal connections between 
status and events, but we still lack laws or hypotheses showing how causation occurs.38 
As Jonathan Renshon puts it: “Although there is considerable agreement within the 
political science discipline and the foreign policy community that status matters in 
                                                
35 The term “moral exemplar” has been used in terms of Indian status aspirations. See: Ian Hall, 'The 
Persistence of Nehruvianism in India’s Strategic Culture,' in Strategic Asia 2016-17: Understanding 
Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific, ed. Ashley J. Tellis, Alison Szalwinski, and Michael Wills (Seattle: 
The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2016), 154. 
36 Thomas J Volgy et al., 'Major Power Status in International Politics,' in Major Powers and the Quest 
for Status in International Politics: Global and Regional Perspectives, ed. Thomas J Volgy, et al. (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 2-3. 
37 Dafoe, Renshon, and Huth, ‘Reputation and Status,’ 389. 
38 Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1997), 9. 
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world affairs, there is little focused research on how and when it matters.”39 The key 
unsolved puzzles that motivate this thesis include: difficulties in demonstrating that 
status is a variable rather than a constant; problems showing that social identity theory 
provides more important causation than IR’s traditional explanations for events; over-
emphasis on conflictual outcomes from status issues; the continued focus on historical 
European data to support hypotheses about status; and the general lack of comparison 
between status explanations and competing explanations for events or outcomes. 
 
The first outstanding puzzle exists because some scholars are so keen to assert the 
importance of status that they treat it as a near-universal factor in IR. The problem is 
that this turns status into a constant, rather than guiding us on how it might work as an 
independent variable or causal factor in outcomes. For example, one scholar has noted 
that “prestige, whether denoted as glory, honour or reputation, is a motive force behind 
the behaviour of individuals, statesmen and nations.”40 According to this, prestige 
should be seen as an underlying factor explaining the beliefs about threat that make 
states ever-concerned about their security. Unfortunately, such an underlying factor 
would be a constant that cannot explain specific policy decisions taken by states in the 
pursuit of their security.41 Unless we can resolve this puzzle, status might be an 
unusable concept: perhaps a desire for status is a universal aspect of human nature that 
we cannot correlate to any specific events.  
 
The second literature gap area concerns the main theory in the field, social identity 
theory, which is under-specified about how social concerns lead to changes in state 
                                                
39 Renshon, ‘Status Deficits and War,’ 514. 
40 Markey, ‘Prestige and the Origins of War,’ 155. 
41 Jacques Hymans uses this argument to question whether a prestige motive can explain the decision of 
states to acquire nuclear weapons. See: Jacques E. C. Hymans, 'Why Do States Acquire Nuclear 
Weapons? Comparing the Cases of India and France,' in Nuclear India in the Twenty-First Century, ed. 
D.R. SarDesai and Raju GC Thomas (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 143. 
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behaviour. IR scholars working on social identity theory point to a base of 
psychological research showing that people tend to identify with their social group and 
wish to see favourable comparisons between their group and other relevant social 
groups. But when it comes to demonstrating a link between the psychology of 
individuals and the behaviour of states, the literature frequently asserts that we should 
assume that decision-makers identify with their state and gain utility from the state’s 
international status.42 For example, social identity theory assumes that decision-makers 
value high national status because it enhances people’s collective self-esteem.43 The 
issue is that this does not explain how or whether decision-makers rank self-esteem 
against traditional standards of national interest such as security or prosperity. 
 
The third major gap in the literature is that much work on status focuses on situations 
where there is a perception a state’s status has not been adequately recognised. Studies 
of this “status inconsistency” too frequently assume that the pursuit of status places 
states at risk of conflict, or at least intensifies their competition and rivalry.44 Some 
studies highlight the risk that states facing status inconsistency will resort to conflict out 
of frustration, while others take the opposite approach and consider whether states 
might engage in conflict in order to increase their status.45 However, this does not 
address the wide range of behaviour that states engage in to increase their status, aside 
from conflict. Looking only at the states that are case study subjects in this thesis, India 
has varied between seeking the status of leader of the non-aligned movement, to being a 
declared nuclear weapons state; China was once (championing the developing world) a 
vociferous opponent of the nuclear nonproliferation regime, but became a supporter of 
                                                
42 Wohlforth, ‘Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War,’ 37. 
43 Larson, Paul, and Wohlforth, 'Status and World Order,' 18. 
44 Renshon provides a table showing eight studies of status inconsistency, all of which have as their 




it; and Japan has variously pursued and stepped back from a campaign to gain a 
permanent seat on the UN Security Council. All these behaviours have been related to 
national status, yet some involve security confrontations and others do not. IR needs a 
concept of status that can take all this behaviour into account. 
 
A fourth issue that has held back progress in this area is that most theoretical studies 
cast back to traditional sources of IR theory, such as power transition and rivalry in 
Europe in the century to 1914.46 Meanwhile country studies of the major rising or 
aspirant powers, such as Japan, India, China, or Russia, seldom engage with this 
theoretical work on status.47 There is a value on an empirical study that focuses an 
examination of the theories of status on the actual behaviour of contemporary rivalrous 
powers. 
 
Overall, the key issue in the existing literature is that there is little analysis of how 
significant a factor status was, if any, compared with other causal factors leading to 
specific policy decisions. Nor is there sufficient examination of the processes that lead 
status considerations to become a major causal explanation for events. While status 
understandings are reached intersubjectively, suggesting each instance is somewhat  
distinct, there is little research about consistencies between episodes of status-seeking 
that could help us identify patterns in status’ role in IR. A key gap in the literature is the 
need to connect IR’s theoretical literature on status with the abundant literature on 
contemporary rising and aspirant powers. Filling such gaps would provide not only 
better theory but research that is closely linked to current policy debates about shifting 
power.  
                                                
46 Examples using 1815-1914 data include Wohlforth (2009) and Renshon (2016). 
47 For example, as of July 2017, a database search showed more than 100 scholarly peer-reviewed articles 
published in the past decade including both “China” and “great power” in their title, but only one of these 




Aim of the project 
 
This thesis is narrowly aimed at exploring causal mechanisms explaining the role of 
status concerns in producing policy change. As the preceding section emphasises, there 
are wide gaps in the literature on status and no single research project could address 
them all. However this study aims to provide a more conceptualised and operational 
account of status, by questioning how status concerns played out as a factor in a series 
of historical case studies. To focus the project further, this thesis is based on the 
distinction drawn above between status and prestige. This definitional distinction lets 
this project home in on the link between decision-makers’ concerns about status on one 
hand, and prestige-building activity on the other. This makes the project specifically 
about building a working model of decision-makers’ self-perceptions of status, and 
what results from it. The project looks specifically at this point of linkage to identify the 
circumstances in which status plays a causal role in IR.  
 
As the explanation of research design sets out in more detail below, the aim of this 
project necessitates an eclectic research methodology. This is because the project is 
trying to connect individual beliefs (decision-makers’ concerns about their state’s 
status) with policy outcomes (prestige-building activity). A study of beliefs defies a 
purely positivist methodology, and the project does not attempt a quantitative analysis 
of status-related behaviour. It requires an interpretive approach that accepts that 
individuals have agency yet are influenced by historical inheritances and the dilemmas 
of modifying those as events demand.48 Having said this, policy outcomes become the 
                                                
48 Mark Bevir, Oliver Daddow, and Ian Hall, ‘Introduction: Interpreting British Foreign Policy,’ The 
British Journal of Politics and International Relations 15, no. 2 (2013): 167. 
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stuff of historical events, which call for empirical study – most likely through the 
comparison of cases in order to find generalisable commonalities. This combination of 
the interpretive and the empirical opens up space for conceptual innovation.  
 
Given the specific focus here, it is worth clarifying a number of matters that the thesis is 
not trying to address. First, the mechanism of interest is decision-makers’ perceptions of 
their own states’ status. Certainly, status arises intersubjectively, so people’s beliefs 
about their state’s status necessarily incorporate judgements about what other actors 
believe. But the purpose of using case studies is to explore what decision-makers chose 
to do for their own states, not to show whether a state gained or lost status from events. 
In other words, we are interested in when decision makers believed that a particular 
course of action would result in an increase in their state’s prestige, but not whether this 
belief turned out to be correct. 
 
Second, the project is not primarily about testing social identity theory and its 
connection to status. This thesis builds on social identity theory, but aims to work on 
causal mechanisms that are more specific than most of this theoretical work published 
to date. Third, the project does not try to rework debates about whether status is pursued 
for instrumental or intrinsic motives. These debates run the risk of circularity, because 
being recognised for high status may give a state influence, which is a practical benefit, 
yet at the same time having a great degree of influence may also be psychologically 
rewarding. Recognising that such attributes are inextricable, one study of status notes 
that: “Seemingly irrational psychological and social processes may be the very 
mechanisms by which strategic commitments are constructed.”49 Finally, this project is 
not trying to recontest debates about whether status compared with other causes was the 
                                                
49 Dafoe, Renshon, and Huth, ‘Reputation and Status,’ 383. 
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determining factor in cases. It will research cases where the literature already assumes 
status was an important factor for consideration. Rather than trying to champion status 
as a cause, the project is interested in how concern about status affected decision-
makers’ perceptions, so it assumes that status is just one of several factors that lead to 
final outcomes. 
 
As well as developing new causal explanations for the role of status, this thesis has 
secondary policy and empirical aims. It looks at the nuances of foreign policy decisions 
made in states that are currently of key relevance in debates about the power transition 
underway in the Asia-Pacific. The empirical side of the thesis will contribute to our 
understanding of foreign policy decisions in key states of interest, in addition to 





The starting point of this thesis is that decision-makers place a value on possessing high 
status, and they support this by pursuing prestige-building policies consistent with that 
valuation. Specifically, a high-status position in a social hierarchy can be described as a 
status role – the role itself may vary widely, but invariably involves the translation of 
accumulated prestige into a recognised social role perceived as delivering status benefits 
including rights, respect and the expectation of deference. These perceived benefits are 
the basis for states’ valuations.  
 
The central argument of the thesis is that the onset of a “status crisis” can force 
decision-makers to reassess these status valuations. This leads to a point of variation 
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where the crisis changes decision-makers’ perceptions about how securely the state 
holds its valued status roles, and this causes decision-makers to change policies to 
compensate, by increasing the level of prestige-building activity. The research 
conducted for this project, including interviewing practitioners involved with, and close 
to, policy decisions made at the time in each country, highlighted the way that this 
variation takes place through three major phases. These are identified as: normal status-
seeking; the status crisis; and enhanced prestige-earning. Fieldwork on each of the three 
case studies found these distinct phases in operation, and they are described 
conceptually here. 
 
Normal status-seeking: The key to this baseline phase is that decision-makers form 
beliefs not simply about how high their state’s standing should be, but about the specific 
status roles that are valuable to them. Prestige, for decision-makers, meets the definition 
of a general belief by actors that the state has positive qualities, but the nature of those 
qualities are those that are relevant to upholding the valued status role. This explains 
starkly differing policy outcomes, because a state seeking the status of autonomous 
major power might find prestige in the pursuit of material power such as military 
capabilities, while a state that saw its status as tied up with its legitimacy might even  
sacrifice military capabilities. The reasons a state settles upon particular definitions of 
status may result from a combination of history, geography and culture, and the term 
“strategic culture” is one way of describing a state’s orientation towards certain status 
roles. However, the argument of this thesis is that once states have established status 
goals, they support those goals through appropriate policies. The essential argument is 
that this period of normal status-seeking involves policies selected according to risk- 
benefit analyses. Decision-makers draw upon beliefs and traditions to decide the value 
of particular status roles, and therefore what costs should be paid in seeking them. 
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These costs may be financial, domestic-political or internationally-political. Decision-
makers set parameters to earn enough prestige to support status interests, but these 
policies are generally sustainable and low-risk in nature. 
 
The status crisis: The second phase takes place when decision-makers become aware 
that a certain status role has become threatened. The cases studied in this project 
showed this realisation most starkly when the threat to status was unexpected and put 
decision-makers under almost immediate pressure. This thesis calls the phase a “status 
crisis” because it conforms closely to classic definitions of crisis in IR – as Janice Gross 
Stein writes: “Crisis has traditionally been defined as a threat to basic values that 
simultaneously creates a sense of urgency and uncertainty among policy makers.”50 The 
key causal connection between this crisis and outcomes lies in the vital role crises play 
in crystallising beliefs about changed circumstances. Robert Jervis sees this arising 
because the volume of discrepant information generated by a crisis is too great for 
decision-makers to absorb into existing worldviews: “In politics, sudden events 
influence images more than do slow developments.”51 A crisis, in other words, is a 
catalyst for reassessing foreign policy goals and strategies.52 In this case, the crisis 
triggers a reassessment of how intensively the state needs to acquire prestige in order to 
support its valued status roles.  
 
Enhanced prestige-earning: The final phase is where decision-makers carry out policies 
in line with the reassessment forced by the status crisis. The key to this phase is that the 
objective – the valued status role – remains the same, but decision-makers believe that 
                                                
50 Janice Gross Stein, ‘Crisis Management: Looking Back to Look Forward,’ Political Psychology 29, no. 
4 (2008): 554. 
51 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton University Press, 
1976), 308. 
52 Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1981), 5. 
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due to the threat to this role, the state must earn additional prestige in order to secure 
recognition of this status. The essential change in policy is that decision-makers shift 
their calculus on the risk-return trade-off required. Faced with greater threats to valued 
status roles, decision-makers accept greater risks in the policies they pursue to support 
them. An essential finding is that a new calculus in regards to enhancing prestige-
earning does not necessarily mean conflict with other states. In fact, because status is a 
socially derived good, the findings support a more plausible theory that states most 
often act within existing systems of order to protect their status.53 
 
A key implication of this main argument is that discussion of status, crises and 
dissatisfaction should not be overly focused on armed conflict. While it is true that some 
states will have security-related status concerns that may lead to armed confrontation, 
status relates to many other areas of international relations. In this thesis, the case 
studies broaden our knowledge base for analysing status crises of different kinds, from 





Within the broader research theme – analysing the role of status in Asian inter-state 
relations – this thesis focuses on a specific research puzzle of when and how concerns 
about status lead to changes in policy. As the project was trying to identify why these 
status concerns may be important in some cases rather than others, this called for an 
analytically eclectic research design. This allows for the project being both about beliefs 
and perceptions, and about empirical evidence that these beliefs and perceptions lead to 
                                                
53 We may say that status aspirations often lead to “pro-social” rather than antisocial outcomes. 
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policy outcomes. As will be explained below, this places the project broadly in the 
context of the neoclassical realist research agenda. 
 
On one hand, this study needs to describe when and how decision-makers think about 
their state’s status, develop beliefs about that status being valuable, and perceive threats 
to such a valued position. This meant that elements of interpretivism would be 
important to the study, because it ultimately was concerned not so much with the facts 
of historical events, but with explaining how decision-makers thought about those 
events and chose to respond to them. On the other hand, the project needed to identify 
evidence that when these status concerns became critical, decision-makers take action in 
the form of policies to enhance their prestige-building. Identifying empirical examples 
of this decision-making process would confirm the broad hypothesis, but would also 
provide valuable information about how exactly status concerns are translated into 
policy choices. For this reason the project used a case study method, as the project’s key 
concern was about how status functions. As John Gerring notes, “case studies, if well-
constructed, allow one to peer into the box of causality to the intermediate causes lying 
between some cause and its purported effect.”54 This called for process-tracing cases in 
detail. It uses a small number of cases, and through induction aims to propose new 
causal explanations that account for all the cases.55 
 
Approach to the research 
 
Essentially, the thesis is trying to identify whether changes to decision-makers’ status 
perceptions cause states to adopt new policies to build prestige and thereby protect 
                                                
54 John Gerring, ‘What Is a Case Study and What Is It Good For?,’ American Political Science Review 98, 
no. 2 (2004): 348. 
55 Herbert J Rubin and Irene S Rubin, Qualitative Interviewing: The Art of Hearing Data, 2nd ed. (SAGE 
Publications, 2005), 240-41.  
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status roles. This means that the thesis is about the choices of decision-makers, and in 
turn about how to assess the decision-makers’ key beliefs. These beliefs include 
whether their state’s status matters to them, whether that status is under any threat, and 
whether they should do anything about it. Thus, the project is a study of elite self-
perceptions and their role as a causal mechanism in status-related events. As a result, 
this is a theoretically pluralist project that combines interpretive methodology with a 
case study analysis of causal connections.56 Because the case study analysis is a study of 
perceptions, it is very much informed by the neoclassical realist research program. 
 
The interpretivist methodology is important because traditionally positivist political 
science methods have run into difficulty studying beliefs and social understandings. 
One recent review of the IR literature on status noted the methodological challenges of 
studying status, especially when it comes to distinguishing status motivations from 
others such as material interests:  
A large body of contemporary work—spanning constructivist, realist, and rationalist 
approaches, formal and informal theory, statistical and qualitative evidence, 
experimental (field, survey, and laboratory) and observational designs—continues to 
investigate reputation and status. However, studying these concepts in a scientific 
manner faces a number of challenges intrinsic to the study of beliefs and motives more 
generally. Beliefs and motives are not directly observable, are subject to psychological 
and strategic biases in their expression, and are theoretically complex and context 
specific; furthermore, their behavioural implications are subject to substantial selection 
effects. Perhaps as a result, a coherent conceptual framework for these phenomena has 
remained elusive.57 
Noting the above, this project (in Chapter 3) sets out its own conceptual framework, 
clarifying what it means when it argues that actors accumulate, assess and value 
prestige and status. 
 
                                                
56 For a general defence of theoretical pluralism, see Jeffrey T. Checkel, 'Theoretical Pluralism in Ir: 
Possibilities and Limits,' in Handbook of International Relations, ed. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, 
and Beth A Simmons (London: SAGE Publications, 2013), 235-36. 
57 Dafoe, Renshon, and Huth, ‘Reputation and Status,’ 372. 
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This thesis understands the interpretive approach to be a focus on the meanings and 
beliefs that frame actions. The thesis researches the beliefs and motives of those who 
are involved in each case study, and it assumes that these people act on their beliefs and 
preferences. The key to approaching the puzzle in this thesis is that while the project 
searches for a causal connection between events, the events themselves have to be 
interpreted. As described above, the key to the events is how decision-makers believed 
they mattered, in this case in terms of national status. Thus this is an example of an 
interpretive research design that “does not start from a cause-and-effect puzzle, but 
rather engages with a very different type of puzzle that can be described as an 
ontological puzzle,”58 that is, one that searches for the meaning of the events observed. 
 
While an interpretive approach is essential to this subject matter, it is important to stress 
that this project does not embark on the approach that Mark Bevir and R.A.W. Rhodes 
call post-structuralist or postmodern.59 The thesis assumes that while people cannot 
escape all social influence, they can act creatively, and the project also assumes that 
decision-makers can select their beliefs and actions. For example, the thesis accepts the 
importance of traditions, a key element of interpretivism, but also allows individual 
choice:  
People necessarily arrive at their beliefs, and perform their actions, against the 
background of a tradition that influences those beliefs and actions, but they are also 
creative agents who have the capacity to reason and act innovatively against the 
background of that tradition.60   
New beliefs pose dilemmas for existing beliefs, but tradition allows for the possibility 
that people adapt and develop their heritage, as they try to organise their beliefs to fit 
their own notion of best belief. Thus this study assumes people retain agency, which is 
                                                
58 Christopher K. Lamont, Research Methods in International Relations (Los Angeles: Sage, 2015), 43. 
59 Mark Bevir and R.A.W Rhodes, 'Interpretive Theory,' in Theory and Methods in Political Science, ed. 
David Marsh and Gerry Stoker (Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 139-40. 
60 Mark Bevir, Oliver Daddow, and Ian Hall, 'Introduction,' in Interpreting Global Security, ed. Mark 
Bevir, Oliver Daddow, and Ian Hall (Routledge, 2014), 6. 
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one reason the case study approach and the search for causal connection is relevant to 
this project. 
 
Some interpretive approaches are not concerned with causal analysis, instead focusing 
on “elucidating the meaning of behaviour” or critiquing use of power.61 However, the 
goal set by this project is to explain policy change. Even when it concerns events driven 
by actors’ beliefs, this thesis is seeking “at least some evidence that the actors actually 
perceive the benefits and acted for the reasons posited by the theory.”62 In addition, 
Christopher Lamont’s analysis of interpretive research design helps explain why this 
project’s theoretical pluralism includes the use of interpretivism as well as empiricism. 
Lamont notes that on the one hand, a project seeking to determine why wars occur 
would be empirical, while one trying to understand the social meaning underlying 
warfare would be interpretive.63 On the other hand, he recognises that there can be 
overlap between the two approaches, as when constructivists use empirical or positivist 
methods to argue that norms and ideas have explanatory power.64 This thesis is very 
much in the position that interpretation is necessary to understand what decision-makers 
believe status means, but empirical methods such as comparative case studies are 
required to study the link between these beliefs and real-world outcomes. 
 
In taking an eclectic approach, this thesis is informed not only by interpretivism but also 
by the work of IR positivists studying perceptions as a variable contributing to policy 
outcomes. For example, Robert Jervis bases his key arguments on the idea that beliefs 
                                                
61 Gary Goertz and James Mahoney, A Tale of Two Cultures : Qualitative and Quantitative Research in 
the Social Sciences (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2012), 4-5. 
62 Craig Parsons, 'Constructivism and Interpretive Theory,' in Theory and Methods in Political Science, 
ed. David Marsh and Gerry Stoker (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 85-86. 
63 Lamont, Research Methods in International Relations, 39-40. 
64 Ibid., 48, note 9. 
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and perceptions can assume the status of reality.65 In this tradition of research, 
sometimes called neoclassical realism, perceptions may be seen as a medium-term 
variable, or as a key intervening variable, between states’ material power and policy 
outcomes.66 While the political science methodology is quite different, in practical 
terms this approach covers remarkably similar ground to that of interpretivists. This is 
highlighted in a recent volume on neoclassical realism’s theoretical underpinnings: 
[Neoclassical realism] stresses the primacy of the international system. States construct 
foreign policy with an eye to the external environment above all other considerations, as 
realists maintain. Whether and how they respond to international challenges may be 
affected by other variables, be they domestic political variables of the type emphasized 
by liberals or ideational or cultural variables advanced by constructivists...neoclassical 
realism is a realist subset of eclectic or multiparadigmatic theories.67 
In this sense, while neoclassical realism is a distinct perspective, in line with eclectic 
approaches its emphasis is on explanatory power rather than theoretical parsimony for 
its own sake. 
 
Approaches to perception cover three issues of particular relevance. First, as Gideon 
Rose notes, the study of perceptions calls for a detailed process-tracing approach to 
historical cases: “Analysts wanting to understand any particular case need to do justice 
to the full complexity of the causal chain linking relative material power and foreign 
policy outputs.”68 Second, like recent scholarship on status, this approach is useful for 
the study of power transition. For example, Aaron Friedberg has observed that while 
power transition theories assume that states can self-assess their international standing, 
this is difficult and it is rare for decision-makers to transcend accepted ways of thinking 
                                                
65 Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, 8-10, 401. A similar approach to the  
question is to see it as one of cognitive processes, whereby individuals’ differing processing of 
information explains varying policy recommendations concerning the same objective circumstances: see 
Deborah Welch Larson, Origins of Containment : A Psychological Explanation (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1985), 22. 
66 See respectively: William C. Wohlforth, ‘The Perception of Power: Russia in the Pre-1914 Balance,’ 
World Politics 39, no. 3 (1987); Rose, ‘Neoclassical Realism.’ 
67 Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell, Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics. 
68 Rose, ‘Neoclassical Realism,’ 164. 
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in order to recognise changes in relative power. Friedberg notes that the problem is that 
power transition theories tend to neglect the "intervening mechanisms of perception, 
analysis and decision.”69 Third, this project has clear parallels with Rose’s argument 
that policy change results from the gradual diffusion of intellectual developments, 
rivalry over perceived power, or perceptual ‘shocks’ making decision-makers aware of 
long-term power trends.70 Of particular interest is Robert Jervis’ argument that 
perceptual shocks require unambiguous information to challenge established theories, 
making international crises important as catalysts allowing leaders to reassess the basis 
of policy.71  
 
Use of case studies 
 
While this thesis deals with the interpretive domain of individual beliefs, it is also a 
study of the effects and outcomes of these beliefs. In particular, as discussed above, this 
thesis is trying to identify a causal process by which beliefs about status lead to 
outcomes. A case study method is necessary because, as John Gerring notes: “Causal 
arguments depend not only on measuring causal effects. They also presuppose the 
identification of a causal mechanism.”72 Case studies are a well-established technique in 
political science for studying events where multiple, often interdependent, factors have 
plausible causal value. The identification of a causal mechanism becomes possible 
through an inductive comparison of commonalities between cases. As Andrew Lamont 
                                                
69 Aaron L. Friedberg, The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 1895-1905 
(Princeton University Press, 1988), 9. 
70 Rose, ‘Neoclassical Realism,’ 159. 
71 Robert Jervis, ‘Hypotheses on Misperception,’ World Politics 20, no. 3 (1968): 455-56. 
72 Gerring, ‘What Is a Case Study and What Is It Good For?,’ 348. 
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points out, “case studies do something large quantitative studies cannot. They can help 
generate new hypotheses.”73 
 
Within the case studies, the approach used in this project was in line with Jeffrey T. 
Checkel’s analytically eclectic approach to process tracing. Checkel explains that 
process tracing is about identifying intervening causal processes between independent 
variables and their outcomes: “Between the beginning (independent variable[s]) and end 
(effect of dependent variable), the researcher looks for a series of theoretically predicted 
intermediate steps.”74 Checkel notes that effective process tracing requires some 
epistemological pluralism, using both positivist and post-positivist methods. This focus 
on causal mechanisms – mechanisms operating at an analytical level below all-
encompassing theories – gives fine-grained explanations.75 Indeed, interpretivist 
approaches may involve reconstruction of historical episodes, where the analysis may 
use valid causal inference, just as positivists may look at the same episodes but put 
greater emphasis on assumptions about rationality, causal relationships or parsimonious 
theories. As King, Keohane and Verba have written, “all good research can be 
understood – indeed is best understood – to derive from the same underlying logic of 
inference.”76 
 
                                                
73 Lamont, Research Methods in International Relations, 129. To reiterate briefly, this project uses John 
Gerring’s definition: “A case study is best defined as an in-depth study of a single unit (a relatively 
bounded phenomenon) where the scholar’s aim is to elucidate features of a larger class of similar 
phenomena.” See Gerring, ‘What Is a Case Study and What Is It Good For?,’ 341. 
74 Jeffrey T. Checkel, It’s the Process Stupid! Process Tracing in the Study of European and International 
Politics (ARENA Centre for European Studies, Working Paper 26, 2005). 
75 Jeffrey T. Checkel, 'Process Tracing,' in Qualitative Methods in International Relations: A Pluralist 
Guide, ed. Audie Klotz and Deepa Prakash (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 114-15. 
76 Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry : Scientific Inference in 
Qualitative Research (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994), 4. 
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Case study selection 
 
This introduction has emphasised that there is now a good deal of scholarship 
contending that status matters in IR, but this project seeks to find causes to help explain 
when and why status matters in shaping policy decisions. Because of this, case study 
selection for the project was about finding historical episodes that would yield a good 
prospect of revealing the causal power of status. In the terminology of qualitative 
research methods, this meant finding “most likely cases” – that is, cases where status 
was already most likely to be a causal factor. If, based on the existing research, we 
could be reasonably sure that status was in play in the case, it would then be possible to 
study the chain of events, and from commonalities between cases begin to induce 
distinct processes by which status works. It should be emphasised that this is not a 
matter of “selecting on the dependent variable,” because the project is not trying to find 
whether status played a role in events. The project is about how concerns about status 
led to changes in prestige-building activity.  
     
The process of case study selection started out from the notion that “most likely” cases 
would be found among states that see the greatest costs and benefits from changes in 
their status – that is, major powers, or aspirants to the role of major power. The 
following literature review chapter goes into more detail about the IR literature on 
major (or “great”) powers. Suffice to say that, as Thomas Volgy and colleagues explain 
it, states exert such efforts to gain or maintain major power status because the latter 
reduces the cost of exercising material power, provides legitimacy for a wider range of 
foreign activities, and can bolster domestic political support.77 Noting that status 
                                                
77 Thomas J Volgy et al., 'Status Considerations in International Politics and the Rise of Regional Powers,' 
in Status in World Politics, ed. T. V. Paul, Deborah Welch Larson, and William C Wohlforth (Cambridge 
University Press, 2014), 60-61. 
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attribution concerns general beliefs (as defined above), the aim is to become recognised 
as a major power, after which observers will have to accept that other members of the 
group are likely to defer to the major power: “Major power status attribution is 
indicative of expectations that these very strong and determined actors will exercise 
leadership on a variety of issues and conflicts central to international politics.”78 
Moreover, while any major power will be keen to maintain its status, we may see yet 
more concern about status among rising powers. This is because as a general belief, 
status is only valuable when it is recognised, and the question of recognition is still very 
much under contestation for new or rising powers.79 
 
A second element in case selection was to hold the time period constant, which let the 
project study differing cases under similar conditions of international structure. The 
decade of the 1990s was an attractive time period because the upheavals immediately 
after the end of the Cold War broke down the long-established bipolar distribution of 
power and status and threw up the potential for states to significantly change their 
relative status.80 Holding the international structure constant then made it appropriate to 
select one case study per state, so that the thesis could examine how states faced up to 
different challenges with varying responses. It was in turn practical for a doctoral 
project to attempt three country studies. Volgy, et al, are typical in naming the United 
States, the United Kingdom, France, the USSR/Russia, Germany, China, and Japan as 
major powers in the post-Second World War era (they use Correlates of War statistics), 
while Brazil and India stand out as key aspirants toward that status.81 Out of these, 
                                                
78 Volgy et al., 'Major Power Status in International Politics,' 10. 
79 Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko, 'Managing Rising Powers: The Role of Status 
Concerns,' in Status in World Politics, ed. T. V. Paul, Deborah Welch Larson, and William C. Wohlforth 
(Cambridge University Press, 2014), 41. 
80 See for example: Kenneth N. Waltz, ‘Structural Realism after the Cold War,’ International Security 25, 
no. 1 (2000). 
81 Volgy et al., 'Major Power Status in International Politics.'; Barry Buzan, The United States and the 
Great Powers: World Politics in the Twenty-First Century (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004). 
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China, Japan and India were all seen as rising powers during the relevant period, in 
which each of them showed a wide range of foreign policy changes. They offered an 
abundant range of historical incidents in which status was already considered a likely 
causal factor.82 
 
In terms of the specific historical episodes chosen, a key factor was to select cases that 
were widely considered to be status related, but which also showed variation in policy 
responses. This was intended to address gaps in the literature about status-seeking that 
did not lead to armed conflict. The incongruence between the existing literature and the 
observed behaviour of these states suggested a need for better theory about how states 
deal with status concerns. For this project, the cases were chosen as follows: for Japan, 
the bid for a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council showed a state 
seeking status through international institutional privileges; for China, its decision to 
join the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was an example of pursuing status 
through legitimacy; and for India, its Pokhran II nuclear test explosions in 1998 were 
examples of a state seeking status through material gains. This allowed the cases to 
highlight a major puzzle in the field: if each of these states were seeking status – 
including status as major powers – why were their policy decisions so different? 
 
An outcome of the above choice of the three cases was that the subject of this thesis was 
“the role of status in Asia-Pacific international relations,” and indeed that accurately 
describes the research conducted. However, the research question was not confined to 
Asia-Pacific cases, and it is hoped that the findings can be generalised to any region of 
                                                
82 The theme is can be seen in the focus of relevant books on the IR of each country, for example: 
Reinhard Drifte, Japan's Quest for a Permanent Security Council Seat : A Matter of Pride or Justice?, St 
Antony's Series (Macmillan, 2000); Yong Deng, China's Struggle for Status: The Realignment of 
International Relations (Cambridge University Press, 2008); Baldev Raj Nayar and T. V. Paul, India in 
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the world. The one area where the Asia-Pacific aspect is important is that this project 
was always concerned about contemporary debates about international power shifts. 
The choice of three Asia-Pacific cases has advantages in terms of topicality and the 
project’s empirical contribution to knowledge of the international relations of the three 
countries studied. Thus the Asia-Pacific focus is of practical benefit, but should not 
narrow the applicability of this project’s conceptual findings. 
 
Case analysis methods and methodology 
 
The research of each case study involved process-tracing, focused on elite decision-
makers’ perceptions of their state’s prestige and status and its effects on policy debates. 
In line with the approach of Andrew Bennett and Jeffrey Checkel, this thesis avoids the 
terminology of ‘intervening’ variables, and instead focuses on process-tracing as 
defined as “the analysis of evidence on processes, sequences, and conjunctures of 
events within a case for the purposes of either developing or testing hypotheses about 
causal mechanisms that might causally explain the case.”83 Bennett and Checkel also 
note that despite differing styles of reasoning, process-tracing can be compatible with 
interpretive analysis. Even though any study of mutually constitutive phenomena, such 
as international status, leads to the problem of distinguishing events where agents or 
wider structures are driving the process, a pragmatic approach to interpretivism will still 
seek out instances where agents contest social structures.84 Similarly, Vincent Pouliot 
points out that while the cause behind any social ‘fact’ is actors’ beliefs that it is real, 
                                                
83 Andrew Bennett and Jeffrey T. Checkel, 'Process Tracing: From Philosophical Roots to Best Practices,' 
in Process Tracing: From Metaphor to Analytic Tool, ed. Andrew Bennett and Jeffrey T. Checkel 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 7. 
84 Ibid., 15. 
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researchers can take a practical approach provided they are aware that ‘causation’ is 
really an instance of ‘constitutive analysis’.85  
 
The actual work of process tracing involved a review of published material and primary 
sources such as news reports and speeches, combined with fresh interviews with 
decision-makers and experts. As the case studies were chosen as ‘most likely’ ones for 
revealing status in operation, they each presented an abundance of published material 
which was useful for assembling the detailed steps of process tracing. This was 
important because the purpose of this thesis was not to reveal basic historical narrative. 
The intention throughout the project was that the cases presented a good deal of 
narrative and factual information, which could then be examined through the lens of the 
research framework outlined here in order to answer the research question of exactly 
when and how do status concerns effect policy decisions. 
 
Aside from published material, the sources used varied between case studies. The Japan 
case study used Japanese government reports and contemporary newspaper reports, 
combined with 11 interviews. The interviewees included all but one of the surviving 
Japanese ambassadors to the United Nations. The China case study used detailed reports 
on arms control negotiations published by the Acronym Institute, as well as officially-
backed English language sources such as the Beijing Review. In China, only five 
interviews were possible, but these included arms control experts who had worked as 
negotiators in the events of the case study. The Indian case study used local journalistic 
accounts of the Pokhran II tests (which have generated a huge amount of literature 
inside and outside of India), but also gained a great deal from personal memoirs of key 
protagonists. This was joined with 10 interviews, which included retired high-ranking 
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officials who were either directly involved in, or were close to and often influential 
upon, the policy decisions made at the time.  
 
The elite interviews conducted in each case proved to be enormously important. As 
noted, in each case study it was possible to interview individuals who had been 
personally involved in the historical decisions concerned. The interviews were 
conducted with the full understanding that they would inevitably convey the biases and 
interests of the interviewee.86 It was also anticipated that while the interviews were 
semi-structured, with common question themes across the three cases, interviewees 
would divert them to “something which sounds like a discussion but is really a quasi-
monologue stimulated by understanding comments.”87 However, the latter tendency 
proved to be exactly the strength of using interviews. Because the key interviewees had 
first-hand knowledge of events, they were able to shift the focus towards themes that 
were not necessarily obvious from reviewing published material and written accounts. 
This shift was precisely what allowed the construction of the central argument of the 
thesis that the onset of a “status crisis” causes states to respond with enhanced prestige-
building efforts.  
 
Analysis of the interviews involved weighing different versions of events to gain key 
plausible explanations. The project searched for “syntheses of understandings that come 
about by combining different individuals’ detailed reports of a particular event or 
cultural issue.”88 By observing the commonalities and differences between the cases and 
the policy outcomes, the study inductively arrived at initial theoretical propositions 
                                                
86 William S. Harvey, ‘Strategies for Conducting Elite Interviews,’ Qualitative Research 11, no. 4 (2011): 
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specifying how and when status is likely to be a factor in foreign policy outcomes. 
These initial propositions may be useful in other cases where status is a factor in 
international relations. To this end, the research question driving the thesis is: “What 




Outline of the thesis 
 
This thesis presents a working model of status, set out in the central argument above, 
and develops this across six further chapters: setting the project in the context of IR 
scholarship, outlining concepts necessary to support the central argument, showing how 
the model was demonstrated in three historical cases, and explaining the findings and 
their implications in a conclusion.  
 
The central argument of this project was built up from the empirical findings, centring 
at first on the accounts of interviewees of varying policy settings in order to achieve 
recognition of valuable status roles. It was clear that the accounts of these policymakers 
and experts were consistent with the definition above of status as a general belief giving 
rise to expectations of deference, and it was also clear that they believed that 
appropriate policies would build a case for achieving status recognition. From there it 
was possible to define the policy process as “prestige-building” as part of overall aim of 
“status-seeking”. The three phases became evident when interviewees, in describing the 
historical events, emphasised the emergence of threats that forced a change in status 
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perceptions, and that major policy decisions had been the result. This middle “status 
crisis” phase became central to this thesis as the causal driver of policy change. 
 
The thesis sets out how the central argument was reached and how it manifested itself in 
historical episodes. The first chapter has started the process, outlining the major puzzles 
and the aim of the project. It has provided a taste of the big ideas of the thesis, such as 
prestige and status being “general” or higher-order beliefs, which makes a considerable 
difference to how states believe they should behave to be recognised for these qualities, 
as well as how they would measure them. The introduction also set out the research 
methodology. The latter explained that as a study of both beliefs and policy outcomes, 
the project uses a theoretically pluralist approach informed by the neoclassical realist 
research program.  
 
The second chapter situates the project in the context of the existing literature. While 
this chapter provides an overall literature review, its main aim is to assess the strengths 
and weaknesses of the literature and explain what is and is not relevant to a new project 
in the field. The literature review finds an extensive role for status in traditional IR 
research programs including realism, the role of major powers, and hierarchy, and it 
reviews the recent status “turn” in IR, it concludes that the gaps noted above are still an 
issue. By proposing one working model for status concerns as a causal factor in policy, 
this project is addressing just one of these outstanding gaps.  
 
The third chapter is a conceptual framework for the project. This introduction has 
outlined the central argument of the thesis, but due to the limited range of theory in this 
field, the argument requires a fresh conceptual explanation in order to succeed. There 
are three parts to the conceptual framework. First, it develops the definition of prestige 
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and status that are being discussed in this thesis, including how states measure it and 
what kinds of pay-offs are expected from gaining it. Second, it proposes ways that states 
perceive their own status situation. This self-perception is the key vehicle by which this 
thesis argues that status works as an independent variable or causal factor leading to 
changes in national policy. Third, it explains the context for states making cost-benefit 
analyses about prestige-earning activity.  
 
The third, fourth and fifth chapters deal with the empirical case studies, on Japan, China 
and India respectively. The thesis has aimed for some consistency across the case 
studies. The first sub-chapters for each case study address in turn the general literature 
on each state and its national status, and then the existing explanations in the literature 
for the events of each case study. The second sub-chapters then each have three parts: 
national policies toward the problem in question; the onset of a “status crisis”; and 
decisions to resolve the crisis.  
 
In its concluding chapter, this thesis analyses case study findings and assesses their 
implications for research in IR. It proposes that status is more than a constant national 
motive, and it is applicable to far more political situations than conflict and war. The 
policymakers and other practitioners interviewed in this research considered status 
crises as real events with visible, qualitative impacts. Status was something to be 
pursued, by means that fitted their countries particular context, goals, and place in 
international society. Understanding status and its actual impacts on state behaviour is 
important for a world where the traditional hierarchy is in flux. This project provides a 
new window into status-seeking as seen by experts in three of the most important 
powers in Asia-Pacific IR. 
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2. SITUATING THE THESIS IN THE LITERATURE 
 
 
Status is a pervasive theme in International Relations, spanning Thucydides to 
contemporary writers on Asia-Pacific affairs. However, there is no one literature on 
status – it is both an ancient topic of philosophy, and a new wave of research emerging 
in just the past decade. It is better to understand that status is such an enduring subject 
of interest because IR, however materially or socially focused, has always been 
concerned about international relationships of respect and deference. What changes over 
time are the ways these things are studied: writers and scholars have turned their interest 
variously from the desire of individuals for rank; to the perceptions of power; the role of 
great powers; and the quest for social recognition of one’s values, among many other 
topics.  
 
This thesis proposes that major foreign policy decisions were influenced by 
considerations of status. This chapter provides definitions, highlights the theoretical 
context of the thesis and identifies gaps in the existing literature, but more importantly it 
helps clarify the IR problem we are trying to solve. Even if status has been an enduring 
theme of interest to IR, its role and function has been perceived very differently by 
writers and schools of thought. The major contribution of this chapter, therefore, is to 
identify conceptions of status relevant to the problems of this thesis, and gaps in the 
literature that this thesis will aim to fill. To foreshadow the conclusion, this thesis finds 
the driving force of status comes from it being a general belief about an actor’s position 
in a social hierarchy, which sets up expectations about whether that actor will defer to 
others or be deferred to. This contrasts with understandings of status as inherent to 
actors’ group identity and related self-esteem, but the overlap is such that we have to 
fully understand the latter as well. As a result, this chapter consists of a broad overview 
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of the literature, before providing an assessment of the ideas most important to the 
thesis topic.   
 
This chapter serves three purposes: to define terms, to survey the existing literature on 
status in IR, and to explain the parts of the literature that will or will not be the focus of 
the project. The definitions are important for explaining why and how the project uses 
key terms such as prestige and status. The survey of the literature looks at status as it 
has appeared across IR: the contribution of canonical writers and classical realists to the 
foundations of IR; the role of hierarchy in IR, as seen in the roles of major powers and 
in authority relationships; and the recent “turn” in IR to scholarship specifically on 
status, which frequently applies social identity theory this field. The final part of the 
chapter explains that there are parts of the literature that specifically underpin the thesis, 
while other parts appear less certain – for the most part, this thesis does not reject 
particular arguments, but it does not see them filling outstanding gaps. Those gaps 
particularly involve demonstrating a role for status concerns as a cause of policy 
change, so the chapter then links ahead to a separate conceptual framework and then to 





This section makes a functional distinction between relevant terms, but it should be 
stressed at the outset that many people use the same terms without such distinctions. In 
everyday usage, political leaders and decision-makers are likely to use many terms 
interchangeably. However, it is useful to clarify definitions as, even when we look at 
real-world usage of the terms, we can see they play particular roles in IR. If anything, 
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the overlap and similarities between the terms might be more important than the 
distinctions, because they let us bring together different traditions and schools of 
thinking in IR, under the single heading of “status”.   
 
The central terms of this thesis are prestige and status: 
 
Prestige is a general belief that an actor has positive qualities. Some definitions given in 
the literature are that it is “public recognition of admired achievements or qualities,”1 “a 
belief that one has a reputation for a positive trait,”2 or simply “recognition of 
importance.”3 O’Neill goes into more detail, saying:  
A party has prestige with a group for a certain quality if (a) the members generally 
believe that they generally believe that the party has the quality, (b) they generally 
believe that they see the quality as desirable, and (c) they generally believe on account 
of the considerations in (a) and (b) that the party holds power with the group.4 
O’Neill’s definition is useful because it highlights that prestige is a belief about beliefs, 
that is to say a higher-order belief. These kinds of beliefs are discussed below. His 
definition also points out that prestige is generally taken to involve positive qualities – 
whether normatively so, or simply qualities that others desire.5 O’Neill explains his 
third point, that prestige means the holding of power, in the sense that prestigious 
qualities are linked to influence or authority.6 In addition to the above definitions, as 
discussed below, prestige is a relative trait. IR traditionally has referred to a “hierarchy 
                                                
1 Larson, Paul, and Wohlforth, 'Status and World Order,' 16. 
2 Dafoe, Renshon, and Huth, ‘Reputation and Status,’ 372. 
3 Wood, ‘Prestige in World Politics,’ 388. 
4 O'Neill, Nuclear Weapons and National Prestige, 8-9. 
5 Wolf notes that Morgenthau, for example, identified prestige with power, but most Americans would 
not have regarded the Nazi regime as prestigious: Wolf, ‘Respect and Disrespect in International Politics,’ 
115, note 12. A general belief about a state’s negative qualities might involve infamy or opprobrium 
giving rise to “pariah” status, but this requires a separate research project. 
6 O'Neill, Nuclear Weapons and National Prestige, 11. 
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of prestige,”7  but recent scholarship on status in IR does not usually place prestige 
explicitly on a hierarchy.8  
 
Status is a collective belief about where a state stands with respect to others and about 
its identity as a member of valued groups. In the contemporary IR literature, it is 
defined as “standing or rank in a hierarchy,”9 “an attribute of an individual or social role 
that refers to position vis-a-vis a comparison group,”10 or “collective beliefs about a 
given state’s ranking on valued attributes.”11 As the last definition by Larson, Paul and 
Wohlforth suggests, status is close to prestige: both are general, higher-order beliefs, 
and are based on valued qualities. As a result, some scholars such as Wood and 
Renshon use status interchangeably with prestige.12 However, this thesis emphasises the 
distinction that status is specifically a belief about where a state stands relative to others, 
not just a belief about its positive qualities. A belief about status can mean both that a 
state has a position in a deference hierarchy (its standing), and that a state has an 
identity as a member of a group that grants a certain standing. Johnston’s definition of 
status as “an individual’s standing in the hierarchy of a group based on criteria such as 
prestige, honor, and deference,”13 is helpful because it reinforces the idea that prestige is 
a criterion for being granted status. 
 
The key to both prestige and status is that they are general, or higher-order beliefs. This 
makes them beliefs about beliefs. To take matters in sequence, zero-order beliefs are the 
objective situation, while first-order beliefs are what an observer believes about an 
                                                
7 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge University Press, 1981), 32-33. 
8 Larson, Paul, and Wohlforth, 'Status and World Order,' 16. 
9 Renshon, ‘Status Deficits and War,’ 513. 
10 Dafoe, Renshon, and Huth, ‘Reputation and Status,’ 374. 
11 Larson, Paul, and Wohlforth, 'Status and World Order,' 7. 
12 Renshon, ‘Status Deficits and War,’ 520, note 29; Wood, ‘Prestige in World Politics.’ 
13 Alastair Iain Johnston, Social States : China in International Institutions, 1980-2000 (Princeton 
University Press, 2008), 82. 
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actor.14 One such first-order belief is reputation, which Dafoe, Renshon and Huth define 
as “beliefs about persistent characteristics or behavioural tendencies of an actor.”15 
Prestige is built up from reputation, but not in the sense that it is an observer’s 
judgement of the actor in question. Rather, it is the observer’s belief about the 
reputation that an actor holds within the group as a whole. O’Neill writes that “a party 
holds prestige in a group for a certain desirable quality if the group’s members generally 
believe that they themselves generally believe that the party possesses that quality.”16 To 
illustrate this, O’Neill gives the helpful example of a university: each student may 
individually believe the university is poor, but if people believe that most other people 
see the university as good, then it is prestigious.17  Status is also a general belief. As 
Renshon points out: “Status is not one actor’s beliefs about one other actor. Rather, 
status describes many actors’ beliefs about what many other actors also believe.”18 As 
will be explained below, this eases the process of status recognition. An actor’s status 
does not need to be recognised individually by every other actor; rather, each actor need 
merely be aware that the community generally believes that it (the community) has 
recognised the actor’s status. 
 
Renshon provides three additional features of status that aid in analysis. First, status is 
positional: the absolute values of an actor are not so important as its position relative to 
relevant “reference groups”. Second, status is perceptual, which means it is based on the 
beliefs of actors. Third, status is social, requiring a shared consensus about a state’s 
relative position. As Renshon notes, the latter two features imply “the ‘visibility’ or 
                                                
14 O'Neill, Nuclear Weapons and National Prestige, 1. 
15 Dafoe, Renshon, and Huth, ‘Reputation and Status,’ 374. 
16 O'Neill, Nuclear Weapons and National Prestige, 1. Emphasis in original. 
17 Ibid. We could also consider the example of the Peninsula Hotel in Hong Kong, which famously ferries 
its guests in a fleet of green Rolls-Royces. Individual guests may feel that Rolls-Royces are silly cars, but 
they are happy to ride them because they are aware of a general belief that Rolls-Royces represent 
prestige. Not only this, but the guests don’t have to worry about whether particular bystanders like Rolls-
Royces. The guests know that the bystanders know about the general prestige of the cars. 
18 Renshon, ‘Status Deficits and War,’ 519. 
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‘publicity’ hypothesis: the only way to obtain status is through actions that can be seen 
by others or actions that have visible consequences.”19 These three attributes of status 
have further implications. Being positional, this lets us distinguish status from non-
positional goods such as honour (defined below), while it also suggests that an analysis 
of status requires us to first identify the reference groups that matter to an actor. 
Positionality is also important because one state’s gain in status must be other states’ 
losses (with the major exception, discussed further below, that membership of status 
groups can have a certain level of flexibility). The perceptual aspect requires us to 
further examine the role of beliefs in gauging status. Finally, the social aspect means 
that because status is accorded on the basis of valued attributes, it is necessary to know 
what attributes are considered valuable at any time.  
 
A key outcome of both prestige and status being general beliefs is that it becomes easier 
to reach consensus on where actors stand. Larson, Paul and Wohlforth note that status is 
a consensus of opinion; indeed they note that status would not exist if it relied on the 
individual judgements of each observer.20   
 
Attractions of status 
 
Two characteristics make status an attractive prize. One is that high status establishes 
expectations that states will be deferred to by lower-status actors. The other is that 
                                                
19 Ibid., 32. 
20 Paul, Larson, and Wohlforth, Status in World Politics, 8. 
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status, once recognised, is “sticky” and states can continue to benefit from it even if 
their underlying values fluctuate.  
 
We saw status defined as an actor’s relative position in the hierarchy of a social group, 
and in a more detailed definition it refers to “an actor’s standing in a global deference 
hierarchy arising from power, resolve, and wealth, and consequently what rights, 
respect, and patterns of deference that actor can expect.”21 The meaning of a “deference 
hierarchy” varies in the literature. Larson, Paul and Wohlforth argue that “status 
increases the probability of exercising power” (where power is “a relationship of 
influence that is distinct from the resources that an actor may deploy”), because “people 
defer to a high-status actor out of respect and esteem.”22 It is true that respect can be 
more specifically defined as an actor’s demand for “the level of consideration they feel 
entitled to on the basis of prevailing social norms.”23 But other scholars refute the 
notion of voluntary deference. Jonathan Mercer, for example, (using prestige 
synonymously with status) contends that “prestige rarely generates voluntary deference 
even among allies,” let alone among adversaries.24 Because of this, respect and esteem 
alone do not go far enough to explain why an actor should expect deference.  
 
This thesis prefers Renshon’s more specific explanation that “states seek status 
commensurate with their abilities because it is a valuable resource for coordinating 
expectations of dominance and deference in strategic interactions.”25 The reference to 
expectations is important because, as Renshon notes, “status is not one actor’s beliefs 
about one other actor.”26 It involves beliefs about what many other actors believe. As a 
                                                
21 Dafoe, Renshon, and Huth, ‘Reputation and Status,’ 375. 
22 Larson, Paul, and Wohlforth, 'Status and World Order.' 
23 Wolf, ‘Respect and Disrespect in International Politics,’ 116. 
24 Jonathan Mercer, ‘The Illusion of International Prestige,’ International Security 41, no. 4 (2017): 168. 
25 Renshon, ‘Status Deficits and War,’ 515. 
26 Ibid., 519. 
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result, status provides a useful heuristic for actors to understand their relations with 
others.27 Observers may not, in fact, hold a high-status actor in esteem, but they will be 
aware of the deference that the group generally expects to accord to that actor. The 
high-status actor in turn can use its status to influence individual observers, because the 
latter will be mindful of the general deference accorded to the actor. Conflict can 
however arise when status hierarchies are unclear, such as when there are multiple 
dimensions on which actors may be ranked, or when an actor challenges existing 
hierarchies.28  
 
The second major attraction of status is that it is “sticky”. It provides benefits after the 
original basis for one’s status declines; and it is a fungible attribute: status won in one 
area can be applied elsewhere.29 A reason for this is that status is to some extent 
institutionalised prestige: prestigious actors win status recognition that may be worn in 
the form of markers or titles, and often actual institutional membership. Status is, 
indeed, frequently institutionalised in the form of membership of formal groupings such 
as the United Nations Security Council or the Group of Seven. Prestige changes as 
reputations are incorporated into collective beliefs, which can be both positive and 
negative. But status, once accorded, is “sticky”: “Once a state obtains a certain status 
along with the accompanying privileges, it retains a presumptive right to that status 
which can outlast the initial conditions that gave rise to it.”30 In turn, status becomes a 
generally held “social fact” about an actor’s social position. Gadi Heimann notes: 
“Status is based to some degree on possessing a certain characteristic and could be 
described as the outcome of the institutionalisation of that characteristic.”31 
                                                
27 David A. Lake, Hierarchy in International Relations (Cornell University Press, 2011). 
28 Wohlforth, ‘Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War.’ 
29 Larson, Paul, and Wohlforth, 'Status and World Order,' 19. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Gadi Heimann, ‘ What Does It Take to Be a Great Power? The Story of France Joining the Big Five,’ 
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Prestige and reputation 
 
We saw earlier that actors’ beliefs about other actors are first-order beliefs. When these 
beliefs about another actor’s qualities are persistent over time, we can say that an actor 
has acquired a reputation for such qualities. States can have reputations for many things, 
such as: “military capability, a public that tolerates the costs of war, or loyal generals”; 
behaviours such as resolve, fulfilling its threats and commitments, risk acceptance, 
hostility, ruthless retaliation, sensitivity to insults, ambition, or greed; and conversely, 
cooperative behaviours such as complying with treaties, repaying debt, non-revisionist 
ambitions, or being a reliable ally.32 (A subsidiary term is “honour”, which is defined as 
public reputation accepted according to compliance with norms set by a social group.33) 
It is important, however, that as a first-order belief, an actor’s reputation will differ from 
observer to observer. 
 
Prestige, by contrast with reputation, is a second-order belief, because it is a belief about 
an actor’s reputation.34 One feature distinguishing prestige and status seems to be the 
degree to which they are in the power of the actor or community. Reputation and 
prestige are more often regarded as being somewhat in the control of the actor: actors 
can seize, acquire, and invest in their reputation and prestige. Status, on the other hand, 
is more often regarded as a function of the community: it is granted or accorded by 
others.35 Contemporary scholarship tends to define prestige as a quality that can be won, 
held and lost, but not ranked in a hierarchy like status.36 To be sure, definitions have 
                                                
32 Dafoe, Renshon, and Huth, ‘Reputation and Status,’ 374. 
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changed over time. As outlined below, realist literature has often referred to a 
“hierarchy of prestige” in IR, but that was due to differing assumptions that gave the 




This thesis has provided a distinction between prestige and status for analytical 
purposes. Scholars not focusing on the same analytical points, and indeed the 
policymaking vernacular, will tend to elide the differences, as both terms refer to 
higher-order beliefs about how an actor is generally regarded by a group. This thesis 
makes the distinction as it is useful to explain the causal role of status in changing 
policy outcomes. 
 
A practical distinction between prestige and status arises from the many kinds of status 
that can be accorded by a social group. It is true that frequently states acquire prestige 
from their overall material and normative qualities, and then move up a general axis in 
the international hierarchy. However, states may also be seen to acquire prestige related 
to diverse positive attributes. When there are multiple sources of prestige, states may 
gain status positions in equally many social hierarchies and groups:  
A state can be a ‘great power’, ‘medium-sized power’, or ‘small state’; it can be a 
‘developed’, ‘developing’, or ‘under-developed’ state; it can be a ‘sovereign state’, a 
‘protectorate’, or a ‘colony’… States may have a top position in some hierarchies but a 
lower one in others. It is the sum of its various statuses that will determine an actor’s 
general standing in the community.38  
 
If prestige is a general belief about a state’s positive qualities, and status is a general 
belief about a state’s position relative to others, then the connection between the two 
                                                
37 Gilpin, War and Change, 186. 
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lies in the criteria by which a group values qualities as being worthy of particular 
positions. Some guidance for this comes from one’s beliefs about the nature of 
international order. If one believes in a predominantly instrumental international order, 
then the dominant measure of prestige may be material qualities, which in turn may 
fairly directly rank a state as having high status. However, more solidarist approaches 
might mean that many aspects of prestige lead to states simultaneously holding status. 
Therefore, we can gain an idea of whether a decision-maker is likely to be concerned 
about a distinction between status and prestige. Those who mainly see their national 
standing moving as part of an international hierarchy with one axis will not make a 
great distinction between the terms (and are likely to use terms such as the ‘hierarchy of 
prestige’ interchangeably with hierarchies of status or standing). Those who see 
multiple ways in which their state can be accorded status will see a more useful 
distinction.  
 
In the remainder of this chapter, we will first look at the study of prestige in classical 
and realist writing, then the role of great powers and international hierarchy, and finally 
recent scholarship focused on social identity theory. 
 
 
Canonical and realist perspectives on prestige 
 
This section reviews the place of status in IR’s longstanding canonical and realist 
traditions. It shows that status had a key role in IR’s pre-modern foundations, and it was 
also strongly emphasised by classical realists who shaped the early decades of scholarly 
IR in the 20th century. These writers mostly discussed status using the terminology of 
prestige. In some cases, this was due to prestige being important to actors’ social 
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identity; as discussed in a following section, this has interesting parallels to 
contemporary research on social identity theory. In other cases, prestige was a way of 
describing perceptions of an actor’s material power. As mentioned above, when the 
standing of states is largely determined by a single criterion (such as possession of 
material power), then prestige and status become nearly synonymous. This was very 
much the case for the classical realists.  
 
Prestige in canonical writing  
 
This scene is set in this section first by canonical writers of IR – Thucydides, 
Machiavelli and Hobbes – before we turn to realism from the early period of scholarly 
IR onwards. The following part of this section reviews recent scholarship specifically 
reviving the theme of prestige. The aim is to highlight the aspects of prestige that are 
currently considered important in research programs on status.  
 
Classical thinkers such as Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hobbes all identified that the 
causes of war included security, wealth, and some form of prestige (which sometimes 
included other terms related to beliefs about qualities or social standing, such as 
reputation and honour). In a study of the “prestige motive,” Daniel Markey recounts 
some of descriptions employed by these canonical writers: For Thucydides, the causes 
of war were “security, honour and self-interest;” Machiavelli said the injuries to a state 
come “in property, in blood, or in honour;” while Hobbes said man is motivated by 
“competition, diffidence and glory.”39 In Markey’s interpretation, the key role of 
prestige is “as the individual or collective desire for public recognition of eminence as 
                                                
39 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, trans. Rex Warner, intro. M. I. Finley (London: 
Penguin, 1972), I.76; Niccolo Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy, trans, and intro. Harvey C. Mansfield and 
Nathan Tarcov (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 219; Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. C. B. 
Macpherson (New York: Penguin, 1985), 18; all cited in Markey, ‘Prestige and the Origins of War,’ 135. 
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an end in itself,” not for the instrumental benefits of, say, positive reputation.40 As 
examples of how prestige worked in canonical writing, according to Thucydides, in the 
Peloponnesian War, the Corinthians were motivated towards war by resentment of 
arrogant ex-colonies, and there was no distinction between instrumental and intrinsic 
motivations; Machiavelli writes that the true aim of a prince is worldly glory, which can 
be won even in defeat; and for Hobbes, pride is pursued by everybody, not just by 
princes, and “a strong sovereign is required to quell these glory-hounds.”41 
 
Much of this writing about the prestige motive demonstrates the way that canonical 
philosophers saw the drive for power and competition in terms of human nature. Steve 
Wood refers to this as “recognition of importance,”42 while Markey calls it “the 
individual or collective desire for public recognition of eminence as an end in itself.”43 
Steve Wood argues that “prestige demonstrates universality and persistence as a 
motivation and informal ordering principle in international affairs.”44 
People seek self-esteem not only through their personal activities, but vicariously 
through the achievements of social units to which they feel attached, such as sports 
teams and nations.”45 
Referring back to Rousseau, Markey contends that there are several essential 
characteristics linking prestige and conflict: prestige is the ultimate relative or positional 
good; it is scarce; and the desire for it is never truly quenched. Thus it is perpetual, 
irrational, and it is not always proportional to means-ends calculations. Furthermore, as 
it is social, the worst violence can take place in a social setting, where there are things 
                                                
40 Ibid., 126-7. 
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42 Wood, ‘Prestige in World Politics,’ 388. 
43 Markey, ‘Prestige and the Origins of War,’ 126. 
44 Wood, ‘Prestige in World Politics,’ 405. 
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worth fighting over.46 Prestige was seen as a motive force behind the behaviour of 
individuals, statesmen and nations. 
 
The idea of a prestige drive as a perpetual factor in IR has also been revived recently by 
Richard Ned Lebow. Lebow takes an interesting approach, focusing on an innate human 
drive for self-esteem that he calls “spirit.”47 He argues that states seek status 
commensurate with their power and accomplishments, but reversing the argument of 
this thesis, he sees prestige (attractive as an end in itself because it boosts self-esteem) 
flowing back from status recognition. “On the whole [states] appear at least as 
interested in the prestige conferred by this status, its related offices and privileges as 
they are in any material or security benefits.”48 However, by describing prestige as a 
universal human want, Lebow makes it difficult to use the idea as a variable to analyse 
specific problems. It leaves the question of why “spirit”, rather than any other human 
characteristic, should be the major driver of IR, and does not explain periods of peace as 
well as conflict.49 Therefore it may be difficult to use notions of prestige as a perpetual 
factor in research projects that try to identify variables or specific causes. By contrast, 
as we will see below, social identity theory has attracted greater interest in IR because it 
is a study of group beliefs, not individual psychology.  
 
Prestige in classical realism 
 
Turning to scholarly IR since the mid-20th century, realists emphasised the role of 
prestige as an element of international politics. The key distinction between the realists 
                                                
46 Markey, ‘Prestige and the Origins of War,’ 157-61. 
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48 Ibid., 545. 
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and the canonical writers was that the former, concerned with the decisive role of power 
in IR, focused on prestige as an instrumental factor acting as a proxy for power. This 
made prestige of great significance to realists, because it was a vehicle by which states 
could communicate or understand perceptions of power. There was another important 
implication of the realist focus on prestige as a proxy for power: because what matters 
to states is their power relative to others, it led these scholars to identify a hierarchy of 
prestige playing a vital role in IR.  
 
Hans Morgenthau believed that politics was about power – with the display of power 
being just as important as the exercise of it. He said policies about power were about 
keeping it, expanding it, or displaying it: this equated to foreign policies of the status 
quo, imperialism, or prestige. He said the purpose of prestige is “to impress other 
nations with the power one’s own nation actually possesses, or with the power it 
believes, or wants the other nations to believe, it possesses.”50 Also, all power politics 
was about power estimations, and “it is the primary function of the policy of prestige to 
influence these evaluations.”51 Morgenthau noted that the desire for social recognition is 
a potent dynamic force determining social relations and creating social institutions, 
while “reputation gives an individual the measure of his due.”52 Meanwhile, for Robert 
Gilpin writing about power transition and hegemonic conflict, prestige rather than 
power was the everyday currency of international politics:  
Prestige is the reputation for power, and military power in particular. Whereas power 
refers to the economic, military and related capabilities of a state, prestige refers 
primarily to the perceptions of other states with respect to a state’s capacities and its 
ability and willingness to use its power.53 
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By the 1980s, there was an extensive body of literature about prestige in international 
relations, but it could be argued that prestige was narrowly perceived as a device to 
convey perceptions of power. There was little exploration of the range of identities and 
interests that states might have that might make them pursue diverse status goals. In 
particular, there was little in the literature about how states would use prestige in areas 
that did not involve demonstrations of military power.  
 
We can see here the interesting results of the realists’ focus on power in IR. As state 
power – whether determined by military, economic or moral strengths – was the 
overwhelming criterion for international standing, we can see this describing very much 
a “single axis” world hierarchy. Indeed, prestige as used in the mid-century was highly 
focused on military power, rather than any other factors.54 An implication of this is that 
the classical realist approach to prestige assumes too great a role for coercion. We may 
be better off if we can find ways of identifying a status hierarchy as a source of 
legitimate authority.55 This opens up a wider range of ways of analysing status in IR, 
such as exploring how different status goals accord legitimate authority to certain actors 
in the international system. Another implication of the realist approach is that we should 
not be confused if realists refer to a “hierarchy of prestige” even if we prefer to define 
prestige as a non-hierarchical good. Within the assumptions made by the realists, 
prestige is virtually interchangeable with status as defined in this chapter.  
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Status and hierarchy in IR 
 
There is a growing recognition in IR of the importance of international power 
hierarchies.56 The literature on status in IR engages with that on international hierarchy 
through the two ways that states are recognised for having status: membership of status 
groups, and standing with respect to others. The following is an outline of IR’s 
understanding of the  status group of major powers, and of the role of legitimate 
authority stemming from relative standing. We saw earlier that actors are attracted to 
high status because it sets up expectations of deference, and the following review of 
these major currents in IR helps explain that attraction.  
 
Major power status 
 
Major powers, or “great powers,” are only one example of a status group,57 but the 
outsize role of these powers means they are of great interest to IR. While changes in 
states’ standing is normally a zero-sum exchange, it is possible for the ranks of major 
powers to expand, up to a point, without appreciably detracting from the status of the 
members. David Lake calls this a “club good.”58 There are several definitions for this 
group of states that rank highly in international social hierarchies. Some of the key 
criteria are that major powers have the opportunity to act as one, thanks to their unusual 
capabilities; they have the willingness to act, relatively independently of other major 
powers; and they are attributed “an unusual amount of status by policy makers of other 
states within the international community.”59 Others are that major powers play a major 
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role in international security, rank in the top few states, and have a degree of economic 
self-sufficiency and a massive resource and skill differential compared with lesser 
powers, making them strong and able to mobilise resources in service of policy 
objectives.60  
 
Major powers are expected to take on special roles within the international system. One 
of these is to act as part of a “concert of powers.” Along with anarchy and hegemony, a 
concert of powers is one form of international order that is possible under an 
instrumentalist (that is to say, realist) framework. Concerts are, however, a less common 
form of order-building than the other two. In an instrumentalist framework, states are 
not expected to form a concert of power for its own sake. They are only likely to appear 
after hegemonic wars, when the conflict has eliminated one or more major powers that 
would normally play a part in balancing coalitions, and when states are too exhausted to 
wish to return to warfare. As a result, concerts inevitably decay once the usual 
assumptions of balance of power politics resume.61 Major powers therefore only have 
limited management roles under instrumentalist models of international order. 
 
If we turn from instrumentalist to pluralist (that is, English School) approaches to 
international order, we find major powers taking on a much more fundamental role. It is 
one thing to define a “club” of major powers defined by their outsize capabilities and 
willingness to act. Hedley Bull, however, went further and defined “great powers” as 
one of the primary institutions of international society, alongside the balance of power, 
international law, diplomacy and war.62 He defined great powers as not only having 
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military and economic strength, but also social recognition as “legitimate great powers.” 
Superior status is recognised by minor states, so the great powers are “powers 
recognised by others to have, and conceived by their own leaders and peoples to have, 
certain special rights and duties.”63 The great powers treat each other with relative 
equality, while they enjoy the privileges of participating in all major international 
institutional processes. They are expected to uphold the core norms of international 
society; even if they do not, in this model, minor powers put up with the hypocrisy of 
great powers because the stability of the system depends on it.64  
 
The English School approach involves more than simply recognising the size or 
strength of major powers. Bull argued that great powers were so-defined because they 
took on a major role in ordering and governing international society – and were 
recognised for doing so. An implication was that this definition would not properly 
describe a single hegemon; it implies a form of order-building between a number of 
major powers. As Bull put it, even front-rank military powers such as Nazi Germany, if 
they were not accepted as having the relevant rights and responsibilities, would not be 
great powers under this definition. “We imply...that there are two or more powers that 
are comparable in status; we imply... the existence of a club with a rule of 
membership.”65 Ian Clark explains that “implicit in this argument is that the defining 
feature of a great power is its (horizontal) relationship with other great powers, not 
simply its (vertical) relationship with the remainder of international society.”66 Great 
powers took on greater responsibilities than other states, and in return enjoyed special 
privileges.  
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In many ways Hedley Bull was approaching the issue of status from the reverse 
direction of the realists before him. Realists were interested in mechanisms that would 
help states to perceive and clarify each other’s power (the most important variable in IR, 
as they saw it), and prestige was just such a device. By contrast, the English School was 
interested in what states did once they had power, and particularly the way the major 
powers took on the specific roles that let them be recognised as great powers with an 
institutionalised role in managing international society. In other words, the realists were 
not concerned about the establishment of a social structure – state to state perceptions of 
power were all that mattered. The English School looked at relative social positions, 
which gives us the definition of status that I used earlier in this chapter.  
 
Provision of public goods is a key basis of great power authority and a marker of 
hegemonic legitimacy. To give a contemporary example: “Washington’s claims to 
being an ‘Asia-Pacific power’ are hard to refute given its undeniably central position 
within the East Asian security complex, and its continuing unsurpassed ability to 
provide security public goods including freedom of navigation, deterrence of 
adventurism by both allies and enemies, and disaster relief.”67 As David Lake outlines, 
the costs of international governance are substantial: dominant states must provide 
valuable international order; discipline subordinate states that break the rules of the 
order; and engage in credible self-restraint – “with great power comes great 
responsibility.”68 In return, the attraction for a state of taking on such a burden is that 
recognition as a major power reduces the cost of acting as one. “Rather than 
continuously coercing others into abiding by their will, it is far cheaper and more 
efficient for dominant states if subordinates comply with rules regarded as rightful and 
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appropriate.”69 In addition, major power recognition adds soft power to the state’s 
material capabilities, creates legitimacy for foreign policy pursuits, and reduces the cost 
of intervention or building co-operation. The effects of reputation also strengthen the 
credibility of a state’s threats and commitments.70  
 
Legitimacy and authority 
 
Applying relative standing to IR assumes inequalities between states, and at least a 
nuanced view of international anarchy that allows for hierarchical relations between 
states. In general, studies of hierarchy in IR concern bargains that are struck between 
states of varying status. Some of the lines of research include the theory of authority and 
hierarchy, especially as to what concerns a legitimate bargain in this context; the 
institutional shape of such bargains in the context of international order; and studies of 
Asia-Pacific order which emphasise hierarchical traditions in regional IR. Inspired by 
the period of US unipolarity after the end of the Cold War, by China’s historical role as 
the centre of Asian order, and by the roles of regional hegemons, this research questions 
the traditional central place of anarchy in IR. It argues that hierarchies frequently form, 
with high-status states enjoying legitimate authority.  
 
The first key theme in this literature is that authority is a form of power driven by 
obligation, rather than force alone. This approach seeks to further erode the distinction 
between domestic and international politics, seeing no reason why authority-building 
should stop at the level of the state. As Lake puts it, authority is a form of “rightful 
rule”, that only exists if one party acknowledges a duty to comply with another.71 Lake 
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specifies that authority relationships are not necessarily free of coercion, but they are 
defined by the status or legitimacy of any force involved. The key is that authority in 
contemporary IR is not formal or legal, as an empire, but only exists when states 
willingly subordinate themselves to others for a given return. “Since authority does not 
exist without recognition of their duty by the ruled, it rests not on assertions of rights by 
the ruler, but on the conferral of rights by the ruled.”72 Lake describes his model as 
broadly Hobbesian, as “the right to rule rests on a social contract in which the ruler 
provides a political order of value to the ruled, who in turn grant legitimacy to the 
ruler.”73 This social contract – “relational authority contract”, as Lake puts it – is 
essentially an exchange in which dominant states get to set the rules of political order, 
while subordinate states benefit from reduced uncertainty and transaction costs. Indeed 
the behaviour of dominant states is shaped by this contract, as “dominant states must 
produce the promised order, even when it is costly to do so.”74 This is a largely 
materialist approach, in which status is a measure of a state’s role in building and 
sharing in order. 
 
Lake’s contractual approach is worth comparing with the ways other writers and 
schools of IR deal with legitimacy. For realists, a legitimate order was one that is 
accepted by all major powers, and provides durable peace,75 or one where the position 
of the dominant power was supported by values common to participating states.76 
Taking a liberal institutionalist approach, John Ikenberry and Charles Kupchan concur 
on the importance of values, saying hegemons gain compliance when “elites in 
secondary states buy into and internalise norms that are articulated by the hegemon and 
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therefore pursue policies consistent with the hegemon’s notion of international order.”77 
However, Ikenberry also emphasises a much more “constitutional” model of order, in 
which major powers willingly agree to be constrained by institutions, while domestic 
politics locks in their commitments. Agreement on legitimate order means dominant 
states offer some kind of restraint. The attraction is that their authority comes with 
lower enforcement costs, and they can lock in a high status in the international order 
which endures even if their relative power wanes.78 In addition, self-binding becomes a 
form of power in itself, as it makes power more durable, systematic, and legitimate.79 
This could be seen as particular explanation for the English School argument that great 
powers have both special rights and special responsibilities in international society.  
 
Scholarship about authority gives rise to a key debate about the role of status in IR. Do 
relatively higher status and authority exist separately, or does one always entail the 
other? For Lake, both status and authority are social constructs, but status is a “club 
good,” and a somewhat malleable social construct, while authority is exclusive and 
zero-sum.80 The two are likely to be correlated, as states with authority are likely to be 
accorded special status, while high status may boost a state’s ability to deliver 
international order. However, he notes, during the Cold War, high-status states such as 
Germany and Japan were still subordinate in authority to the United States.81 He 
therefore argues that while status carries with it special privileges and responsibilities, 
authority still requires the separate existence of international hierarchy. As an example, 
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he predicts that a rising China could gain status without necessarily threatening the US, 
because this need not affect American authority over its regional subordinates.82 
 
An opposite view is taken by Anne Clunan, who argues that Lake is wrong because 
status is necessary for authority to exist.83 The argument is that status needs to be 
recognised, so states have the legitimacy to enact it. This in fact is an important process, 
whereby states seek to improve their standing in the hierarchy by seeking social 
recognition. This also explains why some states appear so insecure, such as China 
which still believes it needs to project a certain image in order to win social 
acceptance.84 Similarly David Kang contends that authority is a key manifestation of 
status. He uses the same definition of authority as does Lake, but sees it as a belief 
arising from political socialisation that explains why one state will defer to another. 
This intrinsic relationship between the two is the reason why status is so important to 
stability: if two states agree on status, their relationship will be stable regardless of 
material differences, and vice-versa.85 
 
To conclude this section, it is worth noting that Kang is well known for placing debates 
about hierarchy squarely in a regional context. He argues that Asian international 
relations have historically conformed more to a pattern of hierarchy than a pattern of 
balancing. This is a pattern where the dominant power still functions in anarchy, but 
other states neither balance against it nor fold under it as in an empire.86 Kang bases his 
analysis of East Asia upon Ikenberry and Kupchan’s institutionalism, and the lack of 
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power-balancing as had been predicted at the end of the Cold War. “East Asian regional 
relations have historically been hierarchic, more peaceful, and more stable than those in 
the West,” he notes.87 This highlights the central importance of status to understanding 
the international relations of East Asia, and is a good point on which to turn to recent 
scholarship on the subject. 
 
 
Major directions of the contemporary literature 
 
This chapter so far has outlined definitions, especially of prestige and status as higher-
order beliefs, put this work in the context of canonical and classical IR’s writing about 
prestige, and pointed to IR’s strong interest in hierarchy (both the roles of major powers 
and of authority relationships) as helping to explain roles status play in IR. This has 
been joined in recent years by a new wave of IR scholarship specifically focused on 
status itself. This section is about themes in the status “turn” in IR, and aims to highlight 
the issues of current interest to scholars, as well as some of the strengths and 
weaknesses in their arguments.  
 
To put the recent wave of status-related literature in context, it marks a revival of a 
theme that had been in decline in the late 20th century. A research project led by 
Galtung and others in the 1960s focused on the idea that states that did not receive 
status recognition might respond with aggression.88 A representative view from around 
that time was that, “the nation whose reputational status is lower than its capability will 
perceive itself as suffering from a material as well as symbolic deprivation… [and] will 
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be rather more likely to engage in hostile and aggressive behaviour as a consequence.”89 
This ran into the problem that blaming conflict on “frustration” assumed too much 
irrationality.90 In addition, this status research program failed to fit in with IR’s 
“paradigm wars” of neorealism, liberal institutionalism and constructivism from the 
1980s onwards, so was neglected because it lacked a clear place in the IR discipline.91  
 
By contrast, in the last decade or so the IR research into status has been revived by new 
interdisciplinary work drawing from IR, sociology, social psychology, political theory 
and behavioural economics, as well as some returns to IR’s roots. This interdisciplinary 
study often examines status in IR from the perspective of social identity theory (SIT), 
which looks to explain these issues in IR via sociological and psychological research on 
people’s identification with social groups. The following sections outline the emergence 
of SIT as a program in IR and look at “socially creative” status-building strategies 
suggested by SIT. Two more sections go into some more detail on what recent 
scholarship says about winning status recognition and the nexus between status and 
inter-state conflict.  
 
Social identity theory 
 
A starting point for the current scholarly interest in status was a 2009 conference paper 
by David Kang and William Wohlforth, in which they argued that it was time to start to 
operationalise status as an important variable in IR.92 This was followed the same year 
by a prominent paper by Wohlforth, which has helped prompt a renewed wave of 
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publishing on status in IR.93 Wohlforth argues that while conditions of unipolarity 
reduced material motivations for conflict, rising powers might still be dissatisfied with 
the status quo because “humans appear to be hardwired for sensitivity to status and that 
relative standing is a powerful and independent motivator of behavior.”94 Wohlforth 
wished to specifically counter the assumption in power transition and hegemonic war 
theories that states’ satisfaction with their social position was a function of the material 
costs and benefits of that status:  
The assumption is undermined by cumulative research in disciplines ranging from 
neuroscience and evolutionary biology to economics, anthropology, sociology, and 
psychology that human beings are powerfully motivated by the desire for favourable 
social status comparisons. This research suggests that the preference for status is a basic 
disposition rather than merely a strategy for achieving other goals.95 
The key outcome, Wohlforth contends, is that “under certain conditions, the search for 
status will cause people to behave in ways that directly contradict their material interest 
in security and/or prosperity.”96 This “basic disposition” argument aimed to clearly 
diverge from IR’s previous instrumental approaches to status and prestige.  
 
To replace instrumental motivations, the theoretical toolkit that scholars have proposed 
for consideration is SIT, which provides a psychological explanation for competitive 
interstate behaviour. Drawing on the work of SIT’s founder, Henri Tajfel, Wohlforth 
argues that “deep-seated human motivations of self-definition and self-esteem induce 
people to define their identity in relation to their in-group, to compare and contrast that 
in-group with out-groups, and to want that comparison to reflect favourably on 
themselves.”97 In another study of SIT and IR, Mercer noted the theory’s key 
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breakthrough was that it operates at the level of the group, not the individual. As SIT is 
not an attempt to sum the beliefs of individuals to give group behaviour, Mercer said he 
used “SIT because it is a social psychological theory of intergroup behaviour… SIT 
begins with the observation that interpersonal processes and intergroup processes can be 
different. It puts the ‘social’ into psychology to explain how a group becomes different 
from the sum of its individual parts.”98 Certainly, as Wohlforth notes, it has been 
challenging to translate SIT’s general claim into specific hypotheses about state 
behaviour. SIT research “is generally not framed in a way that captures salient features 
of international relations.”99 However, Wohlforth sees “no reason to doubt” SIT’s claim 
that individual preferences for status will affect intergroup relations. “If those who act 
on behalf of a state (or those who select them) identify with that state, then they can be 
expected to derive utility from its status in international society.”100 This provides a new 
focus that brings together many areas of social science research. It fits in well with the 
idea that emotions are important in political science.101   
 
After Wohlforth’s 2009 article, there have been several major books, articles and 
reviews that have outlined ideas of status in IR, primarily from an SIT perspective. 
Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko have argued that SIT can help explain 
why China and Russia are motivated by such a keen sense of grievance over perceived 
past humiliations at the hands of foreign powers: 
Social identity theory posits that people derive part of their identity from membership in 
various social groups—nation, ethnicity, religion, political party, gender, or occupation. 
Because membership reflects back on the self, people want their group to have a 
positive identity.102 
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Larson and Shevchenko went on to explain the strategies that SIT suggested states 
would employ if dissatisfied with their status position, and these are examined below.  
 
Socially creative status strategies 
 
Larson and Shevchenko used SIT to explain three strategies that states would employ to 
improve their status: social mobility (emulating high-status groups); social competition 
(trying to surpass the dominant group); or social creativity (in which a state stresses 
achievements in new domains).103 Taking into account Hedley Bull’s observation that 
great power status requires approval from the international community, Larson and 
Shevchenko noted that social creativity was a particularly useful strategy. It would let 
states overcome obstacles to their rise without having to overturn the prevailing 
international hierarchy. Creativity involves developing new international norms, 
regimes, institutions or development models, and emphasises distinctiveness from 
established powers – as exemplified by India leading the non-aligned movement.104 
Larson and Shevchenko also argued that Beijing, concerned by the rise of “China 
threat” perceptions in the 1990s, adopted the “responsible great power” strategy as a 
form of social creativity. In particular, this strategy was successful because it was 
endorsed by the United States, as the then dominant power in the system.105 The two 
authors thus argued that with appropriate strategies, high-status states need not feel 
threatened by rising powers.  
Status is based on a group’s standing on some trait valued by society. Status is a 
positional good, meaning that one group’s status can improve only if another’s declines. 
SIT introduces an important modification to this prevailing zero-sum conception of 
status by pointing out that groups have multiple traits on which to be evaluated, so that 
comparisons among them need not be competitive.106 
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Having said this, scholars have also written about creative status-seeking without basing 
their approach on SIT. Randall Schweller has studied how states have competed 
historically through palace-building or railway construction, and currently through 
everything from technology, culture or environmental stewardship. Like Larson and 
Shevchenko, Schweller also notes that multiple axes of prestige can allow status-
seeking without conflict: “If everyone defines prestige differently, it can be commonly 
enjoyed; actors can feel ‘good about themselves’ without bringing others down in the 
process.”107 But Schweller also considers the counter-argument that multi-axis prestige-
building is self-delusion, because states are giving up the types of prestige that really 
matter. For example, Germany prides itself on its international responsibility, but 
Schweller says this is only possible because Germany is dependent on US protection, 
diminishing its autonomy and international clout.108  
 
Winning status recognition 
 
Considerable current research into status focuses on the process of securing appropriate 
status recognition. This research frequently proposes that states will engage in various 
“games” to have their status recognised. For example, Larson, Paul and Wohlforth add 
that status is made concrete by status markers – visible displays that are perceived as 
signs of status.109 They argue that these displays aid in status accommodation, as higher 
status actors acknowledge the enhanced role of a state via its status markers. Status-
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seeking behaviour is thus about acquiring status symbols, such as space programs, 
aircraft carriers, or nuclear weapons.110 
 
Emphasising the importance of winning status recognition, Volgy, Corbetta, Grant and 
Baird provide a similar definition of major powers as noted earlier – states that possess 
unusual capabilities, are prepared to use them, and seek to independently influence 
international events.111 But these states do not enjoy major power status until there is 
attribution by other states (community attribution); recognition by other major powers 
and acceptance into the club (in-group status attribution); and self-reference. Thus 
major power status came from a combination of capabilities and behaviour, plus the 
constraint of assuming an independent leadership role in international politics. Major 
power status indicated expectations of leadership - that such important actors would 
exercise a range of leadership roles in issues of importance internationally: “The 
community of states attributing major power status will expect these powers to be 
involved in international affairs, accept such involvement as legitimate, and may even 
ask for assistance.”112  
 
Volgy, et al, provide an additional hypothesis that an important consideration is “status 
consistency” – a situation where the state’s  material capabilities and foreign policy 
activities have received full status attribution: “Status-consistent major powers… should 
have the most legitimacy and influence and should behave differently from status-
inconsistent major powers or from non-major powers.”113 If a state is status consistent it 
should gain extra capacities, such as cooperative efforts (constructing regimes, 
institutions and organisations), and will find it easier to perform coercive activity 
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(implementing sanctions, dealing with militarised disputes, war, and so on). All these 
actions are more costly for status-inconsistent powers and non-major powers.114 This 
said, other scholars have questioned whether status consistency is still relevant to 
contemporary IR. It assumes that status recognition must be consistent with material 
capabilities (implying the “single-axis” approach to prestige mentioned earlier), yet 
status recognition is increasingly accorded as a result of non-material considerations.115 
 
Whether or not status consistency is an important consideration, scholars have a strong 
interest in the “recognition games” played by states to boost their prestige and status. 
These games are ways that states try to show that they should be recognised by others as 
having high status, and particularly where the goal is great power status, these games 
often involve ostentatious investments in status goods. Such conspicuous consumption 
is either instrumental (where it is also a useful investment), or ‘expressive’ (purely 
expressing the state’s values): “Some projects—space programs, nuclear weapons, and 
aircraft carriers, to name a few—are intended as costly signals of great-power status, for 
they require enormous capabilities and resources that most countries do not possess.”116 
Recent research has studied states engaging in these games specifically to demonstrate 
their legitimate great power status. Shogo Suzuki argues that both China and Japan are 
‘frustrated great powers’ because they have not been given the full privileges they 
believe accords to their status. However, instead of upending the international system 
(as ‘revisionist’ powers had done in the past), the two states have strived to show that 
they uphold core international norms, for example through engagement in UN 
peacekeeping operations.117 These cases are interesting because while China and Japan 
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are assumed to be dissatisfied, Suzuki highlights ways that they address their status 
situation within the existing normative framework of international society.  
 
Status recognition and conflict 
 
Scholars contend that if states perceive a gap between what others think and what they 
“should” think about their status, then there is “status dissonance”. This is a question of 
“respect”, which Reinhard Wolf proposes “is usually experienced as an unacceptable 
mismatch between the social position one is assigned by the Other and the position one 
expects to deserve according to prevailing standards or norms.”118 Such a mismatch is 
likely when a state has recently gained strength on a particular scale, but its treatment 
by others is lagging. This appears consistent with earlier work by Robert Gilpin, who 
argued that status inconsistencies, where a state is not receiving recognition for its 
advances, are a source of the major ruptures in IR: “If all components were to change in 
unison, peaceful evolution of the system would take place. It is the differential rate of 
change… that produces a disjuncture or disequilibrium in the system.”119 For 
contestation to subside would require a costly arms race or international crisis that 
forces beliefs about status to come into alignment. 
 
There are a number of ways that scholars propose status dissonance may trigger 
conflict. One of these is the idea of “status dilemmas”, which involve spirals of tension 
similar to the security dilemma.120 William Wohlforth argues that there is much 
uncertainty involved in signalling and recognising status claims. The problem is that “if 
a state wants to know its status, it needs to estimate the collective recognition of such by 
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relevant other states, even as those states face strategic incentives to misrepresent their 
beliefs.”121 Conflicts can arise when states are unable to signal their status claims, 
exacerbating tension even when states only want to maintain their relative standing. 
This occurs when states are otherwise rational security-seekers, but status is still a key 
preference. 122 The danger, Janice Gross Stein argues, is that when states value status as 
well as security, some may perceive that their status is being challenged when it isn’t. 
“These leaders then take action to reassert their status, which the other perceives as 
threatening. And so the spiral begins.”123 One suggestion is that to avoid this situation, 
dominant states should “stroke the status aspirations of rising powers” on issues of the 
moment.124  
 
Another approach to conflict is taken by Jonathan Renshon, who argues that states will 
wish to correct status inconsistency in order to gain the ensuing benefits of deference. 
The risk of conflict arises because states that initiate and win conflicts may expect to 
boost their status: 
Rather than a response to failing to change an actor’s status position, the initiation of 
conflict is better conceptualized as one way that states seek to alter the beliefs of other 
members of the international community.125 
Renshon’s approach is important because he rejects the notion in some of the literature 
that status and conflict are linked due to emotions which, he argues, assumes too much 
irrationality on the part of states. Instead, he feels that the literature neglects the 
possibility of using violence to increase status. Violence might be an effective tool 
because status beliefs are only irregularly updated, but war reveals hitherto private 
information. This demonstration of capabilities and behaviours influence others in the 
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hierarchy to simultaneously re-calibrate their judgements.126 This said, while Renshon 
backs up his hypothesis with a quantitative analysis, his data set involves international 
conflicts between 1816 and 2005, and measures of status such as diplomatic 
representation. The question is whether this data is relevant to the present: in the 19th 
century, states that won wars gained material resources, so were highly likely to get 
more diplomatic representation. It also leaves the question of whether higher status was 
a cause or effect of conflict during that period, and whether the motivations for 
initiating conflict today can be compared to past centuries. 
 
 
Grounding this project  
 
This project will pick up and run with several major themes in the existing literature, 
but there are also notions in the literature that will be less relied upon, and these are 
explained below. However to briefly recap the above, first, on definitions it is worth 
restating that the major terms in this thesis are status and prestige, which are together 
important because they are higher-order beliefs about an actor’s values. The thesis 
accepts that the terms are close in meaning, but the distinction is highlighted here in 
order to better set out the central argument of the project. Second, this chapter has set 
out canonical and classical accounts of prestige, which both provide context and give 
useful accounts of status-seeking in the framework of a single axis of prestige. Third, 
IR’s work on hierarchy (both major powers and authority relationships), explains the 
attractiveness of status and how it contributes to establishing patterns of expectations 
around deference. 
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Turning to contemporary scholarship on status, this thesis takes the position that it is not 
necessary to adopt the underpinnings of SIT in order to make use of its predictions 
regarding status-seeking strategies. The motivations for status-seeking generally given 
in SIT-related work need more validation to apply to IR. For example, SIT bases status-
seeking on in-group versus out-group rivalry: Wohlforth argues that there is “no reason 
to doubt” SIT’s claim that individual preferences for status will affect intergroup 
relations, and “if those who act on behalf of a state (or those who select them) identify 
with that state, then they can be expected to derive utility from its status in international 
society.”127 Similarly, Larson, Paul and Wohlforth note that “higher social group status 
enhances collective self-esteem, derived from pride in one’s membership and social 
identity.”128 However, more evidence should be provided as to why studies of 
individuals’ attachment to social groups can be equated to the behaviour of states in 
international politics.129 For these reasons, the thesis has not relied on these 
explanations as the basic motivation for status-seeking. The thesis does not rule them 
out, but it is important not to get caught up in futile arguments about whether status-
seeking is an intrinsic or instrumental behaviour. The pursuit of any valued ends is 
likely to show both motivations.130 
 
Compared with the motivations presented by SIT, this thesis is much more convinced 
that it is possible to study status as a good pursued in IR for its strategic benefits. These 
benefits primarily involve establishing expectations of deference, as O’Neill sets out,131 
but status is specifically pursued because it involves the institutionalisation of prestige, 
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making it durable and fungible. The most privileged status groups, such as great 
powers, may be accorded a host of special rights (as well as responsibilities). As 
Heimann writes, status provides not just self-esteem but practical advantages -- 
“influence, economic advantage, and even security.”132 With this said, there is much 
that can be used from IR’s engagement with SIT: the whole range of socially creative 
strategies set out by Larson and Shevchenko are highly useful in this thesis. This is 
understandable when we consider that even when states have strategic motivations to 
seek status, they are aware that they are building sets of social expectations to their 
benefit, so social strategies are the logical way to attain them. 
 
The major gap in the literature remains demonstrating how and when status concerns 
play a causal role in IR. Much classical work assumes too often that prestige and status-
seeking is a perpetual background constant, while broad IR agendas on hierarchy 
describe the roles and interactions of mostly high-status actors, without explaining 
specifics about when status concerns might change behaviour. Recent work involving 
SIT provides useful accounts of status-seeking strategies, but does not explain the 
circumstances when status dissatisfaction, for example, plays a causal role in policy 
decisions. Even work such as Renshon’s that focuses on strategic motivations for status-
seeking still uses historical data that focuses on status concerns leading to war. 
Contemporary IR needs to consider a much broader range of outcomes arising from 
status concerns. 
 
As a result of the above, the thesis proceeds with the following steps. First, a short 
chapter fleshes out concepts in order to fill the gap between existing status literature and 
the findings of the empirical case studies. These concepts, including prestige-building 
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behaviour, perceptions of prestige and status, and cost-benefit analyses in the context of 
status-seeking, are not themselves intended to be innovative, but they place building 
blocks under the pattern of activity that was observed in the case studies. The thesis 
then follows with the three country case studies. Each was selected as a case that was 
“most likely” to show status in practice, and in each case there is a pattern of activity 
that involves status concerns. The analysis of these cases aims to fill one gap in the 
literature by showing specific situations where status concerns had a causal role in 
policy decisions.
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In the chapters that follow we will explore the empirical evidence that supports the 
central argument of this thesis. This argument is that states value certain status roles and 
will accumulate prestige in a gradual fashion in order to secure these roles, but crises 
may arise that force a change in these valuations, leading states to enhance their 
prestige-building activity. The existing literature has touched on many aspects of status, 
but leaves gaps in terms of explaining this sequence of events. In particular, the 
literature does not work in detail to distinguish prestige and status, there are gaps in the 
prevailing social identity theory, especially in terms of causal connections, and there is 
still a lack of explanation of variability in the role of status.  
 
The theoretical framework for this study is broadly a neoclassical realist one. It is agent-
focused while allowing for structural effects to shape the foreign policies of states. It 
assumes rational decision making as a starting point, but builds on the neoclassical 
realist literature that emphasises biases and other perceptual limits to achieving ideal 
cost-benefit analyses.1 Rose described foreign policy under neoclassical realism as 
primarily driven by effects of the external environment, translated through “unit-level 
intervening variables such as decision-makers’ perceptions and state structure,”2 while 
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Taliaferro, Lobell and Ripsman emphasise that “neoclassical realism identifies elite 
calculations and perceptions of relative power and domestic constraints as intervening 
variables between international pressures and states’ foreign policies.”3 Broadly 
speaking, this project sits in a neoclassical realist approach to structural factors (such as 
relative international status) being translated in a causal sense through the perceptions 
and rationality biases of individuals and groups of decision makers. 
 
This chapter clarifies a number of concepts that will be used to frame the empirical 
analysis in the chapters that follow. It outlines concepts to support each of the three 
phases of status-seeking activity observed in the cases: clarifying the role of prestige, by 
explaining that states have a variety of status roles and they seek recognition for this 
status by building up prestige for differing positive qualities (referred to here as 
“multiple axes” of prestige); explaining that in situations such as a status crisis, actors 
are capable of judging their own and others’ status because prestige and status are 
general beliefs held by a group rather than individuals (actors are also aware that 
general beliefs need to be contentious and clearly communicated to change the views of 
a group); and explaining how valuations of status-seeking strategies may change, 
looking to the “Rubicon theory” of war as one way that crises force a change in mind-
sets, and also looking at the role of crises themselves in changing perceptions. 
 
 
                                                
3 Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Steven E. Lobell, and Norrin M. Ripsman, 'Introduction: Neoclassical Realism, 
the State, and Foreign Policy,' in Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, ed. Steven E. 
Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro (Cambridge University Press, 2009), 28. 
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Prestige in this thesis 
 
Prestige is important in this thesis because the building of it is a key variable in the 
central argument. The argument is that states accumulate prestige in order to support 
their status goals, and in particular circumstances (after a status crisis) will work harder 
to secure their status by enhancing their prestige-building efforts. This requires clear 
definitions: as we have seen, status is an actor’s position in a social hierarchy, while 
prestige is the general belief that a party holds a positive quality. The general quality of 
this belief should be borne in mind as critical: prestige becomes analytically useful 
when we recall that individual observers do not have to believe the party has a good 
reputation; they only have to consider that the social group (in this case, the relevant 
community of states) generally thinks that the group itself thinks so.   
 
This project uses prestige and status to describe the means and ends seen in the cases, 
where prestige was the currency and status the pay-off. This conforms to many of the 
concepts seen in the literature: as Dafoe, Renshon and Huth point out, status is a 
function of community attribution and is granted or accorded by others.4 Prestige can be 
gained or lost; it is built up from their actions and interactions over time: “Actors can 
seize, acquire, and invest in their reputation and prestige.”5 The argument of this thesis 
is very much about states aspiring to status roles and amassing a balance of prestige 
with which to win them. 
 
Prestige is conceived of here as a means that states employ to achieve their status ends. 
As such, this thesis does not use prestige in the sense proposed by some scholars who 
                                                
4 Dafoe, Renshon, and Huth, ‘Reputation and Status,’ 376. 
5 Ibid. 
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outline a “prestige motive” that is perpetual, irrational or non-proportional.6 To the 
contrary, this project sees prestige-building as meeting cost-benefit and risk 
calculations, which can be subject to variation as proposed in the central argument. This 
section outlines the kinds of status goals for which states employ prestige-building, and 
gives examples of this activity. This section and the next section also address criticisms 




There will be as many kinds of prestige as there are status roles, so states with differing 
status ambitions might be equally keen to acquire prestige, but will engage in differing 
activities to do so. As noted in the previous chapter, Heimann points out that various 
status hierarchies can exist in parallel; states may be high in some hierarchies and low in 
others, and the sum of their statuses will determine their overall standing in the 
international community.7 The political purposes of states, we saw earlier, will 
determine which status groups they will seek to join – with examples ranging from 
major power or advanced economy to normative exemplar or leader of the developing 
world. As Anne Clunan notes, these may be determined by material characteristics such 
as wealth or power, or “by political and economic governance, cultural affinity, or 
tradition.”8 In addition, Michelle Murray points out that anarchy contains a “potentially 
infinite” range of social structures in which states could choose to pursue their 
aspirations. “Just as with individuals, every state has multiple identities that only 
                                                
6 Markey, ‘Prestige and the Origins of War,’ 157-61. 
7 Heimann, ‘What Does It Take to Be a Great Power?,’ 188. 
8 Clunan, The Social Construction of Russia's Resurgence, 31. 
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become salient in certain contexts, so at any given time a single state may be engaged in 
multiple struggles for recognition.”9 
 
Taking a parallel, or multi-axis, approach to status is more useful in this project than the 
motivations for status competition generally found in SIT. Mercer has observed that SIT 
was originally developed as an explanation for conflict where it occurred for non-
material reasons. He has noted SIT’s division of test subjects into in-groups and out-
groups, that are seen to generate intergroup competition.10 SIT’s origins in social 
psychology appear too restrictive for it to explain the patterns of activity in this project. 
It may well be that individuals relate to in-groups and out-groups in conflictual ways. 
But states have a vastly greater choice of groups or roles with which to be associated, 
and this should reduce the need to link prestige-building and conflict. 
 
To further explore the implications of this concept, “multi-axis” prestige-building 
reduces the likelihood that prestige gains for one necessarily come at a relative cost to 
others. The latter is implied in meanings of prestige typically found in classical and 
canonical literature and in traditional diplomatic practice. A single axis makes status a 
positional good, which means that “high status is thus inherently scarce, and 
competitions for status tend to be zero sum.”11  Gains in status can only come at costs to 
others, which means status-seeking can be inherently conflictual. Multiple hierarchies 
of status allow for multiple axes of prestige-building: a range of socially creative 
strategies become possible, and actors can pursue status without necessarily impinging 
                                                
9 Michelle Murray, ‘Identity, Insecurity, and Great Power Politics:The Tragedy of German Naval 
Ambition before the First World War,’ Security Studies 19, no. 4 (2010): 665. 
10 Mercer, ‘Anarchy and Identity,’ 237, 241. 
11 Wohlforth, ‘Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War,’ 30. 
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on each other’s interests. It is possible to study the effect of status concerns in many 
areas separate from international conflict.12  
 
A second implication of the multi-axis approach is that prestige-building will frequently 
involve trade-offs between different values. It will typically be difficult for a state to 
devote too much effort to one avenue of status-seeking because the costs and risks will 
be too high. An excessive effort on one front will undermine interests elsewhere. This 
process becomes more visible after separating the concepts of prestige and status, as the 
distinction between means and ends allows us to envisage a pattern where states engage 
in prestige accumulation in order to achieve status goals. The case studies in this project 
look at situations where the normal balance in status-seeking has been upset by status 
crises. These crises can have the effect of tilting the balance of effort toward one axis of 
prestige-building, which requires a particular trade-off, and results in more assertive 
foreign policies.   
 
Examples of prestige-building 
 
The case studies of this project each show examples of states pursuing multiple status 
ambitions. In each of the three cases, the states in question advanced prestige-building 
policies on separate, simultaneous tracks. India had since independence taken on such 
diverse status roles as normative exemplar, leader of the Non-Aligned Movement, 
regional hegemon, and prospective great power; China pursued the status of great power 
and leader of the developing world; and Japan sought both “dignity” as an equal 
sovereign state, and recognition of its material achievements. The trade-offs between 
these prestige-building programs aimed at producing different statuses help explain 
                                                
12 Larson and Shevchenko, 'Managing Rising Powers,' 25. 
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many policy outcomes. However, it is worth stepping back and looking at other 
examples of how states pursue prestige – whether they are large, medium or small 
powers. 
 
A distinctive example of major power-status seeking is given by Larson and 
Shevchenko, who point to Brazil’s efforts from around 2003 to win recognition as a 
great power and build its candidacy for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security 
Council. Their study describes several strategies by Brazil’s President da Silva: joining 
a greater range of international institutions and diplomatic “clubs”; setting up the IBSA 
(India, Brazil, South Africa) Forum of large, multicultural, developing democracies; and 
having Brazil take a greater  responsibility for UN peacekeeping and stabilisation 
missions. At the same time, Brazil maintained an identity as a developing country, and 
continued to develop its credentials on behalf of developing countries in WTO 
negotiations, on climate change and as a “norm entrepreneur.”13 
 
Prestige-building in the pursuit of status recognition is not limited to great power 
candidates, as David Kang points out in a study of South Korea. From the mid-1990s, 
Seoul built its middle power credentials upon its economic success, accession to the 
OECD, and successful consolidation of its democracy. South Korea then worked from 
2009 to actively promote a national image through public diplomacy and campaigns by 
multiple government agencies, often emphasising Korean pop culture. Kang notes that 
this “headlong rush for status” has the problem that South Korea itself does not seem 
clear about what it stands for and how it hopes to get it. In particular, he notes that “the 
relationship is not at all clear between popular culture and the deeper views that others 
hold of a nation, or that popular culture can reflect deeper values and goals of a society 
                                                
13 Ibid., 49-51. 
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in a meaningful manner.”14 The implication is that a public branding exercise may not 
be sufficient to build prestige, unless connected to specific foreign policy goals and 
values.  
 
At another level of national scale, a useful volume by Iver Neumann and Benjamin de 
Carvalho explores the neglected topic of small-power status-seeking. Focusing on the 
case of Norway, Neumann and de Carvalho note that the study of status is too much 
concentrated on competition and conflict between the great powers. Yet compared with 
them, small states may be even more concerned about status, because the latter do not 
have the option of playing in the domain of power politics. Small powers such as 
Norway therefore try to be noticed by taking their own (relatively) small responsibility 
for international peace and security. “Small states achieve status through making 
themselves useful to greater powers,” Neumann and de Carvalho note.15 The prestige-
building activities of small and even middle powers by definition requires a wider 
understanding of the possibilities of status roles than is allowed for by the status 
literature’s focus on international conflict.  
 
Criticism of prestige 
 
While this thesis makes a specific use of prestige, we have seen that it (prestige) is an 
old concept in IR and foreign policy practice, and its underlying validity has been 
criticised. This criticism is well summarised in Mercer’s comment that “prestige is an 
illusion. It has neither strategic nor intrinsic value.”16 Mercer argues that states base 
their own perceptions of prestige upon actions that give them pride, but this gains them 
                                                
14 David C. Kang, ‘Status and Leadership on the Korean Peninsula,’ Orbis 54, no. 4 (2010): 550-51. 
15 Iver B. Neumann and Benjamin de Carvalho, Small States and Status Seeking : Norway's Quest for 
International Standing, New International Relations (London ; New York, NY: Routledge, 2015), 2. 
16 Mercer, ‘The Illusion of International Prestige,’ 135. 
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no real power, while their peers belittle them and refute their prestigiousness. Mercer 
puts the following questions to anyone seeking to build IR theories of prestige: “One 
should be sceptical of prestige arguments that do not explain or document how actors 
evaluate their prestige, how observers assess an actor’s prestige, or why one should 
expect an adversary’s voluntary deference.”17 The questions of evaluation and 
assessment are addressed in the next part of this chapter, while the following addresses 
the question of deference. 
 
The way to clarify the role of deference as a product of prestige is to recall that prestige 
is a general belief. An actor has prestige when the members of the relevant social group 
generally believe that the other members believe the actor has positive qualities.18 When 
a state faces an adversary, neither party need believe the other has a high reputation, but 
they judge each other’s prestige based on what they believe the wider community 
generally believes about them. This is reflected in the way most literature refers to the 
topic: status is “a valuable resource for coordinating expectations of dominance and 
deference”; or “status informs patterns of deference and expectations of behaviour.”19 
Prestige builds status which in turn is a way of informing actors about the deference 
relationships that may be expected. There is no need for an adversary to accept that 
relationship, only for the adversary to be aware that most members of the community 
take it into account. With this said, it is also necessary that actors can perceive prestige, 
and this is a topic of the next part of this chapter. 
 
 
                                                
17 Ibid., 168. 
18 O'Neill, Nuclear Weapons and National Prestige; Dafoe, Renshon, and Huth, ‘Reputation and Status,’ 
364. See also: Renshon, ‘Status Deficits and War,’ 518-19; Larson, Paul, and Wohlforth, 'Status and 
World Order,' 8; Dafoe, Renshon, and Huth, ‘Reputation and Status,’ 364. 
19 Renshon, ‘Status Deficits and War,’ 515; Dafoe, Renshon, and Huth, ‘Reputation and Status,’ 374-75. 
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Self-perceptions of prestige and status 
 
Even if we have working concepts of prestige and status, we then must know how states 
are able to perceive and measure their own prestige and status. This is important 
because the variable at the centre of the project is the change in states’ perception of 
their status that comes about as part of a status crisis. This invites Mercer’s question 
about how states observe or assess their own prestige and that of others, because status 
recognition will be accorded on the basis of prestige. As Jervis comments, “it is hard to 
know what a person's perceptions were and even harder to know whether they were 
correct.”20 This section explains that while prestige and status can sometimes be related 
directly to material assets, the overriding issue is that they are general beliefs. This 
means they can only be assessed – indeed they only matter – as a result of negotiation 
and diplomatic practice. A key way in which this practice works is through states 




This project uses the concept of status roles to help explain how status is assessed by 
actors and observers. Status roles provide a useful connection between accumulated 
prestige and recognition of status, because they allow a shorthand understanding for an 
actor’s position on a social hierarchy. This in turn is important because status only 
delivers its benefits – rights, recognition and the expectation of deference – when it is 
recognised by others. Recognition requires a consensus, yet could be difficult when 
actors can build prestige along many different axes and may sit high in some status 
hierarchies and lower in others.21 In IR, an easily understood status role, such as “great 
                                                
20 Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, 7. 
21 See pp.78-80 above. 
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power”, “developed country”, or “sovereign state” clearly signals the social hierarchy in 
which a state sits. This matters, because as explained below, prestige and status are 
general beliefs that only arise because of publicly visible qualities. Status is only 
possible because audiences can reach consensuses on general beliefs, and by taking on a 
known role, an actor helps its audience to simplify and speed this process. 
 
The concept of a status role is a shorthand that is most relevant to the creation of general 
beliefs among audiences – that is, audiences’ ability to agree that qualities are 
prestigious and warranting status. Roles may entail varying levels of status, and involve 
varying costs to acquire, with the choice of objective determined the political purposes 
of states.22 Acquring roles may however lead to changes in strategy, as the implied or 
explicit demands of audiences cause states to learn or be socialised into their roles.23 
Status roles should not be confused with status markers, which are acquisitions 
contributing to an actor being recognised for a status role. For example, China in 2008 
displayed the status marker of hosting the Olympic Games,24 but this was merely a 
means to the end of the desired status role of rising great power (evidenced by being 
able not only to afford the Games, but to capably host them). In addition, the key risk 
attached to status roles is the fact that their shorthand nature is an asset and a 
vulnerability. If a status role is threatened, an actor could at once lose status recognition 
from an entire audience. Because of this, this project looks closely at the behaviour of 
states when they perceive threats to valued status roles. 
 
                                                
22 See p.78, and discussion of national role conceptions at p.263. 
23 See: Sebastian Harnisch, 'Role Theory: Operationalization of Key Concepts,' in Role Theory in 
International Relations: Approaches and Analyses, ed. Sebastian Harnisch, Cornelia Frank, and Hanns 
Maull (Routledge, 2011), 10-12; Stephen G Walker, 'National Role Conceptions and Systemic 
Outcomes,' in Psychological Models in International Politics, ed. Lawrence S. Falkowski (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1979), 173.See also p.271 below for discussion of how status roles may constrain a state. 
24 See for example: Pu and Schweller, 'Status Signalling,' 143. 
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Social and perceptual considerations 
 
Some scholars do approach the question of prestige and status by measuring underlying 
material qualities. Some see prestige as “an epiphenomenon of material power” and 
therefore measured on material grounds,25 while others see it as measurable 
quantitatively, for example by the density of a state’s diplomatic connections.26 This 
may be adequate when the discussion is of a single axis of status, typically great power 
status, which flows readily from material measures of prestige. But this thesis contends 
that states have many status roles and prestige is pursued through numerous axes. As a 
result Wohlforth comments that while some cases of prestige-building may be easy to 
identify, others are difficult to measure, and then the question becomes how do actors 
agree on what to measure?27 As the following argument sets out, the key to this lies in 
conceptualising the nature of prestige as a general or higher-order belief.  
 
When the belief in question is a higher-order one, actors are making judgements about 
commonly held beliefs or “social facts”. This means judgements are about ideas that 
have been heard, debated or even fought over by the group, just as much or even more 
so than they are about underlying material facts. The key to assessing status is therefore 
to consider that it is made up of a combination of negotiation over according it, and then 
perceptions that it has been accorded. As Renshon notes: 
[That status] is both perceptual (based on beliefs) and social (in that it requires some 
shared consensus about relative position) aids in empirical investigation since these 
qualities imply what is termed the “visibility” or “publicity” hypothesis: the only way to 
obtain status is through actions that can be seen by others or actions that have visible 
consequences.28 
                                                
25 Wood, ‘Prestige in World Politics,’ 388; Wohlforth, ‘Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power 
War.’ 
26 Paul, Larson, and Wohlforth, Status in World Politics, 10-11. 
27 Wohlforth, 'Status Dilemmas and Interstate Conflict,' 121. 
28 Renshon, ‘Status Deficits and War,’ 520. 
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These points highlight that the underlying positive qualities that contribute to prestige 
become only part of the status equation. Assessments of prestige instead are made up of 
an observation that there has been a process of negotiation, combined with 
consideration of how well the acquisition of prestige has been communicated to the 
group. 
 
Negotiation of prestige 
 
When it is understood that prestige and status are both general, higher-order beliefs, the 
process of measuring them also becomes a matter of beliefs. This is true even in 
situations when prestige predominantly comes from quantifiable, material assets, 
because even then we are assuming a general belief that these assets matter. As we 
move to contexts where many status roles are in play, assessing them comes down to 
two main factors: how much states care about them, and negotiation over what counts. 
 
States’ strong beliefs about certain measures of prestige and status make a difference, 
because they contribute to the process of contestation that actually makes prestige and 
status relevant. As Dafoe, Renshon and Huth remark, across the status literature the one 
thing that scholars agree upon is that “leaders, policy elites, and national populations are 
often concerned, even obsessed, with their status and reputation… In fact, the 
importance of reputation and status is so self-evident to leaders that threats against those 
interests are often used to compel and deter other states.”29 Even Mercer, arguing that 
prestige is illusory, accepts that “evidence that states seek international prestige is 
overwhelming.”30 This sensitivity is important because it highlights the way that status 
and prestige are established, like most concepts of hierarchy in IR, by contestation and 
                                                
29 Dafoe, Renshon, and Huth, ‘Reputation and Status,’ 381. 
30 Mercer, ‘The Illusion of International Prestige,’ 133. 
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negotiation. Vincent Pouliot provides a valuable account of how political negotiation, 
social context and practice in fact give meaning to status. He argues that in the absence 
of a “symbolic hegemon”, rules of status attribution are inherently ambiguous and 
disputed, so “what counts as a valuable asset, sometimes even worthy of special status, 
is defined, contested, and implemented in and through diplomatic debate and 
practice.”31 Returning to the above point, the fact that such rules exist is indicated by the 
fact that states care about them. As a result, we should not look to theories to 
deductively establish when and how prestige and status matter, but instead we should be 
guided inductively by the words and actions of decision-makers themselves. 
 
Numerous case studies highlight states’ own signals as part of this process of 
negotiation. For example, Joshua Freedman notes that it is hard to work out where 
China stands on any international status hierarchy, and even harder to use that limited 
information to predict that China will suffer status insecurity. Instead, it is necessary to 
try to track China’s own beliefs about its status via its statements and its acquisition of 
status symbols and emulation of high-status society.32  Another example can be seen in 
Norichika Kanie’s argument that Japan is a status underachiever and is prepared to take 
greater risks and pay higher costs to augment its status. Kanie uses as evidence Japan’s 
self-perceived status referred to in its Diplomatic Yearbook, and many references to 
leadership and initiative in official documents.33 Interesting cases in the literature look 
back to the Congress of Vienna: status-signalling there included Russian and French 
                                                
31 Vincent Pouliot, 'Setting Status in Stone: The Negotiation of International Institutional Privileges ' in 
Status in World Politics, ed. T. V. Paul, Deborah Welch Larson, and William C. Wohlforth (Cambridge 
University Press, 2014), 194-95. 
32 Freedman, ‘Status Insecurity and Temporality in World Politics,’ 808. 
33 Norichika Kanie, 'Japan as an Underachiever: Major Power Status in Climate Change Politics,' in 
Major Powers and the Quest for Status in International Politics: Global and Regional Perspectives, ed. 
Thomas J Volgy, et al. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 116-20. 
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declarations of their claims to great-power status, after initially being excluded from 
negotiations around the Congress.34  
 
States strive to establish their prestige and status as general beliefs. Relatively easy 
ways to identify this can be seen in practices such as conspicuous consumption, and 
institutionalisation of status. Conspicuous consumption involves costly expenditure on 
prestige projects in both civil and military areas.35 It is a way of communicating a 
state’s possession of substantial material assets, because some programs “require 
enormous capabilities and resources that most countries do not possess.”36 For example, 
many states appear to believe the expense of hosting the Olympic Games is 
prestigious;37 certainly the denial of hosting the games, as was suffered by China in 
regards to the 2000 Games, may be taken as a blow to prestige.38 Other examples have 
included the possession of colonies, a space program, a national airline or nuclear 
weapons.39 In a contemporary context, scholars note China’s expenditure on a manned 
space program and an aircraft carrier construction drive.40 The latter examples are 
notable because observers can readily see that China is spending more on these 
programs than would be expected for their material benefits alone.41 
 
If conspicuous consumption promotes material bases of prestige, normative prestige is 
often reinforced through the granting of privileges in international institutions. Heimann 
                                                
34 Iver B. Neumann, 'Status Is Cultural,' in Status in World Politics, ed. T. V. Paul, Deborah Welch 
Larson, and William C. Wohlforth (Cambridge University Press, 2014), 88; Benjamin Zala, ‘Great Power 
Management and Ambiguous Order in Nineteenth-Century International Society,’ Review of 
International Studies 43, no. 2 (2016): 375. 
35 This is also the topic of a forthcoming book by Lilach Gilady, The Price of Prestige: Conspicuous 
consumption in international relations, Chicago University Press 2018. 
36 Pu and Schweller, 'Status Signalling,' 145. 
37 Wood, ‘Prestige in World Politics,’ 405. 
38 Yong Deng, ‘Hegemon on the Offensive: Chinese Perspectives on U.S. Global Strategy,’ Political 
Science Quarterly 116, no. 3 (2001): 354. 
39 Lebow, A Cultural Theory of International Relations, 322. 
40 Fiona Cunningham, ‘The Stellar Status Symbol: True Motives for China’s Manned Space Program,’ 
China Security 5, no. 3 (2009); Pu and Schweller, 'Status Signalling.' 
41 Pu and Schweller, 'Status Signalling,' 151. 
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notes that measures of prestige include the privileges awarded to high-prestige states in 
collective security institutions (such as receiving a permanent UN Security Council 
seat), gaining the right to form a sphere of influence, and receiving a place in the 
informal, exclusive forums that make up a concert of powers.42 These all contribute to 
the “sticky” nature of status, and Larson, Paul and Wohlforth refer in this context to the 
process of “concretising” status.43 This explains how status can endure even as its 
material or normative underpinnings change as, for example, in the cases of Britain and 





Even accepting that the value of prestige arises from negotiation, it might still be argued 
that it is difficult for any consensus to arise on what status should be accorded to it. This 
provides an important insight into understanding why certain activities will be 
prestigious. The actor’s activities or assets do not need to be inherently valuable, nor 
convince every observer that they are valuable. Actors only need to believe that the 
social group in general will be convinced of their value. This compares with reputations, 
where every actor has an individual and private judgement of each other actor. 
Prestigiousness does not require knowing other actors’ private judgements; it only 
requires knowing the general belief, which by definition can only be the belief that is 
openly discussed and communicated throughout the group. This means that establishing 
                                                
42 Heimann, ‘What Does It Take to Be a Great Power?,’ 190. 
43 Larson, Paul, and Wohlforth, 'Status and World Order,' 10-11. 
44 See: Benjamin Zala, ‘Polarity Analysis and Collective Perceptions of Power: The Need for a New 
Approach,’ Journal of Global Security Studies 2, no. 1 (2017): 7-9. 
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prestige and status is not a matter of changing individual judgements, but of promoting 
a general belief.  
 
In addition to the higher-order belief aspects of prestige and status noted above, this 
project is specifically focused on change in perceptions of status. States certainly appear 
to be able to quickly recognise when their relative status changes. As Renshon notes: 
“While preferences for higher status can be taken as a constant, the level of concern 
over relative status is not and thus provides far greater analytical leverage in examining 
the effects of status in world politics.”45 Scholarship in this field shows very interesting 
results in terms of how test participants agree on measurement. Compared with private 
judgements, it is remarkably easy for groups to reach a consensus on what they believe 
a general belief to be.46 This in turn helps us to explain how states can so readily detect 




The result of prestige and status’ general nature is that assessing them often does not 
concern their underlying merits as much as how well they are communicated. An 
inspiration for this comes from studies of the earliest examples of prestige goods in 
human societies. One study notes that humans are unique in that social standing is not 
based solely on violence or threats; instead prestige means gaining admiration or 
deference from others based on qualities such as knowledge, expertise or skill.47 
Prestige goods provide “costly and therefore honest signals” of skill, but anthropologists 
were puzzled as to why they were necessary. The finding was that the goods’ “signal 
                                                
45 Renshon, ‘Status Deficits and War,’ 514. 
46 Larson, Paul, and Wohlforth, 'Status and World Order,' 8. 
47 Aimée M. Plourde, ‘The Origins of Prestige Goods as Honest Signals of Skill and Knowledge,’ Human 
Nature 19, no. 4 (2008). 
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content”, or advertising value, saved considerable time and effort in interactions with 
others.48 Applied to IR, this is a way of seeing prestige-building as a mechanism for 
effective communication. States will choose forms of prestige that will signal their 
suitability for recognition for certain kinds of status. In addition to this, one point from 
the anthropological example that is worth keeping in mind throughout the present study: 
signals need to be costly in order to be convincing. We can see in the case studies that 
follow that decision-makers appear to be strongly aware that policies that will 
significantly boost prestige are also costly ones. 
 
An implication of dealing with higher-order beliefs is that when assessing any actor’s 
prestige, others will save time on studying that actor, and instead will survey the beliefs 
of the rest of the social group. This is O’Neill’s approach when he asserts that what 
matters is what “everybody” in the social group believes. We have seen that a 
prestigious activity generates strong higher-order beliefs, not private beliefs. O’Neill 
outlines that what counts are the abstract properties of an event: whether it is commonly 
known to be of concern to others; if it is a sudden event; if the event makes a clean 
break with existing circumstances; and whether it puts the acting state objectively 
higher on a scale of success compared with others.49 As he points out, nuclear test 
explosions are particularly prestigious because “nuclear tests can be made ‘public 
events,’ in the technical sense that they generate not only knowledge that they have 
occurred but knowledge of others’ knowledge of that fact.”50 
 
Building on this approach, Jonathan Renshon notes that “events are not likely to change 
a state’s position unless they are highly public (visible to all actors in the community), 
                                                
48 Ibid. 
49 O'Neill, Nuclear Weapons and National Prestige, 15-16. 
50 Ibid., 2. 
 93 
dramatic or salient (to capture the attention of potential observers), and convey 
unambiguous information.”51 Renshon argues that a lack of ambiguity is important. If 
no two actors agree, then there will be no change to the state’s status. As such, he points 
out that while war is well known in IR as a way to reveal capabilities, it is useful in the 
context of status because it also reveals behaviour and outcomes. In other words, war 
reveals private information, and the demonstration of capabilities and behaviours 
influences others in the social hierarchy to simultaneously re-calibrate their 
judgements.52 
 
The above is relevant in this research project if we are able to broaden the scope of 
research from the issue of inter-state war to other kinds of events that force 
simultaneous revaluations of prestige judgements. The case studies that follow 
emphasise the role of status crises in causing revaluations of previously existing 
strategies. A further extension of the above extends from inter-state conflict to activities 
that are symbolic of prestige. These examples are prestigious because of accepted social 
rules. As O’Neill notes in relation to public and contentious prestige-building activities, 
they “provide some grounded public evidence of a state’s qualities but their symbolic 
nature gives them special weight in observers’ estimates of how other observers are 
taking them.”53 Examples might include states joining substantive international 
networks, with alliances, trade and institutional connections that are perceived as more 
valuable measures than diplomatic missions alone.54 
 
 
                                                
51 Renshon, ‘Status Deficits and War,’ 526. 
52 Ibid. 
53 O'Neill, Nuclear Weapons and National Prestige, 27-28. 
54 Zeev Maoz, Networks of Nations : The Evolution, Structure, and Impact of International Networks, 
1816-2001, Structural Analysis in the Social Sciences (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2011), 226. 
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Decision-making and crises 
 
This thesis does not try to distinguish between whether status is pursued in the interest 
of “self-esteem” or for instrumental ends. These purposes most likely overlap. Instead, 
the thesis focuses on whether specific actions in building prestige are perceived by 
states as helping to achieve status ambitions. This outcomes-based approach explains 
the context for states making cost-benefit analyses about prestige-earning activity. 
“Actions are valued and chosen not for themselves, but as more or less efficient means 
to a further end.”55 The thesis assumes that the behaviour is based on cost-benefit 
analyses, but decision-makers may frame their thinking in different ways under 
different circumstances. In particular, crises force revaluations of their thinking, leading 




This project assumes rationality among decision-makers, but in ways that are modified 
by biases under the kinds of circumstances seen in the case studies. This is consistent 
with the basic ontological and epistemological assumptions of the neoclassical realist 
approach to IR. The rationality that is assumed has been defined by Duncan Snidal as 
“individual goal-seeking under constraints;” but these goals can be not only self-
regarding and material, but also other-regarding and normative or ideational.56 As Jon 
Elster points out, we do not have to assume that actors are reward-maximising, only that 
they are reward-sensitive: “In general, of course, rational choice theory can easily 
accommodate non-material or non-selfish interests. What matters is whether the actors 
                                                
55 Jon Elster, Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences (Cambridge University Press, 1989), 22. 
56 Duncan Snidal, 'Rational Choice and International Relations,' in Handbook of International Relations, 
ed. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A Simmons (SAGE Publications Limited, 2013). 
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pursue their goals in an instrumentally rational manner, not whether these goals are 
defined in terms of material self-interest.”57  
 
One approach to possible biases in decision-makers’ mindsets, which looks at issues 
relevant to this project, is found in the work of Johnson and Tierney on a “Rubicon 
theory” of war.58 The Rubicon theory is based on psychological theories of action 
phases, in which “processes of judgment and decision-making vary over time.”59 It 
addresses the puzzle in IR that states are generally cautious, and concerned about 
factors such as the security dilemma, yet once war seems imminent, they become 
overconfident and contribute to a spiral of escalation. Johnson and Tierney address this 
using an argument that actors can make normal decisions mostly rationally, but after 
committing to a matter such as war, they become heavily influenced by psychological 
biases.  
 
In explaining why actors may become more confident once they have committed to an 
action, Johnson and Tierney propose that a “deliberative” mind-set dominates in the 
phase before decisions are made, when options and possible outcomes are weighed and 
compared, while an “implemental” mind-set dominates the post-decisional phase, when 
the actor is carrying out the chosen course of action. They note that actors in the 
deliberative phase “adopt a relatively objective approach to judgment and decision-
making, weighing the expected utility of different options in an effort to make the best 
selection.”60 This approaches the rational actor model of decision making. The major 
                                                
57 Jon Elster, ‘Rational Choice History: A Case of Excessive Ambition,’ American Political Science 
Review 94, no. 3 (2000): 692. 
58 Dominic D. P. Johnson and Dominic Tierney, ‘The Rubicon Theory of War: How the Path to Conflict 
Reaches the Point of No Return,’ International Security 36, no. 1 (2011). 
59 Jack S. Levy, 'Psychology and Foreign Policy Decision-Making,' in The Oxford Handbook of Political 
Psychology, 2nd Edition, ed. Leonie Huddy, David O. Sears, and Jack S. Levy (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013). 
60 Johnson and Tierney, ‘The Rubicon Theory of War: How the Path to Conflict Reaches the Point of No 
Return,’ 13-14. 
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differences between the phases involve the introduction of psychological biases. In the 
“implemental” mind-set, there are likely to be biases including reduced receptivity to 
new information, one-sided processing of information, vulnerability to cognitive 
dissonance, self-serving evaluations, and illusions of control.61 The net result is a spike 
in overconfidence.  
 
The “Rubicon theory” has close parallels with this project’s central argument, under 
which prestige-building efforts vary under differing circumstances. This thesis draws on 
the Rubicon theory in order to operationalise the concepts of status and prestige in a 
causal sense. The case studies in this project show situations when decision-makers 
committed to increased prestige-building efforts, and once they had done so they 
appeared to be influenced by the same biases enumerated by Johnson and Tierney. This 
supports a prediction that they would take more risks to accumulate prestige, and it is 
consistent with neoclassical realist literature on biases in decision-making.62 Because of 
this, this project looks to apply the claims of this literature to the realms of 
operationalisation and applied empirical analysis. The above said, it is necessary to 
return to the cause of that increase in prestige-building efforts, the status crisis, which is 
explained below.  
 
                                                
61 Ibid., 15-18. 
62 Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics; Wohlforth, ‘The Perception of Power.’; 
Janice Gross Stein, 'Decision Making: Rational, Psychological, and Neurological Models,' in Foreign 
Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases, ed. Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield, and Tim Dunne (Oxford University 
Press, 2008). 
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Crises and revaluations 
 
In this project, the main driver of a change in cost-benefit calculations is a status crisis. 
To further develop the definition of a crisis given above,63 a crisis is an event involving 
the intersection of threat, time and surprise; or as Stein puts it, “a threat to basic values 
that simultaneously creates a sense of urgency and uncertainty among policy makers.”64 
Richard Ned Lebow writes “the perception of risk generates the intensity and stress that 
are so characteristic of crisis,” while time constraints are “likely to have a significant 
impact on the nature of the decision-making process.”65 A crisis is a “moment of 
truth”,66 in which a full range of elements such as power configurations, interests, 
images and alignments tend to be more sharply clarified, as they are activated and 
focused on a single well-defined issue. For example, the effect of a crisis on perceptions 
of the likelihood of war has been described in the following terms: “In placid peacetime, 
this expectation of potential war remains in the background of the statesman’s 
consciousness and its effects are muted, diffuse and not easily observable. In a crisis, 
the expectation is dramatically elevated and its behavioural effects stand starkly 
revealed.”67 Leaders tend to be risk averse when things are going well and relatively 
                                                
63 At p.19 above: “A threat to basic values that simultaneously creates a sense of urgency and uncertainty 
among policy makers,” a sudden event, and a catalyst for reassessing foreign policy goals and strategies. 
64 Stein, ‘Crisis Management: Looking Back to Look Forward.’ In a similar definition, Charles Hermann 
says: “A crisis is a situation that 1) threatens high-priority goals of the decision-making unit; 2) restricts 
the amount of time available for response before the decision is transformed, and 3) surprises the 
members of the decision-making unit by its occurrence.” Charles F. Hermann, 'International Crisis as a 
Situational Variable,' in International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader, ed. James N. Rosenau (New 
York: Free Press, 1969). This may be distinguished from other definitions such as Brecher and 
Wilkenfeld, who see an international crisis as an increase in disruptive interactions between states, raising 
the probability of armed conflict: Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, A Study of Crisis (Ann 
Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1997), 4. 
65 Lebow, Between Peace and War, 11-12. 
66 Glenn H.  Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and 
System Structure in International Crises (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977), 4. 
67 Ibid. 
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risk acceptant when things are going badly, when they face a crisis in which they are 
likely to lose or have lost something that matters to them.68 
 
As in an international security crisis, a status crisis is important because of the way it 
changes perceptions. Crises are referred to in this project as “functional” because of the 
way they crystallise perceptions about status and roles. In line with the neo-classical 
realist literature, this approach assumes that unlike structural theories of IR, the 
transmission of power to policy is “indirect and problematic.”69 Status crises also have 
the property of “perceptual shocks”, as the term is used by Gideon Rose: “Single events 
[that] suddenly make decision makers aware of the cumulative effects of gradual long-
term power trends.”70 For example, Aaron Friedberg gives a historical case study in 
which crises punctuated the slow evolution of decision-makers’ thinking: “Change went 
forward as the result of gradual, diffuse intellectual developments that were 
consolidated and accelerated by periodic crises.”71  Or to put it bluntly, in a crisis 
“reality is stripped of clutter allowing cause and effect to be more readily identified.”72  
 
There may be a variety of reasons why a crisis causes a revaluation of preferences. The 
public nature of crises helps reveal actors’ preferences. Actions such as mobilisation 
must be a “costly signal” if the other side is to revise its beliefs (otherwise it is just 
“cheap talk”).73 In addition, we can say we can recognise a crisis because it involves “a 
qualitative change in the communication processes amongst the actors involved.”74 
                                                
68 Janice Gross Stein, 'Crisis Behavior: Miscalculation, Escalation, and Inadvertent War,' in The 
International Studies Encyclopedia, ed. Robert A. Denemark and Renee Marlin-Bennett (Wiley-
Blackwell, 2010). 
69 Rose, ‘Neoclassical Realism,’ 157-58. 
70 Ibid., 159. 
71 Friedberg, The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 1895-1905, 288. 
72 Uriel Rosenthal, Michael T. Charles, and Paul 't Hart, Coping with Crises : The Management of 
Disasters, Riots, and Terrorism (Springfield, Ill., U.S.A.: C.C. Thomas, 1989), 7. 
73 James D. Fearon, ‘Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes,’ The 
American Political Science Review 88, no. 3 (1994): 578. 
74 Michele Acuto, ‘Diplomats in Crisis,’ Diplomacy & Statecraft 22, no. 3 (2011): 525. 
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Other characteristics of the crisis situation include time limitations, which allow 
decision-makers to dispense with bureaucratic procedures; decision-makers’ 
disagreements and antagonisms are subdued due to “a felt need for ultimate consensus”; 
and the threat to high-priority objectives means considerable energy is devoted to the 
problem and searching for innovative solution.75 These are all conditions conducive to a 
clear communication of changing circumstances, which we saw were also the 
conditions for establishing new social facts. This is a further explanation for why a 
crisis situation is likely to lead to change in status perceptions. 
 
The conceptual framework outlined in this chapter is employed to analyse the case 
studies that follow. Prestige is a general belief about an actor’s positive qualities, while 
status is also a general belief, about an actor’s position in a social hierarchy. The 
connection is that relevant prestige wins recognition for specific status roles, so status 
recognition may be seen as formalisation of prestige into a social hierarchy. In the case 
studies, status concerns and prestige-building were seen to be operationalised through a 
three-part process. First, during a phase of normal status-seeking, states accumulated 
different types of prestige in order to win recognition for a variety of status roles. 
Second, unexpected threats to that status recognition emerged that revealed information 
about the situation and forced a revaluation of strategy; as such, these situations are 
referred to as status crises. Third, states communicated their status claims more 
assertively through enhanced prestige-building. In this phase, decision-makers narrowed 
and concentrated their status goals and their policies to achieve these goals accepted 
greater costs and risks.  
 
                                                
75 Hermann, 'International Crisis as a Situational Variable,' 416. 
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SECTION A. EXISTING EXPLANATIONS 
 
Introducing the case  
  
In January 1992, Japanese Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa told the United Nations 
Security Council that the body needed “to adjust its functions, composition, and other 
aspects so as to make it more reflective of the realities of the new era,” and this was “a 
process in which Japan is prepared to take an active part.”1 While couched in typically 
diplomatic language, this was the first time a Japanese leader had made such a call for 
reform at the UN, and it carried a clear implication that Japan should take up a 
permanent UNSC seat.2 The pursuit of the seat, aptly described by Ian Hurd as “a scarce 
international resource that confers immense status,”3 led Japan to embark on significant 
policy change and to display renewed ambition on the international stage. Yet Japan 
was also wracked by doubt amongst its politicians, officials and public, about whether it 
was prepared to take on the responsibilities that a permanent UNSC position entailed. 
By the end of 1993 the bid had stalled, with Japan never again to come so close to its 
goal. 
 
                                                
1 Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Diplomatic Bluebook (1992). 
2 Previous calls for UNSC reform had been made by diplomats and foreign ministers. See: Akiko 
Fukushima, Japanese Foreign Policy: The Emerging Logic of Multilateralism (St. Martin's Press, 1999), 
86.  
3 Ian Hurd, 'Security Council Reform: Informal Membership and Practice,' in The Once and Future 
Security Council, ed. Bruce Russett (New York: St Martin's Press, 1997), 148. 
 101 
The intensification of Japan’s bid for a permanent UNSC seat in 1992-93 forms the first 
historical case study of this research project. It should be stressed at the outset that 
Japan has maintained a “bid” for a permanent Security Council role from the beginning 
of its UN membership through to the present. The literature that is reviewed below deals 
with the bid over a range of periods. However, this case study is narrowly focused on a 
specific period including the 1990-91 Gulf War and the period that the bid was 
intensified from 1992-93. This tracks decisions from when the bid was openly declared 
at the UN in early 1992, until the point in late 1993 when the government of Japan 
relaxed its campaign.  
 
The case is dealt with in two sections: aside from introducing the case, this first section 
outlines what is already known, in the form of an outline of events and a review of the 
existing literature on Japan’s bid for a permanent UNSC seat. The second section is an 
analysis of the case against the central arguments of this thesis. The existing literature is 
small but useful in the sense that it places the bid in the context of Japan’s wider 
international relations, and provides detailed historical accounts of events. The latter is 
important because the intention of this thesis is to draw upon cases where it is already 
widely believed that status was a contributing factor in policy outcomes. This allows the 
research project to go more quickly to analysing the case to determine how status might 
have acted as a causal variable. As a result, the main aim of this literature review 
section is to examine the existing accounts to establish whether status motivations are a 
widely accepted factor in the case. This will identify whether this is a case where status 
is “most likely” to be a causal factor in policy outcomes. 
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The key literature on Japan’s UNSC bid includes detailed studies by Drifte, Pan, 
Akiyama, Dore and others.4 These are invaluable for placing the case study in an 
historical context, given the fact that Japan’s aspirations to a permanent Council role 
date from the very start of its UN membership. Doing so ensures that this project covers 
a full range of motivations for the bid. At the same time, as this section sets out, the 
literature leaves several puzzles unsolved. The most important gap concerns the actual 
function of status in Japan’s United Nations aspirations.  
 
While most scholars attribute a prestige or status motivation to the UNSC bid, the 
literature does not show us how this motivation may vary or have causal effect. This is 
the major focus of the case analysis in Section B of this chapter. A separate puzzle is 
worth mentioning: scholars frequently emphasise the value of a permanent UNSC seat 
as a prize in international politics, which raises the question of just why Japan’s efforts 
appeared so modest or even half-hearted. A short answer is that Japan’s unique 
domestic and international political sensitivities tended to mitigate against the benefits 
of the UNSC seat. A longer answer is that the analytical section will also help address 
this puzzle. By showing how perceptions of status varied over time, we gain some clues 
as to how political sensitivities might outweigh status attractions at one moment, but 




                                                
4 See: Drifte, Japan's Quest; Dimitris Bourantonis, The History and Politics of UN Security Council 
Reform (London: Routledge, 2005); Liang Pan, The United Nations in Japan's Foreign and Security 
Policymaking, 1945-1992: National Security, Party Politics, and International Status (Cambridge, Mass: 
Harvard University Asia Center, 2005); Nobumasa Akiyama, 'Japan's Failed Bid for a Permanent Seat on 
the UN Security Council,' in Examining Japan's Lost Decades, ed. Yoishi Funabashi (Routledge, 2015); 
C. S. Ahn, ‘Government-Party Coordination in Japan's Foreign Policy-Making: The Issue of Permanent 
Membership in the UNSC,’ Asian Survey 37, no. 4 (1997). 
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Outline of events 
 
Japan’s interest in a permanent UNSC seat can be traced back to immediately after 
Japan became the 80th UN member state in 1956.5 Only months after its admission, 
Japanese diplomats privately told allies that Japan was seeking a permanent seat, 
because it did not want to be disadvantaged in the first round of UN Charter reform that 
was taking place at the time.6 In terms of a long-term strategy, Reinhard Drifte assesses: 
It is difficult to say exactly when the Ministry of Foreign Affairs established a policy of 
pursuing a Security Council seat, at least as a long-term goal. However, the available 
evidence suggests that right from the time Japan became a member of the UN, Japanese 
policy aimed at reinforcing tendencies among the UN membership in favour of revising 
the Charter, promoting Japan as a leading member of the UN, and strengthening the 
UN's role in keeping world peace.7 
Diplomatic records indicate that Japan continued to privately express its interest in a 
seat through the 1960s.8 However, Japan’s first public declaration of its Security 
Council aspirations was in October 1968, when its UN Ambassador told an American 
audience that Japan was “now entitled to claim a permanent seat in the Security Council 
so we may be able to contribute fully all that is in our power to the search for peace 
through the United Nations.”9 This was followed by calls for UN reform by Japan’s 
foreign minister,10 and indeed by the early 1970s, Washington was supporting Japan on 
the matter.11 But with the growing membership and increasingly stark north-south 
divide in the General Assembly, by the mid-1970s momentum stalled.12   
 
                                                
5 Pan, The United Nations, 289. 
6 Ibid., 292. 
7 Reinhard Drifte, ‘Japan's Quest for a Permanent Seat on the Security Council,’ Asia-Pacific Review 5, 
no. 2 (1998): 90. 
8 Pan, The United Nations, 307. 
9 New York Times, 18 October 1968, cited in Drifte, Japan's Quest, 26. 
10 See addresses by Japanese Foreign Minister Kiichi Aichi to the UN General Assembly in 1969 and 
1970, at UN documents NL730334 and NL740486 respectively. 
11 Pan, The United Nations, 323. 
12 Ibid., 327-28. 
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During the 1980s, Japan continued its engagement with the UN, winning two more 
elected UNSC seats and gaining the title of most-frequently elected non-permanent 
member.13 Japan also launched a number of measures aimed at increasing its profile on 
international security issues, such as Prime Minister Takeshita’s 1988 “International 
Cooperation Initiative,” a policy of enhancing Japan’s international cooperation, 
overseas assistance, and cultural exchanges.14 However, while Japanese officials were 
keen to promote a greater Security Council role, Japan’s political leaders declined to 
raise the matter outside of domestic audiences.15 This was despite the signs by the late 
1980s that the Cold War deadlock was easing, and the Security Council was starting to 
become more influential – boosting the value of permanent membership to its non-
superpower members.16   
 
The literature highlights that Japan may have missed a crucial opportunity, around 
1990-91, to enact reform of the Security Council. Dimitris Bourantonis writes that at 
that time the USSR, later Russia, was inclined to cooperate with the West as a way of 
compensating for the collapse of its superpower status, while China was also disposed 
towards cooperation in order to ensure that it was seen as worthy of Western aid in the 
post-Tiananmen period.17 In September 1990, Italy proposed that the British and French 
seats be merged into a single European Union one plus one for Japan. Such a move may 
have also allowed for a permanent seat for the newly reunified Germany, which was 
starting to call for UNSC reform. But neither aspirant was sufficiently prepared to 
campaign and overcome the vested interests on the Council in order to achieve the 
                                                
13 Ibid., 332. 
14 Ibid., 335. 
15 Ibid., 333. Pan mentions a 1985 visit to Jakarta by an official from Japan’s ruling LDP. The nationalist 
official advocated Japan’s case for a UNSC seat, but was received coolly by the Indonesians. 
16 David L. Bosco, Five to Rule Them All: The UN Security Council and the Making of the Modern World 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 150-51. 
17 Bourantonis, The History and Politics of UN Security Council Reform, 33-34. 
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reform. As Bourantonis writes, “The reluctance of Germany and Japan openly to pursue 
permanent seats for themselves during the period 1990-91 facilitated the permanent 
five’s task of containing debate on the Council reform issue.”18  
 
The policy decisions in the immediate aftermath of the 1990-91 Gulf War make up the 
core of the case study, and they are analysed in detail in Section B of this chapter. To 
summarise, the sequence of events was as follows. Immediately after the conflict began 
with Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, the UNSC passed resolutions imposing 
economic sanctions and authorising a naval blockade. As the stand-off between Iraq and 
the US-led coalition continued in late 1990, the short-lived government of Toshiki 
Kaifu tried to pass a hastily drafted Peace Cooperation Bill, which would have allowed 
Japan to send some military contribution to the Gulf, but this failed in the Diet. After 
the war, many in Japan felt that the country had received little credit for its financial 
contribution – $12 billion – and the experience had highlighted the need for wide-
ranging political and economic reforms.19 There was then an upsurge of activity in 1992 
that included Prime Minister Miyazawa’s and Foreign Minister Watanabe’s speeches to 
the UN, statements by Japanese diplomats setting a timeline on the UNSC goal, and the 
passage of a revised international peacekeeping law. In December 1992, Japan joined a 
UN General Assembly resolution sponsored by 40 states that launched a Security 
Council reform discussion.20 However, the bid lost momentum under Miyazawa’s 
successor Morihiro Hosokawa. After considerable debate, Hosokawa’s September 1993 
address to the UN merely referenced general UNSC reform, not an enhanced Japanese 
role, marking a step back from Japan’s previous efforts.21  
                                                
18 Ibid., 36. 
19 An example of its impact on Japanese thinking can be seen at: Ichirō Ozawa and Eric Gower, Blueprint 
for a New Japan: The Rethinking of a Nation, trans. Louisa Rubinfien, vol. 2 (Kodansha International, 
1994), 36-9. 
20 Akiyama, 'Japan's Failed Bid,' 279-80. 
21 Ibid., 280-82.  
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By way of aftermath, in 1994 Tokyo became even more distracted by the collapse of 
Japan’s post-war political system.22 Hosokawa’s successor, Tomiichi Murayama, 
headed a fragile multi-party coalition, and the latter’s speech to a special UN session of 
October 1995 made no reference to Japanese candidacy for permanent UNSC 
membership.23 Since then Japan has continued to support proposals for UN reform, but 
without success.24  Notably, the 1997 Razali Plan envisaged a two-step process to 
expand the Council to 24 members, but the proposal was abandoned in 2005. Indeed, 
one recent study of UN reform notes that the Razali Plan was asking smaller states “to 
virtually commit political suicide” by handing more veto power to others, and this was 
why there has been no expansion of permanent membership despite 20 years of reform 
proposals.25 This aftermath is useful to keep in mind, but this case study is focused on 
the period during and close to 1992-93. Such a focus is conducive to studying status 
concerns as they affected Japan’s international policy during a set period – not a 
timeline or analysis of Japan’s success or failure in the UNSC, which is outside the 
scope of this project.  
 
 
                                                
22 This system is often referred to as the “1955 system”, which featured semi-permanent rule by the 
Liberal Democratic Party, alongside close cooperation between the bureaucracy, business and politicians. 
For an account of its rise and fall, see: Fukatsu Masumi, ‘Whither Goes the 1955 System?,’ Japan 
Quarterly 42, no. 2 (1995). 
23 Ahn, ‘Government-Party Coordination in Japan's Foreign Policy-Making: The Issue of Permanent 
Membership in the UNSC,’ 375. 
24 See for example: Toshitaka Takeuchi, ‘Japan's Quest for UN Security Council Reform Going 
Nowhere,’ East Asia Forum, 26 February 2016. 
25 Kishore Mahbubani, 'Council Reform and the Emerging Powers,' in The UN Security Council in the 
Twenty-First Century, ed. Sebastian von Einsiedel, David Malone, and Stagno Ugarte (Boulder, 
Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2016), 166. The question of giving the veto power to new UNSC 
permanent or semi-permanent members is a key to UNSC reform debates. Japanese diplomats indicated 
that the current UNSC permanent five, while anachronistic, is tolerated by UN members because it 
ensures the veto power has limited legitimacy. Neither the  UK nor France, for example, have cast vetos 
since 1989. A wholesale reform of the permanent membership would make the veto more legitimate, 
which would disadvantage UN members that failed to gain seats. This is an inherent contradiction to 




Scholars have generated varying explanations for Japan’s UNSC bid. These 
explanations encompass a three-part spectrum that is familiar to scholars of 
international relations – psychological or prestige explanations, instrumental foreign 
policy concerns including national security, and the influence of domestic politics on 
foreign policy decisions. They are concisely summarised by Drifte’s Japan's Quest for a 
Permanent Security Council Seat, which is the most detailed history of Japan’s Security 
Council ambitions: 
The rationale for the bid of permanent Security Council membership… includes 
psychological elements (pride, prestige, need of recognition for multinational 
contributions and economic superpower status), bureaucratic elements (better 
information, enhancing the role of the Gaimusho [Foreign Ministry]), political 
engineering (a lever to forge a domestic consensus for more international burden 
sharing in response to external demands) and political goals (expanding multilateral 
diplomacy for a better balance against the country’s US-focused bilateralism; a hedge 
against abandonment by the American security guarantor).26 
The literature surveyed in the following paragraphs mainly follows Drifte’s list. A key 
additional explanation is proposed by some scholars involving the hopes of some in 
Japan that a high-profile international role would help Japan build “a new national 
narrative” which could be channelled back into the work of domestic institutional 
reform.27  
 
The aim of reviewing the existing explanations is not to weigh them up in order to 
declare which cause is “correct”. As with each of the three case studies in this research 
project, Japan’s UNSC bid had multiple causes, and this thesis is not trying to show that 
status was the sole or even dominant one. This chapter seeks only to show that 
international status was a significant cause, which can then provide a starting point for 
                                                
26 Drifte, Japan's Quest, 3. I have added the translation of Gaimusho to Foreign Ministry. 
27 Akiyama, 'Japan's Failed Bid,' 275. 
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analysis. The literature can also provide additional information that will be important in 
that analysis: what international roles did Japanese decision-makers perceive to be 
valuable in terms of status? For what purpose was status to be acquired? Were trade-
offs seen between gaining status and other foreign policy goals? The following will 
highlight where some of the questions that can be answered in the existing literature in 
order to set the baseline for the analysis of when and how status concerns shaped 
Japan’s decisions on UNSC reform from 1992-93.  
 
Prestige and status explanations 
 
Prestige explanations for Japan’s bid are well established in the literature. As noted 
above,  Drifte uses the term ‘psychological elements’ to collect concerns about pride, 
prestige and recognition for Japan’s international contributions, and he concludes that 
“Japan’s quest for permanent Security Council membership has undoubtedly been 
closely linked with the issue of prestige and status.”28 Overall, the literature divides 
prestige explanations between a category emphasising Japanese national dignity, and a 
category of Japanese pursuit of recognition for national achievements.  
 
A key theme in Ronald Dore’s study of Japan and the UN is the idea of “dignity”, 
which he defines as a belief that a state should be treated with the proper respect, and 
which he presents as one of three pillars of national interest, alongside security and 
prosperity.29 Dore’s argument is that IR tends to understate the importance of dignity 
because established and powerful states can afford to dismiss it as a concern: “Anyone 
who does not show them respect can be easily dismissed.”30 By contrast, Japan’s 
                                                
28 Drifte, Japan's Quest. 
29 Ronald Philip Dore, Japan, Internationalism, and the UN, The Nissan Institute/Routledge Japanese 
Studies Series (Routledge, 1997), 96. 
30 Ibid., 97. 
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perennial self-perception of insecurity means that it is constantly discussing its national 
dignity. Indeed, Dore argues, dignity is inherently a concern of insecure societies: “The 
ones who have this sensitivity most markedly are likely to be both those who are 
upwardly and those who are downwardly mobile.”31 As a result, the desire among the 
Japanese public for dignity to become a goal of national policy is “probably stronger 
than among the publics of any other major country,” and this has attracted Japan to roles 
perceived as likely to boost its international standing.32 While Dore concedes that 
Japanese officials are likely to deny that the pursuit of dignity is of much importance, he 
sees it as nevertheless prevalent in the international relations of Japan. As Japan needs 
to be seen to be acting out of principle rather than self-interest, this explains the 
country’s focus on the UN and UN reform.33  
 
In his history of Japan’s involvement in the UN from 1945 to 1992, Liang Pan uses the 
term “honourable status” in a way that tracks closely to the above notions of dignity and 
pride. Pan stresses that Japan’s engagement with the UN from the very start was 
focused on one goal: “to put it plainly, to occupy an honourable status in international 
society.”34 As he notes, when Japan finally joined the UN in December 1956, Foreign 
Minister Shigemitsu called it a “great leap in our country’s international status.”35 A 
reflection of this is also found in the way, after a difficult campaign for an elected 
Security Council seat in 1965, a Japanese delegate said it was clear Japan was still “not 
in a position to be proud of its status as a big power and feel relaxed during [UN] 
elections.”36 Pan’s conclusion is that the mismatch between Japan’s enthusiasm for 
                                                
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid., 98. 
33 Ibid., 98-99. 
34 Pan, The United Nations, 255. 
35 Ibid., 289. 
36 Tamio Amau, Takokukan gaikōron: Kokuren gaikō no jissō [Multilateral diplomacy: the realities of 
UN diplomacy] (Tokyo: PMC Shuppan, 1990), 338, quoted in ibid., 306. 
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greater roles in the UN, compared with its lack of substantive policy initiatives, meant 
that frequently “Japanese policymakers’ quest for equal or higher international status 
through the UN looked more like a policy of prestige for its own sake.”37  
 
Another take on the idea is presented by Nobumasa Akiyama under the terminology of 
“esteem”. Akiyama notes that, faced with the rise of emerging powers and the likely 
decline of Japan’s own economic influence from its peak, Japan sought the UNSC role 
in order to shore up its esteem in the eyes of the international community:  
Japan wanted to step forward to a new status, beyond that of a good loser, and a 
permanent seat was seen as the symbol of that achievement… by accomplishing a 
reform of the UN and gaining a seat in the Security Council, the hope was to create a 
feeling of having wiped the slate clean of any negative legacy left after World War II, 
including the bitter taste of defeat. The change that Japan had brought to the UN would 
signify to the world that Japan was genuinely reintegrated into the postwar global 
governance system and was now a legitimate major power.38 
And a similar note may be found in the work of Kenneth Pyle, who likewise sees the 
purpose of acquiring a greater UN role as delivering to Japan “dignity and recognition 
as a first-rank nation.”39 Pyle argues that Japan remains an ‘unsatisfied’ power:  
Although Japan has become a status-quo power with a substantial stake in existing 
international rules and international governance, its ambition to rise in the 
international hierarchy of prestige and to establish its national dignity, in its own eyes as 
well as in the eyes of the world, remains unsatisfied. Japan still seeks its place in 
the sun.40 
While sometimes presented using differing terminology, the theme of dignity recurs 
across the literature. The most important point for this project is that it is closely linked 
to Japan’s UN roles, lending credence to the idea that dignity – insofar as it relates to 
status – was a factor in Japan’s UNSC bid. 
 
                                                
37 Ibid., 345. 
38 Akiyama, 'Japan's Failed Bid,' 274. 
39 Kenneth B. Pyle, Japan Rising: The Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose (New York: Public 
Affairs, 2007), 106. 
40 Ibid., 373-74. 
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The second category of psychological explanation focuses on the way a UNSC seat 
would accord Japan recognition for its postwar national achievements, especially its 
economic success. These explanations are sometimes cited by the same works that note 
the “dignity” explanation, but usually with a chronological distinction. It is not 
surprising that while the dignity aspects were most important during Japan’s initial 
postwar recovery, material strength justifications become more important after Japan’s 
export-led economic achievements from the 1960s onwards, and then its greater 
international role in a range of spheres. Richard Samuels, for example, refers to calls for 
a new grand strategy “based on respect.”41 In the words of one Japanese politician, the 
idea is that after decades of achievement, the right to a permanent UNSC seat was seen 
as natural – “as natural as getting the right to vote at the age of twenty.”42 
 
Whereas the aspiration to dignity was seldom overtly expressed by Japanese leaders – it 
is mostly the interpretation of scholars based on Japanese behaviour – a belief in 
recognition for achievement is frequently found in Japanese statements. Histories of 
Japan and the UN note that this belief started to become evident as Japan raised its UN 
ambitions from the 1960s onwards. For example, speaking in 1961, Prime Minister 
Hayato Ikeda believed Japan should be one of three key players in the Western world 
alongside Europe and the US, and he supported an early campaign for Japan to become 
President of the UN General Assembly. He told US representatives that Japan’s interest 
in the Presidency was “attributable in part to the growth of Japan’s real power.”43 
Similarly, in 1967 the veteran diplomat Senjin Tsuruoka – who had been a Japanese 
official at the League of Nations – told the Japanese press that Japan was becoming a 
major contributor to the UN budget, and “if our country wants to gain a voice 
                                                
41 Richard J. Samuels, Securing Japan : Tokyo's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia, Cornell 
Studies in Security Affairs (Cornell University Press, 2007), 187. 
42 Conservative former diplomat Okazaki Hisahiko, quoted in Drifte, Japan's Quest, 97. 
43 Pan, The United Nations, 293. 
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appropriate to this contribution” it would have to attain the status of “big power” like 
the Permanent Five.44 As UN Ambassador the following year he announced to an 
American audience that Japan was “now entitled to claim a permanent seat in the 
Security Council so we may be able to contribute fully all that is in our power to the 
search for peace through the United Nations.”45  
 
These views indicate a transition in Japanese self-perceptions from an emphasis on 
dignity to one of recognition. Drifte sees the bid at first motivated by views about 
“Japan’s status in the world”: memories of membership of the Council of the League of 
Nations, the desire to be part of the “international mainstream”, and peaceful 
exceptionalism. These beliefs were then augmented by the desire for recognition of 
Japan’s material achievements:   
With Japan’s growing economic strength and involvement in multilateral diplomacy 
and development aid, the longing for prestige became reinforced by the desire 
for recognition of its newly won status as an economic power and for greater equality 
with the P5.46 
The emphasis on recognition continues through to the period of the case study. A key 
addition is that some Japanese leaders started to view peacekeeping as a useful way to 
boost Japan’s standing internationally. As Liang Pan notes, Liberal Democratic Party 
politicians believed the UN Peacekeeping Bill of 1990 would help give Japan an 
“honourable status” and “appropriate treatment at the UN commensurate with our 
country’s international power.”47 As with the theme of dignity, the theme of recognition 
recurs across the literature in close relation to the United Nations. This is evidence to 
support the argument that these status-related concerns played a role in the UNSC 
campaign. 
                                                
44 Ibid., 307. 
45 Tsuruoka quoted in: Sam Pope Brewers, ‘Japanese Seeking Full Council Seat: UN Delegate Says 
Tokyo Wants Permanent Role,’ New York Times, 18 October 1968. 
46 Drifte, Japan's Quest, 187. 
47 Pan, The United Nations, 336. 
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Instrumental foreign policy explanations 
 
The literature frequently lists traditional foreign policy explanations for the bid as a 
factor alongside other explanations such as prestige or domestic politics. In particular, 
the bid is seen as both a hedge against over-reliance on the US alliance and as a 
potential reinforcement to it, and it is also seen as a way that Japanese diplomats hoped 
to gain information and influence that could advance foreign policy objectives.  
 
Scholars emphasise that a greater role in the UNSC would help Japan further diversify 
its engagement with international security away from the relationship with the United 
States, while a more influential Japan could simultaneously be a more useful ally to the 
US. For example,  Drifte emphasises that expanded multilateral roles would not only 
give balance to Japanese foreign policy, which had been otherwise focused on US ties, 
but also provide insurance against any threat of US abandonment.48 Japanese officials 
have also seen the UNSC bid as a way to respond to constant US demands for “burden-
sharing” in the UN, to smooth trade frictions, help ensure Japan did not appear overly 
self-interested, and to give Japan’s bureaucracy opportunities for cooperation. “At the 
same time, multilateral diplomacy provides hedges against weaknesses, contradictions 
and possible failures of US-focused bilateralism,” especially considering the limitations 
of the US security guarantee, and Japan’s wish to encourage greater multilateral 
engagement by the US itself.49 
 
In addition to hedging against over-reliance on the US relationship, some scholars also 
see an expanded UN role for Japan as strengthening the same relationship. Akiyama 
                                                
48 Drifte, Japan's Quest, 3. 
49 Ibid., 54. 
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points out that an increased UN role is actually a form of burden-sharing within Japan’s 
US alliance: Article I of the US-Japan security treaty stipulates that both parties “will 
endeavour in concert with other peace-loving countries to strengthen the United 
Nations.”50 As noted above, Japanese officials also believed that US-Japan relations 
would be strengthened if greater Japanese activity in the UN bolstered American 
interest and commitment in multilateral institutions.51 Robert Immerman records that 
this motivation became more pressing during the 1980s, as Japanese officials feared that 
US isolation in the UN would expose division between Washington and Tokyo, 
undermining the security relationship. Immerman gives the example of a 1985 
Japanese-led initiative that encouraged the US to pay its UN budget arrears, which in 
turn restored close cooperation between the US and Japanese delegations in New York. 
This was a case where a greater Japanese role in the UN had enhanced the bilateral 
relationship.52  
 
The other key area where the UNSC is linked to foreign policy interests concerns 
Japan’s access to the confidential discussions of the major powers. Indeed, improved 
access to information about world affairs was one of Japan’s original motivations for 
seeking a high-profile role in the UN.53 The literature emphasises the way this was 
sheeted home during the Gulf conflict.  Immerman notes that Japan was wrong-footed 
at the time by the seriousness of the crisis, whereas “had Japan been a permanent 
member of the Security Council, it would have been privy to all the information in the 
hands of the [Permanent] Five and so would not have been caught off guard by the 
                                                
50 Text of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan available 
at: http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/q&a/ref/1.html 
51 Akiyama, 'Japan's Failed Bid,' 287, 288. 
52 Robert M Immerman, 'Japan in the United Nations,' in Japan: A New Kind of Superpower?, ed. Craig 
Garby and Mary Brown Bullock (Woodrow Wilson Center Press/Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), 
187-88. 
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sudden decisions of the council.”54 Similarly, scholars recount the grievances of 
Japanese diplomats who recalled that, despite representing a major UN budget 
contributor, during 1990-91 they were left standing in corridors in the UN headquarters 
outside closed doors waiting for word of Security Council deliberations.55 To be sure, 
part of this goes back to the issue of prestige, but it is important to note that scholars 
also see the quality of Japan’s access to UNSC deliberations as a “realist” national 
interest, regardless of prestige aspects.56  
 
Domestic political explanations 
 
As is common in domestically-focused foreign policy analysis, domestic political 
explanations fall into two categories: bureaucratic politics, and the pursuit by leaders of 
parliamentary and electoral agendas. Bureaucratic explanations centre on the role of 
Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) as the key driver of the bid within the 
Japanese political system. At a general level, MOFA is seen as a keeper of national 
prestige, and as an organisation is keen to enhance its own status and prestige in the 
domestic context.57 This said, MOFA was also the element of Japanese government 
most keenly sensitive to the need for access to information that was noted above. This 
attraction became more noticeable at the end of the Cold War because, as David Malone 
remarks, “the hermetic nature of [the Security Council’s] working methods drew greater 
attention at a time when its decisions were proving genuinely important.”58 In addition, 
Japanese officialdom was attracted to the goal of holding a permanent UNSC seat as it 
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would save Japan the considerable effort, time and expense of campaigning for elected 
seats on a regular basis.59 
 
The other kind of domestic political motivations concern what some refer to as 
“political engineering” – the belief among some Japanese leaders that a role at the 
pinnacle of the UN system would mobilise domestic support for their agendas. Drifte 
notes that many leaders believed a permanent UNSC role would bridge the gap between 
Japan’s pacifist public and more realist aspects of foreign policy, including the 
pragmatism of the 1951 US-Japan Security Treaty.60 Masayuki Tadokoro, writing in 
1997, asserted that a permanent Security Council seat would help Japan’s foreign 
ministry overcome its friction with the then-socialist government, and Japan’s enduring 
pacifist and isolationist camp: 
The UN offers a workable and effective framework for Japan to become more active in 
the pursuit of its foreign policy because the biggest obstacle to an active Japan is its 
‘legitimacy deficit,’ both externally and internally. The UN can legitimise Japan’s 
active roles in global and regional affairs by more closely involving Japan in its 
decision-making process.61 
Similarly, the United Nations University’s Sebastian von Einsiedel notes that a 
precedent can be seen in the way UNSC membership in the 1970s caused Beijing to 
become more engaged with the UN than outsiders had expected.62 The difficulty was 
that as such agendas became more apparent to the Japanese public, concerns rapidly 
grew that the UNSC role would lead to unacceptable commitments to peacekeeping or 
other foreign security commitments.63 Thus an irony was that this motivation, of 
enhancing domestic legitimacy, also in some part became the undoing of the Japan’s 
UNSC ambitions. 
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A further aspect of domestic political agendas is the idea that the UNSC role could 
motivate domestic political reform within Japan itself. Akiyama notes the desire of 
leaders to build “a new national narrative” that would provide impetus for reconfiguring 
domestic institutions.64 He says Japan needed this narrative to be accepted across the 
political spectrum “to provide a common sense of direction for the whole country to 
locate its position in the changing international community.”65 As discussed in the 
following section, the aim of using foreign policy to advance domestic agendas is a 
recurring theme in Japanese politics since modernisation. Yet the near-impossibility of 




Assessment of the literature as a baseline for status assumptions 
 
The existing literature provides viable grounds for assuming this case to be one where 
status was “most likely” a causal factor in outcomes. This research project accepts this 
assumption because the terms used by scholars, such as dignity, prestige, and 
recognition, can be connected to status perceptions in multiple ways. First, the theme of 
“dignity” can be seen as part of the long-term cultural background within which 
decision-makers put value on national prestige and status. Second, the theme of 
“recognition” goes to the question of whether a state is performing, or under-
performing, in terms of status. In addition to the psychological explanations, this section 
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 118 
explains that even the instrumental explanations relating to foreign policy and domestic 
politics also relate to issues of status. 
 
Dignity and recognition 
 
Although “dignity” is a frequently used term in this context, scholars of the 
international relations of Japan have done little to define or conceptualise the term. 
However, dignity can consistently be found in close proximity to “respect” and 
“honour” in the vocabulary of status in IR.66 The term can refer to a quality of a state, 
sometimes as a synonym for honour,67 or it may be a manner of treatment by other 
actors, for example in a joint phrase such as “dignity and respect.”68 Based on the usage 
in the literature, a practical definition of dignity might be as a minimum treatment to be 
expected by an actor, especially when the actor complies with social codes. A corollary 
of this is that the loss of dignity is likely to constitute humiliation.69 This definition lets 
us relate dignity as used in the IR of Japan with broader notions of dignity in political 
science.  
 
Two themes are helpful in conceptualising dignity. First, in a useful discussion of the 
concept of dignity as a kind of minimal respect, John Fitzgerald notes Francis 
Fukuyama’s argument that a basic political motivation is the struggle for “recognition.” 
Indeed, a common source of nationalism is the politics of indignation over a lack of 
desired recognition of one kind or another.70 As Isaiah Berlin put it, nationalism 
                                                
66 As was described in a previous chapter, respect is where actors treat another according to recognition of 
a certain status, while honour is a state’s reputation for complying with the social code of its peers. 
67 Dafoe and Caughey, ‘Honor and War,’ 351. 
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69 A detailed discussion of this may be found at: Daniel Statman, ‘Humiliation, Dignity and Self-
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70 Fitzgerald uses the term ressentiment for this basic indignation. John Fitzgerald, ‘China and the Quest 
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 119 
frequently occurs from “a wounded or outraged sense of human dignity, the desire for 
recognition.”71 This helps to explain the theme that frequently appears in the literature 
of political leaders perceiving a lack of international recognition, and therefore wishing 
to restore national dignity. It readily corresponds to Japan’s experience of occupation 
and treatment as an enemy power after 1945, and also its leaders’ feelings of insecurity 
about sovereignty due to Japan’s dependent post-occupation security relationship with 
the United States. One could also hypothesise that such feelings of humiliation might be 
pervasive in domestic politics and would provide a powerful incentive to national 
leaders to rectify the situation. A second way of conceptualising dignity is to emphasise 
the comparative nature of the experience. What a state deems to be a minimum 
acceptable level of respect may vary depending upon what the state has become 
accustomed to. In Japan’s case, humiliation was not merely due to the post-1945 
occupation, but also its removal from the role of recognised great power, a role it had 
struggled hard to achieve in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Whereas Japan had 
once sat on the Council of the League of Nations, it did not gain even ordinary 
membership of the United Nations until 1956. Here it is appropriate to use Joshua 
Freedman’s ideas of status insecurity and temporality, and his argument that states 
“engage in self-evaluation and derive self-esteem through temporal comparisons with 
their past.”72 Putting the above together, when scholars refer to Japan’s concern about 
dignity, they are referring to the Japanese polity being particularly concerned about 
Japan being recognised as a fully sovereign state. It is seen in Japan’s insistence on 
being restored to levels of respect consistent with the recollection of the political 
memory. 
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The scholarship on Japan that highlights “recognition” fits readily alongside the 
theoretical literature on status in IR. The aspects most relevant to this case study 
concern Japan, as a rising power in the postwar period, seeking recognition for its 
material achievements but believing that international recognition lagged behind. This is 
generally theorised in the status literature as the problem of status inconsistency or a 
status deficit, which states are keen to resolve because proper status recognition is 
valuable for coordinating expectations of deference in their interactions with other 
actors.73 As noted above, Japanese decision-makers openly stated a belief that Japan’s 
status was not consistent with its economic and diplomatic contribution. This is where 
the literature on the case deviates from the status theory literature. The latter assumes 
that status deficits may lead to conflict. Jonathan Renshon, for example, proposes that 
initiation of conflict is “one way that states seek to alter the beliefs of other members of 
the international community” about their status. According to Volgy, et al:  
We suggest that status underachievers – given their muscular portfolios but unmatched 
status attribution – will seek to resolve uncertainty around their status by competing 
more aggressively than overachievers to create larger roles for themselves in global 
affairs.74 
This leaves a key gap in terms of explaining why, while Japanese leaders frequently 
expressed concern about a status deficit, there was no sign of Japan acting unusually 
aggressively to rectify the situation. It also fails to explain why the main course of 
action taken by Tokyo was to seek recognition via a multilateral institution rather than 
through pursuit of war. 
 
                                                
73 See the detailed discussion in the literature review chapter; key references include: Renshon, ‘Status 
Deficits and War,’ 515; Dafoe, Renshon, and Huth, ‘Reputation and Status,’ 382-83; Volgy et al., 'Major 
Power Status in International Politics,' 10-11. 
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Foreign policy and domestic political aspects 
 
It is important to recognise that there may be overlap between intrinsic and instrumental 
motivations for action such as the UNSC bid. Drifte puts it simply that “the ultimate 
international accolade [is] a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council.”75 
This may be attractive to a state for some of the status-related reasons mentioned above 
– the restoration of dignity, and status consistency. But the seat could also be seen as a 
great prize because of its instrumental benefits. These included the opportunity to 
strengthen the US alliance and to avoid over-reliance upon it, and the benefits access to 
privileged diplomatic information. Indeed, a role such as UNSC permanent member is 
unlikely to remain prestigious unless states continue to draw material benefits from it. 
What is necessary in establishing the baseline for the central argument of this thesis is to 
show that Japanese decision-makers regarded the seat as carrying a bundle of material 
and subjective benefits that they associated with national status. 
 
The discussion in the literature of Japanese domestic politics is an interesting one. It 
highlights a perceived benefit that is not emphasised in the status theory scholarship, 
which is that leaders believed status would let them propose new agendas to the 
electorate. This contrasts with the status literature, which tends to focus on demands by 
the electorate for leaders to acquire prestige for the state for the sake of foreign policy 
benefits.76 The distinctly Japanese emphasis on bringing status gains back home to act 
as domestic political assets provides an additional explanation as to why Japanese 
leaders would be motivated to acquire national status. By the early 1990s Japanese 
                                                
75 Reinhard Drifte, Japan’s Foreign Policy in the 1990s: From Economic Superpower to What Power? 
(New York: St Martin's Press, 1996), 132. 
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leaders saw the need for both foreign and domestic policy reform, yet lacked domestic 
mandates. This provides a plausible explanation for the timing of the UNSC bid.   
 
Gaps and next steps 
 
The key finding of this section is that status did appear to be a significant concern in the 
international relations of Japan at the time of the UNSC bid. Issues of status concerned 
decision-makers in two major ways: there had been a long-running theme that Japan 
needed to restore or maintain its international dignity, and Japanese leaders had a strong 
interest in Japan’s status consistency (that is, that it was recognised for a status 
consistent with its material qualities). In addition, the pragmatic benefits of a UNSC 
seat overlapped with any beliefs that it was an asset worth acquiring for status reasons. 
This section has also highlighted that the literature provides several reasons why Japan 
has prioritised multilateralism and was likely to put value on holding high-status 
positions in global institutions. 
 
Key gaps remain in the literature about Japan and the UNSC. Even though the literature 
highlights the status attractions of a permanent UNSC seat, it does not explain how 
status concerns specifically influenced Japanese policies toward the UNSC at any 
particular time. The literature does describe Japan’s status concerns evolving as the 
desire for national dignity was complemented by a wish for greater recognition of 
Japan’s material achievements, and Japanese statements regarding the UNSC can be 
seen developing alongside that trend. But the literature does not explain how long-term 
status interests affected specific policies, such as the decision to announce the bid in 
1992. It also does not explain how status concerns might have been more or less 
important than the instrumental foreign policy considerations or domestic political 
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concerns that the literature also says motivated the bid. Ultimately the puzzle is left as 
to why, if a UNSC permanent seat is such a prize, Japan’s pursuit of it was so 
conservative for so long, yet for a brief period was surprisingly bold and assertive. 
 
These basic findings provide the starting point for the major analysis of the case. This 
analysis will follow in three main sections. First, it will show how the underlying and 
long-term beliefs about status, noted above, played out in terms of normal status-
seeking by Japan in the leadup to the Gulf War. Second, the analysis assesses whether 
the Gulf conflict provided a significant crisis and caused decision-makers to believe that 
status roles that Japan valued were under threat. Third, the analysis will examine 
whether responses to the Gulf War constituted a variation in Japan’s prestige seeking in 






SECTION B. ANALYSIS OF THE CASE 
 
Analysing the case  
 
Many Japanese diplomats will speak enthusiastically about acquiring a permanent seat 
in the Security Council. It is described as both a pillar of prestige and as a lever for 
increasing Japan’s practical international influence. Former Japanese Ambassador to the 
United Nations Kenzo Oshima says: “Being in the Council, even as a non-permanent 
member, raises the prestige of the country and its level of influence. This is because 
there are other countries that approach you, seeking support… These countries come to 
you, to raise their chance of success, and that indirectly raises the prestige of your 
country.”77 Meanwhile former Permanent Representative Tsuneo Nishida says a 
permanent seat would be “a wonderful tool in order to make Japanese diplomacy richer 
and a way of playing a more important and more responsible international role.”78 Of 
course, this talk of the attraction of the seat can only raise the question of why Japan has 
never been successful in gaining one. The place of this case study is to show how status 
aspirations played a key role in Japan’s UNSC bid. By understanding the role status 
played, we can also understand Japan’s lack of success in this aspiration. 
 
This analytical section divides the historical timeline into three phases, mapping out the 
way Japan’s pursuit of status changed under differing circumstances. The first phase is 
referred to as the “normal” status-seeking phase. During this phase, Japan sought to gain 
status by building prestige in selected areas of international activity. One of these areas 
was the United Nations, and it is instructive to observe the actual activity that Japan 
                                                
77 Kenzo Oshima, interview with the author, 22 December. Japan’s mission to the UN is headed by the 
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engaged in in order to gain prestige there. The second phase deals with a “status crisis”. 
In this phase, the causal role of status changes. The section is asking whether there was 
a crisis point in Japanese decision-makers’ attitudes towards the country’s international 
status position. Building on these two phases, the third phase involves a move to 
“enhanced” prestige-building activity. This part aims to describe outcomes from 
variation in status perceptions. This phase explores the new behaviours or activity that 
make up observable outcomes from the status crisis. 
 
The judgements in this section are necessarily qualitative assessments of known events. 
For example it is necessary to assess some periods as making up normal status-seeking; 
as a status crisis; and as examples of enhanced prestige-building. This is the point where 
the original interviews conducted for this chapter are important. Used in combination 
with published accounts, they let us put weight on particular parts of the  record that 
were perceived by decision-makers in terms such as shock, surprise or disappointment. 
We can then consider whether courses of action were, for example, unusually 
provocative or assertive. In this way, the historical account, drawn from existing 
literature, is reassessed in this chapter through specific use of the qualitative judgements 
of interviewees.  
 
 
The “normal” status-seeking phase 
 
This section assesses Japan’s status-seeking behaviour up to the period of the case study 
in the early 1990s. The evidence shows that there is enough continuity to this behaviour 
to call it “normal”, in contrast to the phase of crisis that ensued after the Gulf conflict. 
In the first half of this section the study describes the various goals of Japanese status-
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seeking that came together to create relatively consistent behaviour. Most of these goals 
appear in scholarly work on Japan, but has not been analysed in the context of Japan’s 
UNSC bid. The thesis has also used interviews to identify which goals were most 
relevant to the bid. The second half of this section describes the practical activity Japan 
undertook in the UN in order to build status. Overall, the section shows that there was 
an established and reasonably consistent sense of purpose and pattern of activity in 
Japan’s diplomacy. This is the situation that would be disrupted by the status crisis after 
1990. 
 
Japan’s status aims 
 
To analyse the case, it is necessary to examine the patterns that Japanese status-seeking 
followed in the years leading up to 1992. Then to explain the drivers of status-seeking, 
we need to refer back to longstanding cultural factors and the circumstances of Japan’s 
modernisation in the 19th century, which we can then relate to the circumstances of 
postwar Japan. The upshot of these cultural and historical factors was that on the eve of 
the case study Japanese status-seeking was the result of at least three long-term factors. 
These were: historical legacies making Japan sensitive to foreign perceptions of its 
status; cultural beliefs about social and international hierarchy that had been frequently 
exploited by the Japanese state for domestic political ends; and the way that Japan’s 
modern history was marked by dramatic changes in its material capabilities, which 
needed to be recognised in the form of changed international status. These combined 
with the more immediate circumstances of postwar Japan. Altogether, they help explain 
both a high consciousness of national status in the Japanese polity, and also the level of 
status that Japan sought internationally.       
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The first driver of Japanese status-seeking was the need to prioritise prestige-building 
activity that would directly secure equality with other sovereign states. This is 
proclaimed in Japan’s postwar constitution as the desire “to occupy an honored place in 
an international society striving for the preservation of peace.”79 This corresponds to the 
concept of “dignity” discussed in the previous section, and reflects a longstanding 
historical belief that a base level of status was essential to survival. In part this was 
because when Japan re-entered international society in the second half of the 19th 
century, it was vital for the country to imitate and compete with the imperialistic 
Western powers. These external factors engaged with existing cultural beliefs in several 
ways. Japan was immediately presented with external models for status comparison, as 
Marius Jansen notes:  
Admiration, as well as irritation, could serve to strengthen the awareness Meiji Japanese 
had of a ‘class’ distinction among nations and leaders; together they stirred the 
determination of Meiji Japan to break free of its second-class standing in the world of 
nation states;80 
In addition, international society was ordered such that Japan could not ignore such 
comparisons even if it wished to. Japanese historian Akira Iriye puts it that: “History 
was marching upward and onward toward an eventual state of human perfection, and all 
human societies were ranked by how far they had advanced on this march.”81 Finally, 
the development of material power did not only allow ascendancy, but was the key to 
genuine equality.82 For Japan – the first non-Western modern power – the lesson was 
that status-seeking was not a luxury, but necessary for minimal recognition of Japan’s 
sovereign equality with other modern states. This historical context helps to explain the 
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concern for national dignity that appears in much literature about Japan, and was 
highlighted in the previous section. This context indicates that Japan was likely to direct 
its efforts to building prestige in ways that would demonstrate national dignity, such as 
equality in international institutions. It also helps explain why Japan was very early to 
mention its interest in positions such as a UNSC seat, but took a long time to take action 
toward this goal.  
 
A second priority in status-seeking was to fulfil promising domestic agendas. A long-
term aspect of Japan’s status-seeking has been the way cultural understandings about 
social hierarchy played a role in domestic political agendas. In Japan’s case, 
hierarchical social beliefs had been reinforced since national consolidation in the late 
16th century, as civil disorder was suppressed by assigning people to “their proper 
stations in society.”83 As with all aspects of national culture, it is difficult to claim that 
any one value is a causal factor in a state’s international relations.84 However, there is 
evidence that widely held beliefs in Japan about social hierarchy were also harnessed as 
a tool of politics. This made it attractive for politicians to look to international 
institutions as locations where Japan could achieve a visible ranking that would be 
widely understood by the public.  
 
To illustrate the way this has occurred in Japan, historians such as Kenneth Pyle go 
back to the way that imperial Japan sought recognition as a state of the “first rank”: 
“The strength of Japan’s inherited rank consciousness prompted an instinctive need 
for recognition of its status in the hierarchy of nations, and the values of hierarchy 
provided a behavioural norm that focused and intensified the realist drive for national 
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power.”85 At the same time, elites often saw their role as guardians and promoters of 
national prestige as part of their credibility, and this was sold to domestic constituencies 
as part of their right to rule. In imperial Japan, Akira Iriye argues, patriotism, militarism 
and imperialism became accepted as essential to the nation’s existence, with the modern 
state and its imperial power seen as two sides of the same coin. “Japan’s drive to great-
power status during the Meiji era, then, was one device by which the nation’s leaders 
sought to establish a connection between domestic and external relations.”86 As such, 
prestige seeking was not simply an inevitable outcome of Japanese culture: it was also 
deliberate government policy. After 1945, this continued to reflect the way that that 
internal political debates gave rise to new consensus strategies for the postwar era.87 By 
focusing on the UN, Japanese politicians continued to focus on prestige-building that 
could achieve not only foreign but also domestic policy ends.  
 
The third enduring factor driving Japanese status-seeking was the need for recognition 
of the country’s material capabilities. As noted in the preceding section, this point has 
been recognised in the existing literature on the case. However, importance of status 
recognition to Japan deserves further analysis because the history of Japan is marked by 
exceptionally abrupt changes in material circumstances. Japan emerged suddenly from 
isolation to become a modernised, imperial power; in 1945 it was devastated and 
occupied; yet by the 1960s it had hosted the Olympic Games and rebounded as one of 
the major global economies.88 These unusually sudden variations meant that Japan 
needed to actively seek recognition for its prestigious qualities, especially compared to 
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other states that had demonstrated prestige for a longer time. This is consistent with the 
understanding of status not as something gained simply by holding capabilities, but as 
an attribute that has to be accorded by approval from other powers in the international 
community.89 For Japan, this meant that high-profile positions in multilateral 
institutions had an outsize quality, prized beyond their immediate diplomatic benefits. 
As an example, Ambassador Nishida describes the way Japan’s accession to the OECD 
in 1964 was a “process of recognition and acknowledgement and appreciation by the 
international society… There was a kind of euphoria. Cabinet was in a rapture, a 
milestone and Japan could confirm its efforts since world war two had been recognised 
and rewarded.”90 A similar valuation of recognition through institutional roles was seen 
in 1975 when Japan became part of the Group of Seven leading economies, which 
“helped transform the Japanese public’s perception of its own country.”91 
 
The above factors interact with immediate international circumstances to explain 
Japan’s post-war focus on its standing in international institutions. Japan may have been 
distinctive after 1945, compared to most defeated states, in maintaining a long-term 
pacifist policy. But analysts such as Akitoshi Miyashita see the pacifist policy as an 
entirely rational response to the existence of the US security guarantee.92 Indeed, 
Japanese status-seeking under the postwar compromise of the “Yoshida Doctrine” was 
driven by similar factors to the pre-war era: international circumstances and domestic 
politics.93 This was a pragmatic policy that allowed Japan to adapt to starkly different 
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external circumstances.94 Thus from 1868 to 1945, Japan applied its concern for 
hierarchy and prestige to a world of competing, expansionist states. After 1945, Japan’s 
war history meant regionalism and regional leadership was problematic, so it became 
one of the few countries, as Funabashi puts it, “with truly global interests.”95 Japan 
adopted a peaceful constitution and accepted US security guarantees, while joining the 
United Nations and the many multilateral structures of the postwar world. As Richard 
Samuels puts it, “Japan has long been doing what all states do to reduce risk and 
maximise gain in an uncertain world―it has hedged.”96 This is a key way in which we 
reconcile a quasi-feudal culture of rank and standing before that date, with the postwar 
role as a cooperative and peaceful member of international society. It indicates that 
while the Yoshida Doctrine may have involved a more modest understanding of Japan’s 
international status, it was pragmatic in terms of being the most achievable way for 
Japan to regain high status in its circumstances.  
 
Put together, the factors listed in this section explain why international institutional 
roles, especially in the United Nations, were so important to Japanese status-seeking. 
We have seen that states are attracted to the benefits that come from status recognition, 
so they try to accumulate prestige that will pay off in the form of high status roles. 
However, the way an actor seeks status is not at all automatic. It is productive to refer to 
Vincent Pouliot’s argument that a “profound sociality” drives interest in status, and 
indeed status is derived from the fact of sociality, rather than human nature as such.97 
As Pouliot argues, while states widely value status, there is no agreement about which 
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status markers count, and so international actors must debate among how to distribute 
status’ privileges. As a result, “the social value of given resources is neither immanent 
nor self-evident, but historically contingent and socially defined.”98 Consistent with the 
idea that prestige may be pursued along multiple axes, Pouliot’s argument is especially 
relevant in the case of Japan. There, postwar pragmatism ensured that the country 
relinquished most international security roles, but instead focused its status ambitions 
on multilateral institutions, of which the United Nations Security Council was most 
prestigious of all.  
 
It is important to recognise that even if Japanese status-seeking was bounded in its 
scope, it was still a key part of national ambitions and foreign policy. Seeking status 
through roles in international institutions was no less important a goal than the search 
by other states for status through, say, the exercise of military power. Aspects of this 
behaviour were referred to previously as “recognition games” that aim to promote 
beliefs about a state’s status. A further way to conceptualise this is to argue, as Shogo 
Suzuki does, that Japan has behaved as a “frustrated great power.”99 The notion is that 
as a frustrated power, Japan believes it has not yet been granted full acceptance in 
international society, which means being treated as a social equal by others and being 
accorded the same constitutional privileges such as participation in high-status “clubs”. 
Being perceived as a legitimate great power is both a means and an end, as this 
recognition enhances the state’s structural power in practical ways. In other words, from 
an English School perspective, this means Japan wanted to be recognised as having full 
privileges in the institutions of international society. Suzuki’s key argument is that 
while Japan may be “frustrated”, it has not become a militaristic, revisionist state. 
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Instead, it is seeking recognition as a legitimate great power within the normative 
framework of international society.100  
 
The way that Japan’s UN role involves the pursuit of recognition, rather than solely 
material benefits, is reflected in the beliefs of Japanese diplomats. They frequently 
argue that the case for their nation having a permanent seat is not so much what Japan 
might do with it, but that it is ‘deserving’ of the seat. Kiyotaka Akasaka, a former 
Japanese diplomat who also held a UN Under-Secretary-General post, notes that “It is 
not that Japan had a good idea of what to do with its new status. Japan wanted to join in 
the club.”101 Kaoru Nemoto, another former diplomat who continues to serve in the UN, 
added: “The longing for Security Council permanent seat is more of a longing for 
acknowledgment, deriving from an inferiority complex, as a former ‘enemy state’.”102 
One former UN Ambassador, Yuko Satoh, put it emphatically: “None of the P5 became 
permanent members thinking what they wanted to do. The important thing is to have 
Japan’s views reflected in international politics - full stop!”103 In a study that helps put 
many of these views in context, Robert Immerman writes of Japan’s policies on the UN 
up to the early 1990s: “[Japanese elites] were not motivated by a desire to shape 
political or economic agendas, alter financing or budgets, facilitate the hiring of large 
numbers of Japanese as international civil servants, or promote specific national 
policies. Instead, they sought UN actions that appeared to confer greater status on 
Japan.”104  
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A combination of pragmatic, structurally driven policy combined with the outcomes of 
at times intense domestic political debates is a key source of the specific strategies that 
prevailed. The Japanese case is an example of a state choosing its status roles, and 
particularly the pursuit of status not through revisionism but through the forums of 
international institutions. This gave the UN a particularly important place in Japan’s 
international thinking, which is why upheavals in the roles of both the UN and Japan’s 
role within it were so sensitive in Japan after the end of the Cold War. First, however, it 
is necessary to provide a snapshot of Japan’s actual pattern of activity during the 
“normal” phase of prestige-building. 
 
The pattern of “normal” status-seeking 
 
In the leadup to the case study, Japan’s policies toward international institutions show 
all the hallmarks of “recognition games” – whereby a state engages in deliberate 
strategies to pursue social recognition to augment its standing in the international 
hierarchy.105 This is to be expected when Japan was sensitive to perceptions of its 
international status, while institutional roles are a high-visibility mechanism to promote 
the country’s standing. We have seen above the way that Japan greatly prized its 
positions in the OECD and the G7 — placing it at the ‘top table’ of global economic 
management. Japan’s engagement with the UN, for example its pursuit of two-year 
elected terms on the Security Council (Japan had by 1990 taken more elected terms than 
any other UN member), was for similar ends. As with the international economic 
institutions, Tokyo saw UN roles as a fruitful avenue for accumulating prestige that 
would translate into desired status roles. However, a study of the pattern of Japan’s 
behaviour reveals an important point. This status-seeking was always carried on within 
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tightly defined boundaries. The level of resources devoted to advancing Japan in the UN 
– whether in terms of tangible international commitments, or the expenditure of 
diplomatic capital – were always constrained. “Normal” status-seeking indicated a 
conservative and incremental approach to raising Japan’s international standing. 
 
Japan’s engagement with the UN in the 1960s and 1970s exemplifies the theme of 
caution. During these two decades, Japan began to receive support for a greater UN 
role. In the late 1960s, for example, ideas were floated for Japan and India sharing a 
rotating Security Council role, and there was a concept for Japan accepting semi-
permanent UNSC status without a veto. By 1971, policymakers in Washington had 
reached a consensus that a permanent UNSC seat for Japan was in American interests, 
not least because it would “channel Japan’s nationalism and desire for recognition as a 
great power into constructive areas.”106 While Japanese diplomats were at times 
impatient with Washington about a public declaration of support, when they did receive 
one, Tokyo agreed to keep its canvassing of support within the UN low-key.107 Even 
after the PRC took over China’s permanent UNSC seat in October 1971, Japan’s 
response was surprisingly reserved. Speeches by Japanese Foreign Minister Fukuda 
simply criticised the Security Council for only having nuclear weapons states as 
permanent members, and suggested that “major economic or cultural powers” should 
also be added.108 The subject was mentioned in joint communiques with the US at 
various points in the mid-1970s, and in a speech to the General Assembly by Japan’s 
then foreign minister Zentaro Kosaka in 1976.109  
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The 1980s saw the goal of a permanent seat firmly established within the Foreign 
Ministry agenda, and supported by Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone, who engaged in 
a steady process of building Japan’s position to progress a bid. These efforts included 
improving bilateral ties with the US, and playing an effective role as an elected Security 
Council member during 1987-88 on issues such as the Iran-Iraq war.110 In 1987, 
Nakasone suggested at a G7 meeting that Japan be considered as an “associate” 
permanent UNSC member, for the purpose of talks on the Iran-Iraq conflict, but this 
was not followed up, and none of Nakasone’s successors wished to expend capital on 
it.111  
 
Instead, Nakasone’s successor Noboru Takeshita made a key turn in foreign policy in 
1988 in the form of his “International Cooperation Initiative”, which indicated a distinct 
increase in attention paid to Japan’s perceived responsibility for international security. 
This opened up scope for debate in the Diet connecting the goal of a UNSC permanent 
seat with increased contributions, potentially including military ones, to UN 
peacekeeping operations.112 Japan also continued to increase the intensity of its UN 
engagement, for example securing the appointment in 1990 of Sadako Ogata as High 
Commissioner for Refugees and indicating greater financial support on refugee issues; 
playing a key role in redrafting the UNSC resolution helping conclude the Iran-Iraq 
conflict; contributing civilian observers to peacekeeping operations in Afghanistan and 
Iran and Iraq; and also participating in UN activities in Namibia.113 It was indicative 
however of Japanese caution that even when this debate was opened up by Takeshita’s 
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initiative, his successor, Kaifu, was reluctant to advance UNSC membership any 
further, lest it open too wide a domestic debate about peacekeeping obligations.114 
 
Japan’s activities regarding the UNSC up to 1990 appear to indicate the presence of a 
firm risk-return metric. As one scholar puts it: “While the Japanese like to stand high in 
accepted hierarchies and push aggressively in well-understood pursuits, they shrink 
from the unknown and the uncertain.”115 One former Japanese Permanent 
Representative (Ambassador) to the UN in New York, Yoshio Hatano, notes that 
expansion of the council was being canvassed in the late 1980s. He says this could have 
gained the support of as many as 140 UN member states, and even if China and Russia 
had been lukewarm about it, they would not have exercised their vetos against it. 
However, Hatano argues, Japanese leaders failed to push for the expansion out of fear 
both of domestic reactions, and of antagonising Washington.116 Another former 
Permanent Representative, Yukio Satoh, agreed, saying: “If a resolution was passed by 
a two-thirds majority to include Japan as a candidate for permanent membership - it 
would be difficult for China not to accept it.”117 What it took was the invasion of 
Kuwait and the Gulf War of 1990-91 to disrupt what had been the Foreign Ministry’s 
“carefully calibrated plan for gradually and quietly expanding Japan’s responsibilities 
for international peace and stability in a UN context.”118 
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The Gulf War and Japan’s status crisis 
 
The 1990-91 Gulf War was immensely disruptive to political thinking in Japan. It 
demonstrated to Japanese leaders that whatever their beliefs about their nation’s status, 
the rest of the world did not recognise it the same way. The ensuing sense of crisis has 
been described by Japanese scholars as “a great shock to many Japanese,”119 a “critical 
turning point in the history of Japan’s postwar foreign policy,”120 and a “crude post-
Cold War awakening for Japan.”121 In wider context, the Gulf conflict was bound to 
challenge Japan’s international relations because it was part of the upheavals of the end 
of the Cold War that transformed relations between the major powers as well as the 
functioning of the United Nations. But it was the way that it constituted a blow to 
Japan’s international status that makes it instructive as a case study. 
 
The preceding section explained that during the postwar period, Japan had focused its 
prestige-building energy on international institutions, particularly the United Nations. 
The Gulf War represented a crisis for Japan’s international status in several ways. It was 
unexpected, in its aftermath there was realisation that Japan’s status had been harmed, 
and there was a belief that Japan needed to respond with urgency. It has also been 
described as a “functional” crisis, in the sense that it crystallised the situation and 
allowed new assessments of foreign policy risks and benefits.122 This section shows that 
the Gulf War status crisis was important because it revealed the ineffectiveness of 
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previous prestige-earning efforts, while also allowing a revaluation of the importance of 
a Security Council seat as a foreign policy objective. 
 
The Gulf War 
 
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, beginning the conflict that lasted until 
February the next year, set up Japan’s status crisis in two ways. First, it revealed the 
new importance of the Security Council in the immediate post-Cold War period, and 
second, it demonstrated the weakness of Japan’s international relations. The invasion 
itself led to several condemnatory UNSC resolutions, but most importantly, in 
November 1990 the Security Council approved Resolution 678, invoking Chapter VII 
of the UN Charter and authorising the use of force against a UN member state. In 
contrast to the pattern of the Cold War, the USSR – by then in its final months of 
existence – voted in favour, and China, preoccupied with post-Tiananmen sanctions, 
abstained. These developments helped thrust the Security Council to an unprecedented 
role of actual leadership in world politics. Among key developments, resolutions 
imposing sanctions against Iraq also involved the UNSC setting up a committee to 
monitor compliance. This was one of the first active governance roles for the Council 
itself, as opposed to delegating the task to the UN Secretary-General.123 Likewise, 
postwar resolutions ensured that the UN body hunting weapons of mass destruction in 
Iraq would also report directly to the Security Council, keeping the process entirely out 
of the Secretary-General’s orbit.124 These measures demonstrated not only the increased 
public profile of the Security Council, but also its greater authority relative to the UN 
secretariat, and its new functional role in managing international security. 
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Even as the Security Council was being thrust to the forefront, Japan’s initial response 
to the Gulf conflict hardly indicated a major challenge to its international relations. 
Although Japan was very quick to impose economic sanctions upon Iraq, its attempts to 
engage in security terms were aptly described as “slow and spasmodic”.125 On one front, 
figures in the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, led by party Secretary-General Ozawa 
Ichiro, wanted to despatch the Self-Defense Force to the Middle East as part of the UN 
sanctioned force. They argued that this would be legal as it would form part of Japan’s 
responsibilities to the international community. But Prime Minister Kaifu allowed 
himself to be bound by the advice of the Cabinet Legislative Bureau – the bureaucratic 
interpreters and guardians of the constitution’s pacifist Article 9 – telling Ozawa 
directly that “the CLB director-general has told me that this is ‘constitutionally 
impossible.’”126 Instead, a special session of the Diet was finally convened on 12 
October 1990, a full two months after the crisis began, and the Foreign Ministry 
persuaded a reluctant Kaifu to sponsor a United Nations Peace Cooperation Bill 
(UNPCB). This legislation was hastily cobbled together by a Foreign Ministry task 
force, mainly from the United Nations Bureau, and lacked the full support of the 
Japanese Defence Agency, the Self-Defence Force, and even the senior leadership of 
the Foreign Ministry and the ruling Liberal Democratic Party.127 After what could fairly 
be described as a “sterile debate” over the Bill’s constitutionality, it was withdrawn 
from the Diet in November 1990.128  
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The result of the legislative fiasco was that the Kaifu government acquiesced entirely to 
the CLB’s highly exacting interpretation of Article 9. On the one hand, Japan 
contributed $13 billion, raised from a special tax, to the US-led coalition’s war costs. 
Yet this appeared to the world as a glaring contrast to Japan’s inability to contribute to 
security efforts. In the end, as fighting raged in January-February 1991, Japan was not 
even able to send transport aircraft to the Gulf to collect refugees. A deployment of 
Japanese minesweepers to the region only took place after the cessation of hostilities, 
and had to be passed off as a “maritime safety” matter rather than a security 
deployment.129 As Richard Samuels puts it, “it was not pretty watching the Japanese 
government fail miserably in its first test of the so-called New World Order.”130 
 
The aftermath of the Gulf War 
 
The upshot of the Gulf War was that Japan had provided an immense financial 
contribution, yet sent no defence assets until after the conflict was over, and had 
received no say in the deliberations of the Security Council. Moreover, the contradiction 
between the great sum involved, and Tokyo’s decisions to place no personnel in harm’s 
way, only served to convince observers that Japan engaged in ‘chequebook 
diplomacy’.131 Adding to the embarrassment, Japan was conspicuously omitted from a 
full-page advertisement of thanks placed by Kuwait in the New York Times after the 
war. To rub salt into the wound, Kuwait also established a monument that flew the flags 
of every country that contributed troops to the US-led coalition; Japan was not 
represented.132 There was the broad view that “Japan’s ambitions in international 
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politics lay very much in ruins after the Gulf War,”133 and this had a significant impact 
on Japan’s prestige at the elite, public and international levels. 
 
At the elite level, “Japanese political circles were crestfallen” by the Kuwaiti snub,134 
which is described by former UN Ambassador Hatano as “a bitter experience.”135 The 
Japanese attitude to the Council had been typified by one diplomat who was quoted 
saying: “The UN question is basically a question of money. We’ll be raising our 
contribution soon from 12.4 per cent to 15 percent — and that should give us a right of 
entry.”136 The Gulf War undercut this belief, demonstrating that financial contributions 
were not an effective way of showing commitment.137 In his Blueprint for a New Japan 
published after the war, Ozawa described the Gulf Crisis as “a painful lesson for Japan.” 
He said those in Japan who felt that the country had financially propped up an 
economically ailing United States were mistaken, as the request for financial support 
was only “fourth or fifth” in the list of US requests of Japan. The influential LDP 
heavyweight wrote: 
It was Japan that, unable to deploy even a single person to the Gulf region, instead 
sought to get by simply by writing checks. Japan chose to become a mere dispenser of 
cash… But no matter how much money Japan spent, the respect of its partners would 
not be forthcoming.138  
Writing that Japan had psychologically distanced itself from the American definition of 
an ally, Ozawa declared that: “As a nation that seeks to preserve its strong alliance with 
the United States, Japan cannot but acknowledge that we suffered a serious ‘defeat’ in 
the Persian Gulf War.”139 
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The hurt from the experience was also felt among the broad public. Naoko Sajima notes 
that “in Japan there was a widespread perception that the country’s prestige had 
suffered,”140 while Richard Samuels cites ubiquitous calls for “a new grand strategy 
‘based on respect’.”141 The impact on the public mind suggests a reversal in perceptions 
of Japan’s international status, undoing many years of steady prestige-building. There 
was the belief that “never again should Japan’s honour be so tarnished,”142 and this was 
reflected in arguments that a UNSC seat was more vital than ever. As the prominent 
Japanese journalist Hiroshi Fujita wrote in 1995, the country needed will and 
perseverance to secure the UNSC seat, and “if Japan fails, there will be nothing for it to 
do but resign itself to being a second-rate country with no confidence either in its ability 
or its way of life.”143 
 
The implications were also not missed by the US Ambassador to Tokyo at the time, 
Michael Armacost, who cabled Washington in 1991: “A large gap was revealed 
between Japan’s desire for recognition as a great power and its willingness and ability 
to assume these risks and responsibilities.... For all its economic prowess, Japan is not 
in the great power league…”144 A particular concern was that the Gulf War had 
revealed Japan’s weakness in terms of engaging with the Security Council or even 
having effective knowledge of the Council’s deliberations.145 This was now of vital 
importance since the body’s new-found cooperation was letting it make decisions of 
great import to Japan. Former Permanent Representative Nishida said: “If you’re not a 
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permanent member you’ll never be consulted on the core issues… A non-permanent 
member of the Security Council is nothing, frankly speaking. When you’re a permanent 
member you notice the difference.”146 As a result, Japan was now poised to take serious 
action to rectify its ability to engage in international security, and in turn to take on a 
greater role in the Security Council itself. 
 
 
Enhanced status-seeking: the bid for the Security Council seat 
 
Japan’s actions in relation to the Security Council from 1991 until 1994 show a pattern 
of more intensive status-seeking in response to the crisis of the Gulf War. In 
undertaking actions that would not have occurred without the crisis, it was distinctive 
that, compared with the Japan’s postwar record of caution and gradualism in its 
international relations, Japan’s post-1991 UNSC campaigning was “unusually and 
uncharacteristically provocative.”147 This reflects the way that the status crisis worked. 
It was, as Richard Samuels describes it, a “functional” crisis, which drove home to 
policymakers and the public truths about the costs of international security, and in that 
way “catalysed debate on fundamental issues about national security and the U.S. 
alliance.”148 Similarly, Drifte describes it as “a catalyst in forging a consensus among 
leading diplomats and the political leadership at the time on pursuing the candidature 
for permanent Security Council membership more forcefully.”149 In response, Japan’s 
actions took two principal directions: domestic political action to allow participation in 
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UN peacekeeping operations (UNPKO), and diplomatic efforts to reform the Security 
Council. 
 
Domestic efforts and new agendas 
 
The crucial groundwork for seeking a seat was a much more intense level of domestic 
political work to strengthen Japan’s presence in the sphere of international security. At 
the centre of this was legislation at last allowing Japan to participate in UNPKO. In 
contrast to the failure of the Peace Cooperation Bill in autumn 1990, a new International 
Peace Cooperation Law was introduced the following year with considerably greater 
care. While any measure allowing the SDF to deploy overseas remained intensely 
sensitive, this time the LDP government carefully brought centrists on board with 
reassuring rhetoric and safeguards such as keeping deployments small, subject to Diet 
approval, and only to locations where a cease-fire was already in effect.150 While the 
new Law still faced intense Diet debate, it was successfully enacted in August 1992. 
Tokyo was keen to make a test case for the legislation,151 and in September 1992 a 600-
strong force was despatched to join the newly created UN peacekeeping operation in 
Cambodia.  
 
The Peace Cooperation Law was important to building Japanese credentials for a 
greater UNSC role, but it also represented a wider domestic agenda. This was the belief 
among Japanese elites that high-profile reforms in foreign policy would in turn mobilise 
domestic support for Japan taking a higher-status international role. This thinking was 
summarised in 1994 by Japan’s then UN Permanent Representative, Hisashi Owada, 
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who noted in a speech that UNSC permanent membership was important because Japan 
had to become more internationally engaged than previously. He explained that the 
permanent UNSC role would be a mechanism for this, because: “Once you are given the 
place where you can engage yourself, there will be a much greater degree of public 
support to what the government can do and there will be much more interest in the 
country as a whole to get engaged,” he said.152 The significance of this view was 
confirmed by former UN Ambassador Satoh, who concurred that increased UN 
responsibilities would mobilise the Japanese public’s enthusiasm for other international 
commitments. “The security council seat can be a source of new creative thinking, and 
we may be able to translate this into political power, at least to expand our 
perspectives.”153 
 
The crisis that resulted from Japan’s exclusion from UNSC deliberations during the 
Gulf conflict had an interesting outcome in terms of prestige-building activity. A clear 
outcome was that the peacekeeping law, previously stymied by domestic opposition, 
was reintroduced after the crisis with greater effort and reduced opposition. Perhaps 
more interestingly, the crisis revised in the minds of policymakers the significance of 
the high-status UNSC role. This then led to redoubled enthusiasm for the role as elites 
swung around to the view that the position could have valuable domestic political 
benefits. In short, it would help build what Akiyama Nobumasa calls a “new national 
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narrative” that would provide impetus for a wide-ranging reconfiguration of Japan’s 




Diplomatic activity intensified after the passage of the International Peace Cooperation 
Law. In September 1991, the Non-Aligned Movement agreed on an increase in the size 
of the Security Council, and at the same time, several countries tabled a resolution in the 
UN on the subject.155 In January 1992, Prime Minister Miyazawa told the Security 
Council – Japan held an elected seat at the time – that the body had to reconsider its 
membership.156 In December 1992, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution to 
formally begin discussions about reform of both the Assembly and the Security 
Council. A year later, a working group was set up to consider Security Council 
membership, and indeed in 1993 UNSC activity peaked with a record 93 resolutions 
passed.157 Meanwhile, with the domestic groundwork laid, and after considerable 
pressure from the UN Division of the Foreign Ministry, in September 1992 Foreign 
Minister Michio Watanabe addressed the UN General Assembly. This marked the first 
official reference (at least at ministerial level) to Japan’s interest in a UNSC permanent 
seat. This was followed by a speech by Prime Minister Miyazawa Kiichi to the same 
General Assembly, stating a similar wish for UN reform. A year later, Miyazawa’s 
successor Morohiro Hosokawa formally said that Japan intended to play a greater role 
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in the Security Council. This was as close to a formal launch of a campaign as Japan’s 
diplomatic language would allow.158  
 
Japan’s UNSC diplomacy, previously indirect and reserved, became more pointed after 
the Gulf crisis. At the January 1992 special Security Council summit in New York, 
Prime Minister Miyazawa said membership of the council must be “more reflective of 
the realities of the new era”,159 while his press secretary, Masamichi Hanabusa, said 
Japan expected to gain a permanent UNSC seat by 1995, or else it would begin to resent 
“taxation without representation…Some tea party may occur somewhere.”160 Equally, 
Ambassador Yoshio Hatano, Japan’s permanent representative to the UN, bluntly 
calling for Japan to receive a permanent seat within five years.161 Similarly, during the 
1991 General Assembly session, foreign minister Nakayama referred to the Enemy 
States Clauses as “utterly inappropriate historical relics which should be promptly 
deleted.”162 This rhetoric was enough, in the recollection of US Ambassador to Tokyo, 
Michael Armacost, to make the American UN delegation “nervous” and attract the 
attention of Washington decision-makers. The US was forced to urge Japan to limit 
calls for UN reform to its own case for a higher-profile role, lest it open the floodgates 
to “unrestrained logrolling” by aspirants to permanent UNSC seats.163 
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The reverse course 
 
The bid lost momentum after Miyazawa was replaced in August 1993 by Hosokawa, 
who served less than a year at the top of a disjointed eight-party coalition. In an 
interview Nobumasa Akiyama pointed out that despite Japan’s strong diplomatic push 
for the Council seat, Hosokawa was not interested in it, and his advisers preferred to 
work on other priorities such as bilateral relations with Seoul and Beijing.164 As a result, 
although the Foreign Ministry tried hard to strengthen his text, Hosokawa’s September 
1993 speech to the General Assembly referred only to a “general need” to expand the 
Council’s membership, and that “Japan intends to participate constructively in the 
discussion on Security Council reform.”165 Hosokawa later said that while Japan was 
ready to accept a UNSC seat, “We will not press our way through. We will not conduct 
a campaign.”166  
 
One great disappointment for Japan must surely be that, considering the lack of UN 
reform to the present, around 1992 there was a window of opportunity to expand the 
Security Council. With Japan then contributing nearly 17 per cent of the UN’s budget, 
more than the combined contribution of the four permanent UNSC members other than 
the United States, the UN needed Japanese support for almost any new initiative, 
including peacekeeping missions.167 Only a single veto was cast on the Council between 
1990 and 1993, and Japanese diplomats felt neither China nor Russia would have cast 
one against Japan, had its UNSC bid been put to the General Assembly and received 
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strong endorsement.168 Indeed, in April 1992 US officials told their Japanese 
counterparts: “If it was just a question of adding Japan and increasing Council size to 
16… ‘we could do it tomorrow’.”169 To be sure, some scholarly observers are more 
sceptical about this than former Japanese diplomats.170 However it was clear that as 
Japan was preoccupied in 1992 with passing the new Peace Cooperation Law, it missed 
its best opportunity.171 Akiyama told the author that discussion of Japan’s UN role was 
still immature in the 1990s and had to fight with emerging domestic concerns such as 
poor economic growth. “There was scope for success, but Japan lacked a political 
strategy and foundations [for the campaign] at home,” Akiyama said.172 It is possible 
that if Japan had moved earlier to bring its peacekeeping activities in line with its role as 
a major world economy and institutional actor, and if crucial domestic debates had also 
occurred earlier, then Japan may have been well placed to seize the opportunity that 
arose in the UN in the early 1990s. But no such preparations had been made, precisely 
because Japan faced no crisis to trigger the necessary action. 
 
 
Notes on findings  
 
This case study has shown a broad pattern of activity that is consistent with the overall 
hypothesis of this thesis. We have seen a relatively stable process of normal status-
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seeking; a status crisis that was perceived as a serious threat to key values; and in 
response, an ensuing phase of enhanced prestige-building. Having said this, interesting 
findings were revealed in the detail of this pattern of activity. The first of these has to do 
with the “functional” aspects of the status crisis. While a crisis can be expected to reveal 
information and force fresh valuations, it is interesting to see that this can cut both 
ways. In this instance, the UNSC seat was shown to be more valuable than previously 
expected, but it also carried higher risks and responsibilities than had been previously 
considered. A separate finding is that the case study highlights the importance of 
domestic politics in any response to a status crisis. As noted below, this empirical 
example only highlights that there may be no uniform response by a state to an issue.    
 
In terms of valuations, the Gulf conflict served as a catalyst to reveal the new role of the 
Security Council as a major centre of world politics. It caused Japanese decision-makers 
to also reassess the benefits of holding a seat. Former Deputy Permanent Representative 
Shinichi Kitaoka, who has remained close to the Abe government and moved on to head 
Japan’s international cooperation agency JICA, is forthcoming about the attractions as 
well as the burdens. He said by holding a seat, other countries would be forced to 
consult with Japan, Japan would have a say in the precedence and procedures of the 
Council (which are guarded by the P5), and the veto would be valuable even if it was 
not exercised, as it could be traded for concessions in the Council. On the other hand, 
Japan would have to face up to greater international responsibility: “We would have to 
make decisions, whether good or bad, while Japan has been accustomed to being hidden 
behind the US. Instead, we would have to show our opinion.”173 At the time, this was 
the view of Prime Minister Hosokawa’s policy advisor, Shusei Tanaka. Tanaka 
identified that the considerable increase in the UNSC’s functions and effective power 
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thanks to the end of the Cold War also meant greater responsibilities, for which the 
Japanese public was unprepared. He wrote at the time: “Japan will become a laughing 
stock of the world when it becomes a permanent SC member but the Japanese public 
refuse to shoulder the responsibility that the new position entails.”174 In this way, the 
“functional” crisis of the Gulf War demonstrated the UNSC’s attractions, which 
appealed to the foreign policy establishment, but also its burdens, which sparked 
anxiety among politicians and their advisers. 
 
This divide between the responses of diplomats and politicians highlights the way 
national responses to status concerns are shaped by domestic political considerations. 
The study shows that the serious status concerns exposed by the Gulf War were met by 
equally strong motivations for action among key constituencies in Japan. Part of the 
information revealed by the crisis was that MOFA was exposed as having driven 
entirely the wrong policy approach during the conflict. Thus the Ministry was the most 
deeply affected part of the government and the most motivated force for change. MOFA 
threw all efforts into mounting a strong UNSC bid, and its efforts continued well after 
1993. At the same time, the Ministry was left isolated because the remainder of the 
Japanese political system was not ready for the bid. Tanaka’s advice to Hosokawa can 
be understood in this context. It demonstrated that even when it is clear that a state has 
suffered a serious loss of status, we must look inside the system of domestic politics to 
identify the constituencies that will drive new prestige-building to rectify the situation. 
 
                                                





Although Japan’s UNSC bid has a substantial literature, the case analysis aimed to 
address the outstanding puzzle around the specific roles that status played in this 
episode. The key findings are that, first, that prestige-building in the pre-Gulf War 
period was cautious and balanced the attractions of a UNSC seat with both international 
and domestic sensitivities. This pattern of activity was disrupted by the Gulf War, and 
the evidence (including the recollections of Japanese diplomats) was that the effects on 
Japan’s status were particularly unexpected and humbling. This crisis delivered new 
information about the value of a UNSC seat and the need for Japan to assert its role 
there. It was then possible to observe a strong pattern of Japanese activity that was more 
assertive, indeed provocative, than before the Gulf conflict, and willing to confront the 
sensibilities of both allies in Washington and the domestic audience. It indicates that 
this case supports the idea of a three-phased pattern of status-seeking behaviour, with 
decision-makers readily perceiving the onset of a status crisis, and moving rapidly to 
adjust policies in response. 
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5. CHINA AND THE COMPREHENSIVE  
NUCLEAR-TEST-BAN TREATY, 1996 
 
 
SECTION A: EXISTING EXPLANATIONS 
 
Introducing the case 
 
On 24 September 1996, China became the second signatory to the Comprehensive 
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). The decision has attracted the attention of scholars 
because, while China had up to that point engaged in arms control commitments such as 
the Outer Space Treaty, the Seabed Arms Control Treaty, and the Antarctic Treaty, the 
CTBT marked the first time China agreed multilaterally to effectively limit its weapon 
capabilities.1 It remains puzzling that while the United States and Russia had together 
tested more than 1,700 nuclear devices, China agreed to halt its program after 
conducting only 45 successful tests. It has made this case one where scholars of IR have 
intently searched for the trade-offs that made the treaty desirable. To quote the 
prominent Chinese arms control expert Li Bin on the matter: “Always when you join a 
treaty you gain something and you pay a price.”2 What did China gain from signing this 
treaty? This case has been selected because the existing scholarship has frequently 
suggested that the attraction, in the eyes of decision-makers in Beijing, was higher 
international status for China. The opportunity here is to take this puzzling event and 
examine how changing perceptions of status may have influenced China’s decisions.  
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The balance of evidence is that China paid a cost in national security terms for signing 
the CTBT. The issue, as Alastair Iain Johnston described it while the CTBT 
negotiations were still underway, was whether China’s concerns about its image were a 
factor in this. Up to that point, China had been reluctant to engage in multilateral arms 
control agreements, knowing that they would be effective in constraining its military 
capabilities: 
Yet China is involved in these negotiations, even though there is no external material 
coercion compelling its participation… So there must be some additional factor that is 
altering the cost-benefit analysis, a factor that compels China to participate in a process 
the end point of which it would prefer to avoid. This variable appears to be international 
image.3  
The first section of this chapter sets out the existing explanations in more detail. These 
explanations include technical developments meaning the CTBT posed only a minimal 
impediment to China’s nuclear weapons program; that the treaty was costly, but the 
choice to sign it was highly instrumental because China’s rivals would pay even greater 
costs; explanations drawing from both instrumental and constructivist lines of thought 
about China’s valuation of its international image; and that the process of international 
engagement had socialised Chinese decision-makers into adopting arms control norms. 
Most of these explanations run a gamut of debates over whether Chinese attitudes on 
the issue were a case of ulterior reassurance, or an internalised transformation of values: 
the so-called “adaptation versus learning” debate.4  
 
This chapter takes into account the existing explanations, but argues that multiple 
causes need to be considered in order to better explain the decision to sign a costly 
treaty, and indeed the timing of that decision. Like the other case studies in this thesis, 
this chapter shows that a contributing factor was an unfavourable international 
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environment. These contexts appear to make status-related concerns more acute and 
more likely to play a causal role in changing policy outcomes. In this case study, a 
contributing factor to China’s decision was its international isolation after the 
Tiananmen Square crackdown in 1989. This put serious pressure on China’s 
international status until at least the signing of the CTBT in 1996. The intensity of this 
status crisis varied over these years, but a contribution to the signing decision was likely 
to have been an upsurge in Chinese concern about the “China threat” issue. This made 
the post-Tiananmen status crisis particularly acute over the same two years that the 
treaty was being negotiated, and combined with pressure on China about its adherence 
to the nuclear non-proliferation regime. These provide a way to set out a sequence of 
events in which changing Chinese self-perceptions of status help explain why it signed 
the test-ban treaty. 
 
 
Outline of events 
 
This timeline sets out a narrow slice of China’s international relations from about 1989 
to 1996, when the CTBT was signed. It includes only events that were relevant to 
debates about China’s international status, and the process of arms control treaty-
making. The purpose of this section is to put in order the events that form part of the 
argument in the next section that the signing of the CTBT was linked to a particular 
pattern of Chinese status-seeking. 
  
The period from 1989 to 1996 was marked by sharp swings in China’s perceptions of its 
security, standing, and overall relations with the outside world. These shifts in Chinese 
self-perceptions were dominated by the state of relations with Washington, with key 
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regional actors such as Japan, and especially during this period, across the Taiwan 
Strait. Sino-American relations were particularly cold immediately after the crackdown 
on student demonstrators in Tiananmen Square on 4 June 1989. Diplomatic efforts in 
late 1989 and early 1990 attempted to trade concessions, but for the most part ran into 
misunderstanding. While the George H.W. Bush administration intended to maintain 
strategically pragmatic relations with Beijing, and vetoed the US Congress’ most 
contentious post-Tiananmen legislation, the greater context of the end of the Cold War 
made restoring relations difficult. Leaders in Beijing were deeply shocked by the fall of 
European communism and the collapse of the USSR lost them a potential partner and 
left China isolated as a communist regime.5 At the same time, Beijing was dismayed 
and placed on the defensive by the demonstration of US military superiority in the 1991 
Gulf War.6  
 
An initial reaction to this situation was Deng Xiaoping’s early 1992 “southern tour” of 
special economic zones in Guangdong Province, which as Robert Suettinger puts it, 
“legitimized and expanded a course of economic reform that led to China’s emergence 
as one of the world’s fastest-growing and fastest-changing economies.”7 In retrospect, 
the period is also characterised by the famous 28-character statement attributed to Deng 
that China should “bide its time” and “maintain a low profile.”8 
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Subsequent efforts to restore China’s external standing began with difficulty. From 
1993-94, US-China relations were bedevilled by the Clinton administration’s linkage of 
China’s human rights record with Most Favored Nation (MFN) trading status. In the 
second half of 1993, there was also a series of disputes between Beijing and 
Washington. These included threats of sanctions against China due to reported missile 
transfers to Pakistan; US efforts to intercept suspected chemical weapon precursors to 
Iran; apparent US opposition to Beijing hosting the 2000 Olympics (which were 
awarded to Sydney instead); and tensions over China’s October 1993 underground 
nuclear test, which came so soon after President Clinton’s July call for a ban on nuclear 
tests.9  
 
On the other hand, during 1993 China’s international position improved on several 
fronts. In that year, China and Taiwan opened unofficial talks and established a 
framework for cooperation, and in 1994 Clinton ended annual trade “linkage”, which 
had bedevilled the bilateral relationship with Washington. China also boosted efforts to 
improve relations with its neighbours, including dialogue over border disputes, 
normalisation of bilateral relationships, and efforts to address intractable historical 
differences.10  
 
It was also during this time that China made significant engagement with multilateral 
arms control. In the early years after its first detonation of a nuclear device in 1964, 
China had been defensive and hostile toward nuclear arms control and nonproliferation. 
While it had stated that it would not export nuclear weapons, Beijing considered the 
Limited Test-Ban Treaty to be targeted against it, while seeing the nuclear Non-
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Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as discriminatory and hypocritical. As late as 1978, official 
Chinese media could call the NPT “a conspiracy concocted by the USSR and the US to 
maintain their nuclear monopoly.”11 During the 1980s and early 1990s, however, China 
joined a succession of nuclear non-proliferation institutions, including the International 
Atomic Energy Agency in 1984, the voluntary safeguards agreement in 1988, and 
acceding to the NPT review and extension process in 1992.12  The signing of the CTBT 
sits near to the culmination of that two-decade long period of increasing Chinese 
engagement with the international non-proliferation regime.  
 
In contrast to the seeming advances of 1992-94, China’s international position took a 
turn for the worse in 1995-96. China had stepped up its engagement in multilateral 
institutions and enjoyed more normal bilateral relations with Washington, but this was 
offset by a new swing toward Chinese assertiveness. This included forceful claims in 
the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait crisis from late 1995, which sparked a rapid 
reaction from an international community. By the time of the case study, China was 
facing serious pressure due to these international disputes. 
 
China first expressed its willingness to participate in CTBT negotiations in September 
1993, and dropped conditions such as attaching the treaty to complete elimination of 
nuclear weapons.13 China was not, however, keen to conclude the treaty too quickly, as 
it was finalising a series of nuclear tests aimed at narrowing the gap with the other 
declared nuclear powers, and producing smaller warheads for more survivable 
systems.14 Only in October 1993, after China had conducted its 39th test, did Beijing 
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announce full support for the CTBT.15 China increased its pace of testing from 1994-96 
(conducting an unprecedented six tests in just over two years). A consideration was that 
Chinese leaders had made an in-principle decision to sign the treaty in late 1995, well 
before the outcome of the final testing series was available. A decision to adhere to the 
moratorium on testing was apparently made in April 1996, four months before the end 





The key purpose for reviewing the literature on China and the CTBT is to investigate 
the existing explanations, especially those that are concerned about China’s image or 
status. The first step is to examine what scholars have said about the costliness of the 
treaty. After this, the principal explanations debated in the literature include 
instrumental security explanations, concerns about China’s image, and the possibility of 
socialisation. To the extent that these explanations highlight prestige and status as a 
factor in the decision, they are a useful way of identifying whether this case was one 
where status was a “most likely” driver of causal outcomes. This review of explanations 
also highlights the gaps that remain in explaining how concerns about image and status 
came to be a causal factor in the decision, and how they may have influenced the timing 
of the decision. 
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Costliness of the decision 
 
For this case study, the decision to sign the CTBT culminated a decade and a half of 
steadily intensifying Chinese involvement with international nonproliferation and arms 
control institutions. The literature shows that this involvement sits in the context of 
wider policies of caution and restraint alongside growing engagement with the outside 
world after 1979. However, the CTBT also marks a qualitative change in the form of 
China joining a costly multilateral treaty, which requires further investigation. 
 
Before 1979, China had condemned US-Soviet strategic arms limitation talks as “sham 
disarmament” intended to cover-up for the superpower arms race.17 Alastair Iain 
Johnston describes Chinese strategic policy as the drive for “a rich state and strong 
army,” and Beijing shunned arms control agreements that would constrain Chinese 
capabilities.18 By contrast, the post-1979 period saw Beijing greatly increase its 
involvement in multilateral institutions.19 This conformed to Deng’s policy that 
“development is the absolute principle,” and that “in everything it does, the military 
should subordinate itself to the bigger picture of national development.”20 As a result, 
the 1980s saw Beijing set aside its earlier antagonism towards arms control; China 
started to participate in the Conference on Disarmament (CD), and let itself free ride on 
arms control agreements that limited the arsenals of other powers.21 In 1982, China 
made its “three halts and one reduction” proposal, in 1986 it announced its de facto 
acceptance of the Partial Test-Ban Treaty, and from the same year China worked with 
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the CD towards in-principle acceptance of a comprehensive test ban.22 Meanwhile, 
China joined the International Atomic Energy Agency in 1984, agreed to make civil 
facilities subject to IAEA safeguards from 1985, signed the voluntary safeguards 
agreement in 1988, and increased reporting to the IAEA from 1991-93.23 By the start of 
the 1990s, China had engaged with a wide range of arms control processes, such as 
acceding to treaties on non-nuclear weapons, making unilateral commitments (including 
to no-first-use), training a cadre of arms controls experts via the CD, and issuing 
statements in support of other agreements, such as the START treaties.24 
 
Out of all China’s arms control engagement prior to 1996, the most significant was its 
decision to sign the NPT. While we have seen that China disparaged that treaty for 
many years after it was opened for signing in 1968, Beijing made a significant change 
of direction in 1990 as it turned to support the treaty, and it formally acceded to the 
treaty in March 1992. As scholars noted at the time, one of the motivations was that it 
“enabled China to gain further legitimacy and status as a great power while pursuing 
various diplomatic, economic, and strategic interests.”25 Key amongst this was that as 
China had conducted a nuclear test prior to the NPT’s 1967 cut-off date, joining the 
treaty formalised China’s status as an internationally recognised nuclear weapons 
state.26 Indeed Swaine and Johnston argue that China was mindful of post-Tiananmen 
criticism, making “scoring diplomatic points [a] critical factor in determining when it 
would sign.”27 On the other hand, Swaine and Johnston also note that signing on to the 
                                                
22 David M. Lampton, The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform, 1978-
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NPT was “a relatively painless step” which imposed few intrusions in terms of 
inspections. Given China’s interest in preventing nuclear proliferation throughout Asia, 
there were “many realpolitik reasons” for China to sign the NPT.28   
 
In contrast to the NPT, most scholars see the CTBT as carrying notable costs and as 
materially constraining China. These costs include limiting weapons development, the 
impact on sovereignty of inspection and compliance, and freezing China’s nuclear 
arsenal well behind the rest of the Permanent Five. China’s program ended after just 45 
nuclear tests, the same number as the UK and far behind the US at 1030, the 
USSR/Russia at 715 and even France with 210 tests.29 
 
Scholars have called the CTBT China’s most constraining treaty so far, as “most 
specialists in the testing community, in the PLA, and even among Western specialists 
on Chinese nuclear weapons argue that the treaty was a ‘sacrifice’ for China, and that 
there are now certain weapons designs that are closed off to the Chinese.”30  Nicola 
Horsburgh notes that it left gaps in the survivability, safety, capabilities, data and 
experience of Chinese nuclear forces, 31 while Ann Kent argues that China made many 
concessions in the CTBT negotiations, for example on requirements for no first use 
declarations, security assurances, the right to conduct peaceful nuclear explosions, and 
allowing on-site inspections. Kent also notes concerns of Chinese experts at the time 
that the treaty would leave China’s international status merely on a par with the Britain 
and France. As a result, she argues, “There is general agreement that, in becoming the 
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for International Security and Arms Control, 1997), 3-4. 
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second signatory of the CTBT after the United States in March 1996, it allowed a 
significant diminution of its sovereignty.”32  
 
Concerns about the costs of the CTBT have also been bluntly expressed by Chinese 
scholars, including former military officers and arms control negotiators. Sun Xiangli 
has highlighted the technical costs to national security: the CTBT was a tough treaty for 
a latecomer, as it caught China in the middle of its programme and testing was cut 
short.33 Sun wrote in 1997 that “China is not technically ready for a CTB 
[Comprehensive Test Ban]… A CTB would seem to not only freeze the gap between 
China and other nuclear states, but very likely enlarge this gap also.”34 Similar concerns 
were clearly stated by former Chinese negotiator, PLA Colonel Zou Yunhua, who says: 
“It was difficult for China to declare a moratorium on nuclear testing. The CTBT has 
direct bearing on China’s fundamental security interests. China’s plan for testing was 
shortened and cut for the sake of the treaty.”35 These expressions of the costs have left 





Some scholars argue that even if the CTBT constrained China’s nuclear weapons 
program, technical developments made testing less vital. For example, David Bachman 
argues that while the treaty “seems to fly in the face of the interests of China’s 
military,” it is possible that China had obtained supercomputing capabilities allowing 
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advanced weapons simulations. “In this case, China’s commitment to the CTBT costs 
China and the PLA relatively little and earns them some international recognition and 
approval.”36 Another view is that aside from further legitimising China’s status as a 
nuclear weapons state, the treaty helped shift attention away from China and onto 
concerns about nuclear proliferation on the Korean peninsula and in South Asia.37  
 
Other scholars put greater weight upon the CTBT’s costs, but argue that these were 
offset in Beijing’s view by benefits elsewhere. In particular, several writers stress that 
while China was well behind the other “legitimate” nuclear weapons states, from 
Beijing’s perspective a freeze would ensure no widening of the gap with the established 
powers, and would lock in China’s advantage over emerging nuclear rivals such as 
India.38 These explain the signing in broadly realpolitik terms. 
 
Costs of isolation 
 
A combination of material, instrumental considerations and more ideational factors 
come into play when scholars consider the role of China’s international image. As Evan 
Medeiros puts it: 
China cares about its image because it wants to be accepted as a member of the 
international community and does not like being ostracised or otherwise isolated, 
especially in international institutions. China pays attention to its reputation because of 
the material benefits that it believes can stem from a positive one, in terms of access to 
trade, aid, technology and investment.39 
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Within this subset of the literature, reputational arguments are often couched in terms of 
China not wanting to lose reputation by being isolated or ostracised.  
 
The literature sees China comparing the costs of joining the treaty with the costs of 
isolation. In their detailed account of interviews with Chinese negotiators, Banning 
Garrett and Bonnie Glaser also note Chinese concerns about being isolated on arms 
control and nonproliferation issues. They note that notwithstanding possible security 
benefits noted above, “Beijing’s decisions in 1992 to become a signatory to the NPT 
and in 1993 to agree to join negotiations aimed at concluding a CTBT were made 
primarily in response to international political pressure.”40 On this issue, Wendy 
Frieman argues that China relinquished weapons development options, and even if it 
had planned to stop testing anyway, it had now committed formally and publicly to the 
test ban regime. As a result, she notes, “the gap between China’s inventory and that of 
the two nuclear superpowers is so large that China has been effectively frozen into a 
position of perpetual inferiority.”41 On the other hand, Frieman contends that what 
mattered more to China was to support its position among developing countries, to 
reinforce its credentials as a P5 member, and to join the club of ‘responsible’ countries: 
China was able to avoid the political isolation, both within the P-5 and in the larger 
international community, which would have resulted from remaining on the outside. 
There is little doubt that refusing to sign the treaty would have carried a serious political 
stigma even if China were to refrain de facto from nuclear testing.42   
 
The above assessment of costs and benefits is consistent with the argument put forward 
by Etel Solingen that nuclear proliferation is more associated with closed, introspective 
states and societies, compared with those that are internationally engaged. While 
Solingen’s major study looked at new proliferators, not China specifically, her overall 
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point is that internationalised economies, compared with closed ones, have many 
motivations to conform to international nuclear regimes: “The former have incentives to 
avoid the political, economic, reputational, and opportunity costs of acquiring nuclear 
weapons because such costs impair a domestic agenda favouring internationalisation.”43 
This argument can be applied to China’s situation where economic opening-up was a 
priority. As Bates Gill notes, “the grand national strategy of reform and opening comes 
close to holy writ among Chinese leaders,” and he points out that in the interests of 
economic development, Beijing was motivated to engage in a full range of relations 
with the international community. 44 
 
China “learning” normative values 
 
A third approach in the literature argues that China did not make costly commitments to 
arms control simply to avoid greater costs, but because it had changed its normative 
values on the issue. As championed by Johnston, a state such as China changes its cost-
benefit calculus due to interactions in arms control processes. Adaptation means 
changes that are tactical in nature and intended to preserve China’s relative capabilities, 
such as diplomatic offensives to break out of post-Tiananmen isolation and improve 
bilateral relations with Washington.45 Learning implies “a basic shift in how China 
understands its security and the role of arms control in this calculus” coming about due 
to high-profile negotiations and exposure to audiences of negotiators.46 As Johnston and 
Paul Evans put it, in the 1980s and 90s, “China’s self-identification underwent a 
change, a blurring,” so that traditional realpolitik major power identity became linked to 
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“a newer identity as a responsible major power” with status partly measured by 
participation in institutions.47 Whereas major power status once meant material assets 
such as imperial power, it now involves “participation in status quo institutions that 
regulate, more or less non coercively, interstate relations.”48 This explains why China 
was likely to be susceptible to socialisation in this case. 
 
Johnston rejects arguments that China joined the CTBT simply to improve its 
international relations or particularly bilateral relations with Washington, as this could 
have been done in less costly ways.49 Johnston argues that Chinese decision-makers 
identified China with the status role of “responsible major power”, and therefore 
became sensitive to social rewards and punishments of others who were identified as 
part of this group.  
I think it was clear that Chinese decision makers were well aware of this discourse, and 
of the back patting benefits and opprobrium costs involved in the CTBT process… 
China could not stay out of, or in the end sabotage, the CTBT because of the costs to 
China’s international image and because of the image benefits from participating in one 
of the pillar treaties of the non-proliferation regime.50  
Johnston’s view is that China, wishing to “compete in order to acquire the status of a 
winner”, was receptive to arguments about behaving consistent with its self-identity as a 
high-status actor.51  
 
Other scholars have also explored “learning” in the context of China’s multilateral 
engagement. David Shambaugh describes a “fundamental evolution” in Chinese 
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attitudes toward multilateral institutions,52 while Mingquan Zhu sees a continuous 
learning process, where thanks to “frequent exchanges with the outside world, many 
new concepts and ideas relating to arms control and nonproliferation have increased in 
their influence on Chinese leaders and the professional segment of society.”53 David 
Lampton argues that there is a feeling that indeed China enters international 
arrangements largely tactically, but this is a “slippery slope” leading to changes of 
beliefs.54 Even Yong Deng concludes that China’s status discontent might yet be 
managed peacefully, because “China’s conception of status now entails seeking 
international legitimacy as a rising great power.”55 Similarly, Garrett and Glaser argue 
that China’s primary approach to its international relations was ‘self-help’, but by the 
mid-1990s there was “growing support in China for the view that multilateral 
agreements to reduce mutual threats can provide meaningful complements to self-help 
measures,” boosting security and deflecting international criticism.56 Against this, Bates 
Gill gives a useful analysis that China mainly takes a realpolitik or “adaptive” approach, 
but over time the imperative to learn becomes more pressing; this tends to make China 
more conforming to international norms: “The realpolitik approach is increasingly 
constrained and shaped by the intricate web of international dependencies, 
commitments, status relationships, and security realities that China faces.”57 
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Assessment of the literature 
 
The literature includes a range of explanations for China joining the CTBT. These 
include some security benefits that could explain the decision in realist terms, concerns 
about China’s legitimacy, image and status that mostly related to maintaining an 
environment for unimpeded domestic economic development, and a process of learning 
among Chinese elites that saw them put value in China’s status role as a “responsible 
major power”. A preponderance of the literature sees the treaty as a costly one, and also 
refers in some form to China’s prestige or status concerns, and this makes the case a 
“most likely” one to find status at work as a causal factor. This section puts the 
discussion of status and the CTBT in the broader context of China and its status beliefs, 
before turning to the outstanding gaps in the literature on the case.  
 
Literature on China and status 
 
As with the other case studies in this project, it is necessary to compare references to 
status in the literature on the case with broader literature on the status roles of China. 
Certainly, much writing about the international relations of China holds that one of 
Beijing’s leading motivations is restoration of the country’s great power status.58 
However, China often appears to be torn in its pursuit of status: on the one hand, it is 
seen as a prestige-maximising state, engaged in an “uphill struggle” against the existing 
international order;59 on the other, China is cautious, wanting to ensure that its quest to 
become a great power did not provoke a preventative reaction from the United States or 
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its allies.60 This contradiction is inherent to the place of great power status in China’s 
national goals, as Yong Deng states it: 
China’s struggle for status is about creating an international environment that allows the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP)-state to continue self-paced reforms at home; increase 
power and recognition abroad to secure China’s core interests; reassure other states of 
China’s nonthreatening intent; and project its influence in Asia and beyond.61 
In Deng’s analysis, both power and recognition must balance each other if China is to 
regain the status it believes it warrants: “Without power there is no recognition.  Yet 
power without recognition fuels the fear of a China threat,” which would jeopardise the 
economic project and thus the major basis of China’s rise.62 
 
China’s dissatisfaction with the international order’s status quo is because, as Aaron 
Friedberg writes: “Their leaders and people often feel that they were unfairly left out 
when the pie was divided up, and may even believe that, because of their prior 
weakness, they were robbed of what was rightfully theirs.”63 Michael Swaine and 
Ashley Tellis describe China’s grand strategy as follows: 
The traditional objectives that the Chinese state has pursued over the centuries still 
remain… These objectives include assuring domestic order and social well-being; 
maintaining an adequate defence against threats to the heartland; increasing the level of 
influence and control over the periphery with an eye to warding off threats that may 
eventually menace the political regime; and restoring China to regional pre-eminence 
while attaining the respect of its peers as a true great power marked by high levels of 
economic and technological development, political stability, military prowess, and 
manifest uprightness.64 
The great power status that China seeks is, however, built up from a combination of 
preponderant material power, the willingness to use it, and social recognition.65 The 
pursuit of social recognition is one explanation for why China has been motivated by 
such a “strong sense of grievance at past humiliations inflicted by external powers,” 
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which may explain why China has acted against its economic interests, for example 
during the 1995-96 Taiwan Straits crisis.66 
 
The other side of the status equation is that China came to value a positive reputation 
and membership of international forums because of the material benefits they have 
brought. Evan Medeiros argues that China’s long-term diplomatic priorities include 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, economic development, and international respect 
and status. He adds that China’s international status has generally been linked to its 
permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council, possession of nuclear 
weapons, large population and landmass, and historic legacy as the major power of 
Asia. China cares about both image and reputation separately: 
China cares about its image because it wants to be accepted as a member of the 
international community and does not like being ostracised or otherwise isolated, 
especially in international institutions. China pays attention to its reputation because of 
the material benefits that it believes can stem from a positive one, in terms of access to 
trade, aid, technology and investment.67  
An interesting perspective on these status values comes from opinion surveys. Yong 
Deng writes that a survey of Chinese youth of attitudes toward the reform period 
showed China’s international status (seen as China’s ranking in international hierarchy 
and its ability to protect its interests and project power) rated among the top three 
concerns, above economic development.68 The status cues that were most valued in 
China included its membership of the Permanent Five and its nuclear status; its 
membership of international institutions, including the World Trade Organisation, 
APEC, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation; and China’s image as a 
‘responsible cooperative power’. In other words, this is what Chinese scholars have 
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called  “international acceptance”, measured by nature of China’s relationships with US 
and other great powers.69  
 
To look at beliefs about status from another perspective, Chinese strategic cultures have 
been described as consisting of a Confucian-Mencian strand that is conflict averse and 
defensive minded, and a Realpolitik strand which favours offensive, military solutions. 
“Chinese elites believe strongly that their country’s strategic tradition is pacifist, 
nonexpansionist, and purely defensive but at the same time able to justify virtually any 
use of force—including offensive and preemptive strikes—as defensive in nature.”70 
The challenge for Beijing is therefore “to devise policies that would facilitate a 
continuing increase in the country’s power relative to others while minimising the 
likelihood that this trend would stimulate potential adversaries to offset China’s 
efforts.”71 Some signs of this were visible early in the reform period; one article notes 
that the ‘new’ China needed to appear peaceful, and support for arms control helped to 
‘clean up’ China’s image: “These actions are understood as an assertion by China of 
what it sees as its rightful place at the world’s top table, but they are also in part a 
recognition that ‘top nations’ have a responsibility for world peace.”72  However, to deal 
with its conflicting goals requires China to think in terms of “comprehensive national 
power”: the means toward achieving China’s strategic objectives, which include 
protecting sovereignty, maintaining security, preventing Taiwan independence, securing 
favourable national image, and promoting economic development.73  
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Gaps and next steps 
 
An assessment of the literature should let us conclude that the CTBT may well have 
carried modest national security benefits such as freezing China’s advantages over India 
or other proliferating states, but these were almost certainly offset by the costs in terms 
of halting a nuclear weapons program after only a very limited number of tests. This 
then leads us to consider whether the attractions of status are sufficient to explain the 
costly decision. Here general approaches, such as outlined by Solingen, suggest that any 
state engaging in intensive international economic engagement will be more inclined to 
conform to international nuclear norms. Explanations that incorporate socialisation, 
such as Johnston’s, suggest that a process of learning allowed Chinese decision-makers 
to embrace the “responsible major power” status role, which explains their willingness 
to accept the costs of the CTBT.  
 
Socialisation explanations can help explain the decision because the 1996 treaty did 
follow a period of increased engagement, which provided relevant opportunities for 
Chinese decision-makers to “learn”. Furthermore, after China signed on to the NPT, 
decision-makers became more aware of the status benefits of being recognised as a fully 
legitimate nuclear weapons state, a status role that would be reinforced by participation 
in the CTBT as well.  However, a key gap remains because this literature does not by 
itself explain why Chinese decision-makers were so receptive to learning. More specific 
factors are needed to connect decision-makers’ greater awareness of legitimacy as a part 
of a specific kind of major power status role, with their decision that this role 
necessitated joining a costly multilateral treaty. Specifically, this role refers to what 
scholars have called China’s “identity-based desire to maximise status as a participant 
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in the legitimate international institutions that regulate state behaviour.”74 The argument 
in the following section is that China’s status crisis after Tiananmen was an additional 
causal factor forcing revaluations of China’s status position. The analysis of this case 
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SECTION B: CASE ANALYSIS 
 
Analysing the case 
 
While scholars continue to debate China’s motivations for signing the CTBT, this 
analysis will look specifically at changes in Chinese prestige-building in the period 
between the 1989 Tiananmen incident and the decision to sign the treaty in 1996. This 
section argues that perceptions in Beijing that the post-Tiananmen status crisis was a 
significant threat were a contributing factor to the reassessment of the CTBT. That 
revaluation occurred alongside greater engagement in international institutions, and the 
increase in normative and ideational interactions that came with this. As a senior scholar 
of China’s international relations, Xia Liping of Tongji University, points out, “The mid 
1990s was a period of learning in the international system, and judging the multilateral 
international system. The NPT and the CTBT were two good examples of this.”75 In 
contrast to the NPT, as we have seen, the CTBT marked a sharp qualitative break as it 
was the first time China had joined a treaty that put material constraints on its own 
military capability. The key theme of this case analysis is that the period 1989-1995 saw 
a process of learning triggered by Tiananmen in which China re-evaluated its status 
objectives, ultimately leading it to sign the test-ban agreement.  
 
The review of the literature on the case provides the starting point for this analysis. The 
review concluded that status was likely to be a factor in the case, but we needed better 
explanations for why Chinese decision-makers were so sensitive to status concerns in 
the lead-up to deciding to sign the CTBT. To pre-empt the arguments of this section, 
even if decision-makers were more aware of arms control norms and sensitive to 
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acceptance in arms control communities, why did they care? Additional factors could 
help explain why decision-makers concluded that status concerns could pose a real 
threat to China’s interests. The aim of this analysis is to track how those status concerns 
may have taken effect, and this chapter adopts a similar approach to the other two case 
studies of this project. 
 
As with the other cases in this thesis, this chapter breaks the events of the case study 
into three phases. The first phase, normal status-seeking, assumes a period in which the 
state built prestige toward desired status goals in a relatively conservative way. In 
China’s case, it is a matter of showing that in the lead-up to 1989, status-seeking was 
progressed according to predictable cost-benefit trade-offs. For example, in that period 
China joined a number of international security-related agreements, but these were 
generally not puzzling in the sense of being costly to China’s own national security. The 
second phase is the status crisis, where unexpected events are perceived as threatening 
status goals, forcing a revaluation of policy trade-offs. The status crisis described here 
involves Tiananmen and the following years, with a spike of “China threat” concerns 
around 1995-96. Finally, the case looks for a third phase of activity – enhanced status-
seeking. The following argues that this phase involved efforts to build prestige, 
offsetting the status crisis, which exhibit an increased appetite for risk.  
 
This case study explores the signing of the CTBT to see whether it is an example of this 
process. In terms of the methodology, compared with other cases it is more difficult to 
gain Chinese decision-makers’ personal views on the status crisis. Instead, it is 
necessary to study evidence of China’s actual behaviour, or references to concerns in 
Chinese publications, to assess that a crisis took place. Afterwards however, it is 
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possible to observe whether China had intensified its pursuit of valuable prestige, which 
can provide evidence that it had moved to a phase of enhanced status-seeking.  
 
 
Normal status seeking: Before Tiananmen 
 
Throughout the reform period, China’s status goals were dominated by the need to work 
within an international environment dominated by the United States and other advanced 
democracies. Leaders in Beijing were well aware that established major powers would 
have the critical role in according or withdrawing recognition of China as it aspired to 
join their ranks. Yong Deng explains that for China status is not only about developing 
the domestic economy, as noted above, but also “increasing overall positive recognition 
of its foreign policy practice and prospect for growing into a great power within the 
globalized world.”76 This section reviews a narrow slice of Chinese status-seeking, 
focusing on engagement with international institutions and the arms control regime. 
During the post-Tiananmen status crisis it was possible to observe distinct changes in 
Chinese behaviour in these institutions.   
 
Greater international engagement 
 
China’s reform-era status-seeking strategy stemmed from Deng Xiaoping’s assessment 
that the global environment of the 1980s would be more peaceful than the height of the 
Cold War, handing China an opportunity to prioritise domestic economic development. 
This domestic-economy-focused strategy is described by Bates Gill as entailing three 
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goals: ensuring a stable environment, including by defusing external challenges; 
carefully managing growing wealth and power to extend influence while reassuring 
neighbours; and dealing with US primacy while avoiding conflict.77 From this starting 
point, China set out on the path of  achieving great power status through gaining 
“institutional privileges in the decision-making process of global governance, thus 
giving it equal political power with other members.”78  
 
Examples of China’s general international engagement including its joining of 
economic forums such as the IMF and World Bank in 1980 and APEC in 1989. It was 
admitted to the GATT as an observer in 1982 and applied for full membership in 1986, 
and began the process of joining the WTO from 1995. It is worth noting that the period 
immediately after 1989 saw China attempt to continue normal status-seeking.  
 
Accepting nonproliferation norms 
 
A specific pattern of status-seeking can be observed in China’s gradual steps to acquire 
legitimacy through engagement with the international nonproliferation and arms control 
regimes. Its moves toward accepting nuclear nonproliferation norms were consistent 
with a pattern of status-seeking at a limited price. Indeed, a similar point could be made 
about China’s own nuclear weapons, which were developed at a very slow rate. Fravel 
and Medeiros note that China brought its first ICBM, the DF-5, online in the early 
1980s, yet a decade later China only possessed four of the missiles.79  
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A pattern of gradualism followed in terms of China’s nonproliferation policies. In 1979, 
Deng could still condemn the NPT and say that unless they themselves disarmed, “the 
nuclear powers have no right to prevent non-nuclear countries from possessing nuclear 
weapons.”80 The attacks on the NPT were seen as a way to break the superpowers’ 
nuclear dominance, and some in Beijing thought of nuclear cooperation as a way to gain 
influence in the developing world.81 Most dramatically, in 1982 China is then believed 
to have transferred to Pakistan a complete nuclear weapon design and fissile material.82 
But from this doubtful start, during the 1980s China gradually moved toward 
nonproliferation norms. 
 
During the 1980s, a key factor in Chinese calculations was the wish for better relations 
with Washington, as it was believed that “close relations with the United States would 
affirm China’s status as a major power.”83 To be sure, Chinese motivations for 
cooperation in that decade also included the promise of American civilian nuclear 
technical assistance, but the desire for closer political ties appeared to be a significant 
motivation in China’s nonproliferation advances.84 Some steps on arms control included 
participation in UN disarmament meetings in Geneva, ratifying the Outer Space Treaty, 
and proposing elimination of chemical weapons.85 In terms of nuclear nonproliferation, 
some of China’s moves included: in 1984, China announcing its general support for the 
principle of nuclear nonproliferation, as well as joining the IAEA and accepting its 
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export safeguards; in 1985 reaching nuclear cooperation agreements with Argentina and 
Brazil (both then pursuing their own nuclear programs); and in 1987 issuing internal 
regulations on exports of nuclear materials.86 Against this, needed to be balanced 
China’s continuing proliferation behaviour throughout the decade, including helping 
Pakistan with uranium enrichment and nuclear reactors, and providing nuclear 
technology to Iran.87 
 
This process can be assessed as normal status-seeking because we can see the continued 
trade-off not only between costs and benefits but between status roles. Benefits in terms 
of relations with Washington were traded against the costs to export industries and to 
relations with customer states. China’s gradual consideration of a role as a respected 
major power was balanced by its role as a regional power with alliances in Pakistan and 
elsewhere. This took place against the backdrop of reduced superpower tensions and the 
newly normalised relationship with Washington. Former arms control negotiator Zou 
Yunhua recalled that China’s 1985 announcement of a moratorium on atmospheric 
testing was an effort “to do something in line with this relaxation of international 
tension.”88 The entente with the United States was a key factor in giving Chinese 
decision-makers space to refocus on domestic development and concomitant 
requirements for international legitimacy: “The reduction of the nuclear threat to China 
prepared the ground for China to change its position toward international 
nonproliferation efforts.”89 This environment would sharply change with the crisis that 
occurred from 1989 onwards. 
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The post-1989 status crisis 
 
This chapter takes the period from 1989 to 1996 to be one of status crisis for China, as 
during this time not only did Beijing reassess key prestige-building priorities, but key 
incidents also forced clarification of the status roles to which China aspired. Compared 
with the other case studies, the crisis is extended, and it included periods of easing as 
well as acute pressure. While it refers to the post-Tiananmen period, in fact the crisis 
was brought on by a combination of international reactions to Tiananmen plus the 
effects on Chinese perceptions of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Thanks to these 
events, in contrast to the optimism of the 1980s, by the start of the new decade China 
was left relegated to an “out-group” by the community of democratic states and forced 
to seek a new relationship between itself and the world.90 As a result of this hostile 
international environment, Yong Deng argues, “the Chinese political elite believed that 
the party-state was beleaguered, marginalised and threatened in the emerging world 
order.”91  China’s status-seeking during this period should therefore be examined 
through the lens of crisis. 
 
There were several key elements of the extended crisis of the first half of the 1990s. 
Professor Fan Jishe of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences observed that the 
combination of factors leading up to China’s decision to join the CTBT included post-
Tiananmen pressure, specifically the “human rights-Most Favored Nation linkage”, the 
1995-96 Taiwan Strait crisis, and the indefinite extension of the NPT.92 This section 
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breaks down the crisis mostly in those terms, as well as setting out the nature of the 
international context that made Beijing so sensitive to threats to its status. 
 
China’s optimism, during the 1980s, about a more peaceful international environment 
was not only due to closer relations with Washington, but also a reconciliation with 
Moscow. In a useful analysis of events, Avery Goldstein notes that this reached full 
normalisation with the visit to Beijing of Mikhail Gorbachev during the May 1989 
Tiananmen protests,93 and indeed “by the end of the 1980s, China’s international 
situation could hardly have seemed brighter.”94 The onset of the post-Cold War period 
was much more precarious, with what had been promising relations with the two 
powers now perceived as serious security threats. As Goldstein explains:  
The United States threatened China not only because it spearheaded the initial post-
Tiananmen effort to isolate Beijing and impose sanctions, but also because its 
subsequent effort to resume constructive engagement carried the risk (for Americans, 
the promise) of what Beijing referred to as peaceful evolution – a process of 
fundamental political change that the CCP believed would lead to domestic unrest, if 
not regime collapse.95 
The threat from the USSR was meanwhile one of example, as leaders in Beijing feared 
democratic reformers would be inspired by the democratisation of the former Soviet 
bloc.96 
 
Elements of the status crisis 
 
One reason the status crisis became a serious factor in Chinese perceptions was that 
Beijing at first underestimated the impact of Tiananmen on American attitudes towards 
their country. There were efforts towards bilateral rapprochement, but with the hostility 
toward China exhibited by the US Congress, relations were effectively frozen for the 
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remainder of the George H.W. Bush administration. China felt the effects of the post-
1989 status crisis in several ways. While it was true that the Clinton administration’s 
decision in 1993 severed the human rights-MFN nexus, trade was sufficiently important 
that this remained a sensitive issue for Chinese decision-makers.  
 
A major spike in the status crisis occurred in early 1993, with the newly inaugurated 
Bill Clinton administration facing a dilemma over whether to ask Congress to renew 
China’s Most Favored Nation (MFN) trading status. Without notable improvements in 
Beijing, human rights issues were almost certain to be linked to that status. David 
Lampton points out that the executive order decided upon by Clinton in May 1993, 
placing multiple demands on Beijing regarding human rights, threatened a further 
deterioration in bilateral relations:  
By publicly articulating the threat and setting a deadline, Clinton made the standard of 
his success the public humiliation of the PRC’s leaders and the alteration of patterns of 
internal PRC governance—a price few nations would pay for market access, let alone 
one as proud as China.”97 
Lampton colourfully remarks that “the second half of 1993 was the U.S.-China relations 
equivalent of a hellish Hieronymus Bosch painting,” including multiple incidents such 
as Washington imposing sanctions on Beijing for alleged missile technology transfers to 
Pakistan.98 In addition, the US Congress resolved to oppose Beijing's bid to host the 
2000 Olympic Games, contributing to the failure of the bid, and (as James Fewsmith 
records) provoking outrage in China. There was further friction the same year when the 
US Navy blocked the Chinese ship Yinhe from entering the Persian Gulf, even though 
the ship was later found not to be carrying any chemical weapons precursors. 
“Americans quickly forgot the incident, but the Chinese did not,” Fewsmith notes.99  
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During late 1993 and early 1994, pressure within Washington from business, the foreign 
policy establishment and even human rights groups, as well messages from US allies, 
helped prompt the Clinton administration to reconsider. Finally, in May 1994, Clinton 
announced a comprehensive backdown from the policy of linkage.100 Temporarily, 
Chinese leaders believed they had achieved a diplomatic breakthrough. Indeed, the 
presence of President Jiang Zemin at the APEC summit in November 1993 was thought 
in Beijing to mark the end of China’s post-Tiananmen isolation, and the start of a new 
phase of US-China relations.101 However, this optimism was premature as a new crisis 
over the Taiwan Strait would soon threaten China’s status even further. 
 
The 1995-96 crisis and the “China threat” issue 
 
The Taiwan Strait crisis of July 1995 to March 1996 was intended by Beijing to signal 
to Taipei and Washington its preparedness to use force against Taiwan independence, 
but resulted in a strong US response and threatened to undo much of what China had 
achieved since Tiananmen.102 A key measure of how seriously Chinese decision-makers 
took the fall-out from the 1995-96 situation can be seen in their reactions to the “China 
threat” issue. Beijing’s sensitivity and concerns can be traced by the way it intensified 
its messaging to try to refute the issue.  A paper by Herbert Yee and Zhu Feng notes that 
there was very little mention in China before 1995 of the ‘China threat theory’ 
[Zhongguo weixielun].103 “However, the PRC’s responses to the China threat issue rose 
                                                
100 Lampton, Same Bed, Different Dreams, 43-45. 
101 Deng, 'Better Than Power,' 61. 
102 For accounts of the crisis, see: Robert S. Ross, ‘The 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Confrontation,’ 
International Security 25, no. 2 (2000); Andrew Scobell, ‘Show of Force: Chinese Soldiers, Statesmen, 
and the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis,’ Political Science Quarterly 115, no. 2 (2000). 
103 Herbert Yee and Zhu Feng, 'Chinese Perspectives of the China Threat: Myth or Reality?,' in The China 
Threat: Perceptions, Myths and Reality, ed. Herbert Yee and Ian Storey (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 
2002), 21. 
 186 
sharply in 1996, especially after the face-off between the People’s Liberation Army 
(PLA) and US aircraft carriers in the Taiwan Straits.” According to Yee and Zhu, in 
1996 there were 12 People’s Daily articles directly refuting the China threat, with 56 
reports mentioning and criticising the accusations, as well as eight academic journal 
articles on the subject.104 The table by Yee and Zhu reproduced below outlines the 
upsurge in ‘China threat’ articles appearing during 1995-96:105 
 
Number of articles and commentaries on the “China threat” appearing in the 
Chinese press and journals (1991-2000):106  
 
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
People’s 
Daily 





















  0 1 8 13 13 5 5 0 
 
 
The importance of the “China threat” debate was that Beijing was deeply mindful of 
theories of the security dilemma, particularly notions that if a state has a threatening 
reputation, other states may balance against it. Deng calls the prospect of a hostile US-
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led coalition “the worst kind of strategic nightmare” for Beijing.107 Explaining why 
Chinese elites would act to prevent this from occurring, Deng notes that: “In this age of 
great power peace, a threat reputation would be particularly damaging to an aspiring 
great power’s social standing, and hence to its security interests.”108 Concerns about the 
suspicions and unforgiving attitudes of the international community are likewise 
stressed by Goldstein, who notes that by March 1996, “Beijing confronted an 
international environment potentially more dangerous than at any time since the late 
1970s.”109   
 
Normative pressure on arms control 
 
Against this backdrop of intense scrutiny of China’s behaviour, nuclear issues became a 
particular flashpoint. Consistent with Alastair Iain Johnston’s analysis, because China 
had become part of the arms control and nonproliferation regime, it was also much more 
susceptible to threats to its status as a legitimate member of this order. Once inside the 
institution, “China was compelled to develop more concrete policy responses to the 
international arms control agenda, in part due to pressures from both developed and 
developing states and out of concern for its image as a responsible major power.”110 
China was thus in a sensitive position when it faced a wave of international criticism, 
especially from the rest of Asia, when it conducted a nuclear test on 15 May 1995, only 
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three days after the end of the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review and Extension 
Conference, and again in August that year.111  
 
A key reason the criticism struck home was because it shifted from being primarily 
Western in origin to becoming (in Nicola Horsburgh’s words) a “wake-up call” from 
Asian neighbours and from the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). That key Chinese 
constituency now accused Beijing of “undermining the very moral fabric of nuclear 
order”:  
It would seem that in understanding China’s decision to enter into negotiations and sign 
the CTBT, US pressure did not play the most significant role. Instead, hefty criticism 
for Chinese nuclear tests in the 1990s from Japan, as well as states within the NAM, 
and the perceived loss of international image as a result of these tests, seemed to play a 
decisive role in motivating China to enter into negotiations… Never before had 
developing countries openly denounced China’s nuclear tests to such a degree. The 
impact of this pressure should not be underestimated, since the CTBT was considered 
by Beijing a costly treaty in terms of security, seriously limiting the future scope of 
China’s nuclear deterrent.”112  
The shift in criticism was keenly noted by Chinese negotiators at the time. Zou Yunhua 
recalls that tests in October 1993 and June 1994 were met with criticism mainly from 
Western non-nuclear weapons states, but not non-aligned countries. But the 15 May 
1995 test “inflicted the most political damage on China”, because at the NPT Review 
and Extension Conference, members had pledged to act with the “utmost restraint” in 
testing. China’s test, before delegations had even left the NPT review conference, 
angered the Non-Aligned Movement.113 
 
This judgement about China’s particular concern, at that time, about NAM pressure is 
backed up by Chinese scholars. Fudan University’s Shen Dingli noted that it was 
impossible to surrender China’s status as a leader of the developing world: “China 
wanted to have international status because we saw ourselves as leader of the third 
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world. How could we say we could decline [to sign] just because we hadn’t tested 
enough? China could not say that without being a hypocrite.”114 
 
 
Enhanced status seeking: Joining the CTBT 
 
China went into defensive crisis-management mode in the immediate post-Tiananmen 
period. For instance, during the 1990-91 Gulf War, China overcame its positions on 
sovereignty to acquiesce to (but not vote in favour of) Security Council resolutions 
authorising military action against Iraq. Once the situation was more stable, Beijing 
looked to restoring its international position, improving relations with neighbours and 
addressing border disputes, and establishing or normalising relations with numerous 
countries.115 Between 1988 and 1994, China established or normalized relations with 18 
countries, plus the successor states to the Soviet Union; it then embarked upon a 
succession of bilateral partnerships; began meetings with ASEAN officials from 1995 
(this later grew into the ASEAN+3 mechanism; and after 1991, China settled border 
disputes with six countries, sometimes on surprisingly advantageous terms to China’s 
neighbours.116 In security forums, Johnston and Evans record the rapid increase in 
Chinese engagement in multilateral security agreements during the 1980s and 90s. 
Whereas in 1982 China was an adherent to only two out of nine multilateral arms 
control agreements, by 1996 when China joined the CTBT, it had signed 12 out of 14 
available treaties.117 The pattern of China joining multilateral security agreements was 
an ongoing process both before and after Tiananmen, but Medeiros points out that 
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“China’s intensive diplomacy after the Tiananmen incident in 1989 to rebuild its 
international image and reputation is an example of the value China puts on these 
factors in its foreign policy, for both symbolic and material reasons.”118 
 
Alongside greater international engagement in general, China worked to restore its post-
Tiananmen position by acting as a legitimate nuclear weapons state. In her detailed 
study of China and international nuclear institutions, Nicola Horsburgh notes that the 
expansion of non-proliferation and arms control treaties in the 1990s was one way that 
China could burnish its reputation as a responsible major power: “China seized this 
opportunity to promote a more multilateral and representative order and secure its stake 
in such an order as a credible and legitimate nuclear weapons state.”119 Reinforcing this 
was the view of one Chinese scholar, Wu Chunsi of the Shanghai Institutes for 
International Studies, who said that after Tiananmen “China changed its perspective on 
nuclear weapons - intellectual society had a different evaluation of nuclear 
proliferation.”120 This was particularly important in the early 1990s when China was 
being accused by the US of transferring nuclear weapons and missile technology to 
Pakistan and the Middle East.121  
 
While China had long criticised the NPT for discriminating against non-nuclear 
countries and failing to stop the expansion of superpower arsenals, Beijing announced 
in August 1991 that it would participate in the NPT regime, and it officially acceded to 
the treaty in March 1992.122 Scholars note that China’s reasons for joining the treaty at 
the time included the June 1991 decision of France, the only other declared nuclear 
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power not a Treaty member, to join; Beijing’s wish to improve its image with Western 
countries post-Tiananmen; the end of the Cold War; and growing beliefs that arms 
control could enhance China’s security.123 One Chinese scholar indeed directly linked 
China’s interest in the nuclear non-proliferation regime with restoring international ties 
after Tiananmen: “Because of the June 4 incident, Western countries imposed sanctions 
against China so China joined the international NNP [nuclear non-proliferation] 
mechanism. It was an important action to break the sanctions from Western 
countries.”124 To be sure, China’s embrace of multilateral arms control was at times 
halting; China abstained from a UN vote on a comprehensive test ban in 1990, and in 
1992 it conducted its biggest-ever nuclear test – a blast that was beyond the limits of the 
Threshold Test Ban Treaty (albeit a treaty China was not a party to).125 Importantly 
however, China backed unconditional and indefinite extension of the NPT at the NPT 
Review and Extension Conference in spring 1995.126 As Nicola Horsburgh explains: 
“Crucially, membership of these important institutions enabled China to become, 
finally, a full-fledged member of global nuclear order:”127 
 
The decision of China’s central leadership to sign the CTBT overruled apparent 
objections from the military, and indicated that the treaty was perceived as valuable to 
restoring China’s international relations during a time of significant pressure. Johnston 
notes that “the timing of China’s decision to sign the treaty also had much to do with a 
diplomatic offensive to break out of the post-Tiananmen isolation and to improve 
relations with the United States.”128 It helped to remove proliferation and arms control 
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as an issue in US-China relations. As Nicola Horsburgh notes, by 1996 China saw 
multilateral arms control as way of getting a “legitimate seat at the table” and 
reinforcing goals under the ‘New Security Concept’ of countering China threat theories, 
especially after the Taiwan straits crisis.  
 
China comes under pressure 
 
China entered the CTBT negotiations hoping a treaty would be not be complete until the 
end of 1996. This would allow a schedule of two tests per year, for a total of 4-6 tests to 
ensure new designs were reliable. Johnston notes that the weapons testing community 
thus required delaying tactics of at least two years, which still left the risk that the test 
series would be unsuccessful.129  “This would suggest as well that when Chinese leaders 
decided when to sign the treaty and when to stop testing, they did so without necessarily 
knowing exactly how constraining the treaty might be.”130 Instead, Johnston argues that 
China was sensitive to a wave of international criticism of its testing program, accusing 
China of, among other things, “being irresponsible, being shocking and provocative, 
offending the feelings of people in the developing world, jeopardising the NPT regime, 
and being insincere… In other words, China was being accused of moral hypocrisy and 
of behaviour inconsistent with its (nascent) identity as a responsible major power.”131 
 
In the CTBT negotiations, China’s initial bargaining positions appeared to initially 
involve stalling for time in order to allow for more nuclear tests.132 Against the 
opposition of virtually all other participants, China advocated for peaceful nuclear 
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explosions (PNEs), and for not ceasing testing until the treaty entered into force. As 
Rebecca Johnson notes, China was “completely isolated” on the PNE issue, and 
participants in the process were well aware that the entry into force could be years 
away.133 Yet it was clear, as Shen Dingli said, that “the job of negotiators was to slow 
negotiations to have more time to test before signing.”134 In the context of 1995-96, 
“China’s initial reluctance to stop testing nuclear weapons and join the CTBT and its 
continued nuclear and missile transfers further fuelled suspicions that Beijing did not 
share the norms of the nonproliferation regime.”135                                                                                                                                                           
 
Reasons the pressure mattered to Beijing 
 
The heavy criticism of China’s nuclear testing has been documented by Johnston as a 
factor in China’s final announcement in August 1996 that it would sign the CTBT. 
However, this chapter has attempted to show that this criticism met its target because 
China was particularly vulnerable at that time. Faced with the aftermath of Tiananmen, 
pressure after the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea episodes, and the upsurge in 
concern about the ‘China threat theory’, China could not dismiss international pressure. 
This was because the pressure appeared to be directly undermining valued elements of 
China’s international status: its position as a legitimate nuclear weapons state, and as a 
leader of the developing world. Bates Gill argues that despite the immediate pressure 
from non-aligned countries, the signing of the CTBT took place only after those in 
Beijing most concerned about image and key relationships won out in “a fierce internal 
debate… [It was] an important step to help bring some greater stability to US-China 
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relations following a rocky period between the two countries, especially escalating 
tensions in 1995-96 over Taiwan.”136 
 
Delays in the progress of the CTBT negotiations proved fortuitous in that their 
conclusion started to fall in line with China’s plans to conclude its testing program. This 
satisfied the nuclear science community. Li Bin argues that the major program of testing 
was in this way complete, and the scientific establishment was supportive because it had 
been given generous resources to compensate for the end of the tests.137 With this, 
China began to become considerably more relaxed and cooperative.138 As noted above, 
Beijing’s decision in principle to sign was probably made in late 1995, and internal 
debates were settled. As Chinese nuclear expert Fan Jishe comments:  
The military wasn’t happy with the CTBT, but people who wanted to be part of the 
international community prevailed… China was creating its own rules. By the end of 
the 1990s, nuclear proliferation was no longer an active issue in the China-US 
relationship.139 
Thus in September 1996, China was the second country (after the US) to sign the 
CTBT, despite the limitations the treaty place on its nuclear arsenal.140 Swaine and 
Johnston judge that given the technical constraints imposed, and lack of countervailing 
benefits, “a powerful reason, then, for China’s participating in and acceding to the treaty 
seems to be a concern about image and status.”141 The result of signing the CTBT was 
that, by the mid-1990s, China was showing widespread acceptance of non-proliferation 
norms, and greater institutional capacity to comply with commitments. 
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139 Fan Jishe, interview with the author, 22 March 2016. 
140 Medeiros, Reluctant Restraint. Li Bin, interview, 22 March 2016. 
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Notes on findings 
 
The experience of the CTBT was that in the post-Tiananmen period, China’s attempt at 
a more forward policy of security assertiveness in 1995-96 “backfired by reinforcing 
perceptions of an emerging China ‘threat’ to the region.”142 Instead, Thomas 
Christensen notes that after the Taiwan Straits crisis, “fear of US encirclement fostered 
Chinese reassurance of its neighbours.”143 Because of this, China’s elite came to realise 
that social competition with the United States would only fuel the China threat 
narrative, causing states to ally against rising China.  
 
As a result, from 1996 China began to outline to a regional audience its “New Security 
Concept” which repackaged and re-emphasised principles of mutual respect, non-
interference and consultation.144 In the decade after 1996, scholars noted China’s 
evolution from threatening regional hegemony to being a “good neighbour, a 
constructive partner, a careful listener, and a nonthreatening regional power.”145 This 
period was dominated by “the fact that the United States did not appear to be in decline 
(just the opposite), [and] Deng's general thesis was still accurate as an overall 
assessment of and guide to China's foreign policy.”146 
 
In their essay on China and status-seeking, Larson and Shevchenko argue that the New 
Security Concept overcomes China’s previous difficulties in directly grasping for higher 
international status. Instead, it is an example of “status creativity”, which instead of 
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challenging the existing order “allows China to claim prestige as a norms 
entrepreneur.”147 Larson and Shevchenko contend that, according to social identity 
theory, a social creativity strategy requires the dominant power’s validation if it is to be 
successful. Fortunately, they say, Washington provided this from the late 1990s, and 
they argued that, “Against this backdrop of mutual recognition of status, there is little 
evidence that China is engaging in social competition with the United States.”148 This 
could, however, be contrasted with the period since their paper was published. This has 
been politely called a period of “assertiveness”, or less diplomatically as a phase of 
“increasingly tough and truculent” behaviour by Beijing toward its neighbours and the 
United States.149   
 
A more useful conclusion from this case study is to break down the findings in the 
sequence of events. China, concerned about its status going in to the CTBT 
negotiations, was attempting to trade off the status roles of being both militarily 
powerful and a legitimate major power. In 1995, it appeared China’s international status 
was again secure enough to demonstrate military power against Taiwan, but the 
ensuring crisis revealed that this was premature. At the same time, while China had 
pursued legitimacy through engagement with the nuclear non-proliferation and arms 
control regimes, it found that once committed, the legitimacy costs of backsliding on 
nuclear testing became high. The result was a recalculation in which China accepted the 
security costs of the CTBT in order to prevent any further cost to its legitimacy. As 
Deng explains, China has pursued great power status by not only building the material 
bases for status recognition through power, but also simultaneously boosting China’s 
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For a critique of the ‘new assertiveness’ debate see: Alastair Iain Johnston, ‘How New and Assertive Is 
China's New Assertiveness?,’ International Security 37, no. 4 (2013); Christensen, The China Challenge, 
260. 
 197 
international legitimacy through participation in international society. “Achieving both 
requires restraining power politics for the sake of cultivating legitimate recognition,” 
Deng writes.150 Tolerating the costs of the CTBT was an example of this. 
 
A topic for further investigation is whether additional domestic political factors made 
this decision easier to make. Not only was China being encouraged by the international 
community to join the test-ban treaty, but domestic constituencies even including the 
scientific establishment were in favour, according to Professor Li Bin.151 It may well be 
that a combination of  both internal and external support for a course of action makes a 




The extensive literature on China and the CTBT sees status concerns as one factor 
alongside instrumental interests as a reason for signing the treaty. A specific explanation 
in the literature is that socialisation in the years leading up to 1996 encouraged Chinese 
decision-makers to take greater account of the social and normative benefits of signing, 
against the costs of non-signing. The puzzle addressed by this case study was why 
decision-makers became sensitive to back-patting and opprobrium at that time. The case 
study has shown that China engaged in a normal status-seeking phase in which it 
gradually accepted nonproliferation norms, but at little cost to material values. The 
Tiananmen crisis is well known, but it appeared the onset of the acute 1995-96 Taiwan 
Strait crisis had a particular effect on the timing of China’s decisions. China also felt 
pressure on its status because, as a participant in the NPT extension process, its status as 
a legitimate nuclear weapons state demanded that it progress to signing the CTBT. As a 
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result, this case study contributes to the existing literature by providing evidence for a 
three-phased process by which China responded at particular times to a status crisis, 
through policies to enhance its prestige-building activity. 
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6. INDIA AND THE POKHRAN II NUCLEAR TESTS, 1998 
 
 
SECTION A: EXISTING EXPLANATIONS 
 
Introducing the case 
 
From 11 to 13 May 1998, India conducted five nuclear test explosions at the Pokhran 
site in the Rajasthan desert, and on the day of the last tests, Prime Minister Atal Bihari 
Vajpayee declared India to be a “nuclear weapons state.”1 The international impact was 
dramatic, with major economies such as Japan imposing sanctions, and many voices 
warning of a negative impact upon India’s foreign relations. The United Nations 
Security Council “strongly deplored” the tests, the Chinese government said the tests 
showed “outrageous contempt” for the international community, and US President Bill 
Clinton said: “We’re going to come down on these guys like a ton of bricks.”2 It might 
have been expected that the tests, even if meeting some kind of national security 
objective, would have jeopardised India’s international reputation. But instead, 
commentators described the tests as motivated by India’s desire for prestige, given what 
was deemed India’s “intense grievance over being locked into what it sees as an inferior 
status” in the nuclear non-proliferation regime.3 The Indian popular press was 
enthusiastic, giving the impression internationally that, as the New York Times put it, 
                                                
1 Jaswant Singh, A Call to Honour: In Service of Emergent India (New Delhi: Rupa & Co., 2006), 101. 
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http://www.acronym.org.uk/old/news/india-nuclear-tests-11-13-may-1998?page=show; Clinton quoted in 
Strobe Talbott, Engaging India: Diplomacy, Democracy, and the Bomb (Washington, D.C.: Brookings 
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India’s “pride and psyche” drove the tests.4 Indian elite commentators were more 
reserved, but saw the tests aiming “to see that India is embraced back on the world’s 
centre-stage,” and that with greater prestige, India was “prepared to undertake the full 
responsibilities of a great power.”5 This began a debate that continues to this day about 
the role of prestige and status in the nuclear tests. 
 
India’s May 1998 nuclear tests make up the third case study of this thesis. Of the three 
cases, the literature on this event is the most abundant, as the tests have excited scholars 
of India and of nuclear proliferation alike. As in the preceding chapters, this case is 
dealt with through a literature review section and an analysis section. In contrast to the 
other cases, the case deals with sudden and dramatic events that immediately generated 
a large literature. As a result, a goal of this chapter (especially the literature review 
section) is to narrow the focus to aspects of the case that answer the research project’s 
major questions about status. 
 
The 1998 tests sit in the context of the wide literature on India’s nuclear program. This 
literature mostly analyses Indian nuclear decision-making through the three main lenses 
of proliferation theory: national security, domestic political interests and bureaucratic 
inertia, and the pursuit of prestige.6 Despite the breadth of the literature, an overarching 
puzzle remains surrounding India’s incremental and drawn-out process of proliferation. 
There were gaps of many years between India’s first nuclear test in 1974, the probable 
first construction of nuclear weapons, and the tests and nuclear state declaration in 
                                                
4 Tim Weiner, ‘C.I.A. Study Details Failures; Scouring of System Is Urged,’ New York Times, 3 June 
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5 Gupta, The Indian Express, 13 May 1998 and Mohan, The Hindu, 12 May 1998, both quoted in Karsten 
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1998.7 The result is that there are multiple contending claims as to the causes of the 
tests. Attempts at a definitive answer often run into an impasse over whether long-term, 
short-term or other explanations should be given priority.  
 
This case study starts from the point that there are multiple plausible explanations for 
the Pokhran II tests. Security, domestic political, and prestige explanations are all 
relevant. In line with the other chapters, the purpose of this study is narrowly focused on 
the way status perceptions played a role in the decision. The literature review has two 
purposes. One is to confirm the selection of the case (as with the other case studies) as 
one where we are likely to see status playing a role, then to find out what the literature 
tells us about the role status played. The literature can tell us about beliefs decision-
makers had about India’s status roles, and as a result which prestige-building efforts 
were prioritised. Then the second part of the chapter will analyse the case to examine 
how changing circumstances may have caused change in that pattern of status-seeking. 
 
 
Outline of events 
 
In the context of India’s many decades of nuclear development, this short time line is 
necessarily selective. The following aspects of the wider history have been chosen in 
order to highlight one sequence of events in which it appears that perceptions of India’s 
international status played a significant role in decision-making. Points of relevance 
include the purposes and nature of Indian nuclear development up to the 1990s, the 
                                                
7 See below for discussion of the probable nuclear weapon construction. 
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effects of the arms control treaties of the mid-1990s, and decisions regarding testing 
prior to and in 1998.  
 
India’s atomic energy research – and just as important for this case study, a strong, 
centralised nuclear science establishment – can be traced back to the earliest years of 
independence.8 While India’s first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, was opposed to 
acquiring nuclear weapons, the issue demanded increased Indian attention after the 
1962 conflict with China, and the latter’s first nuclear test in 1964.9 This led to a period 
in which India both explored a nuclear guarantee from the USSR and helped draft the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. But dissatisfied with the way the NPT did not 
advance disarmament by existing nuclear weapons states, India let the treaty enter in to 
force in 1970 without its participation.10  On 18 May 1974, at the same Pokhran test site 
as the 1998 tests, India detonated a 15-kiloton nuclear device. The so-called “Smiling 
Buddha” or “Pokhran I” test was described by New Delhi as a “peaceful nuclear 
explosion”, and indeed India did not follow up the test with rapid proliferation.11 The 
reasons for this are still debated, but explanations range from Chinese nuclear threats, 
                                                
8 Sumit Ganguly pinpoints the formation of the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research, under India’s 
father of nuclear research Homi J. Bhabha, two years before independence in 1947. Later Bhabha became 
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10 Ibid., 155-58. 
11 Ibid., 160. 
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lack of industrial resources and Western non-proliferation pressure,12 through to concern 
about economic costs,13 foreign pressure,14 and ethical concerns.15  
 
While India’s scientists were not successful in their lobbying for follow-up tests in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s,16 a major change in Indian security circumstances occurred 
with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, which led to substantial US arms sales 
to Pakistan.17 In 1988, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi proposed a plan for global nuclear 
disarmament, which was rebuffed by the nuclear states.18 Scholars assess that this 
setback, the weakening Soviet security guarantee, and intelligence that Pakistan had 
acquired a number of nuclear devices, caused Gandhi to approve final nuclear weapons 
development around 1989-90.19 By 1994, India may have had weapons-grade fissile 
material for as many as 25 nuclear warheads, with several available for assembly at 
short notice.20 However, debate continues about the deployability of these devices, with 
some scholars arguing that an air-delivery capability was not achieved until as late as 
1996.21 As a result, India’s position in the mid-1990s has been called “nuclear opacity” 
because nuclear weapons existed, but were not openly declared or deployed.22  
 
                                                
12 Kampani, ‘New Delhi's Long Nuclear Journey,’ 86. 
13 Andrew B. Kennedy, ‘India's Nuclear Odyssey: Implicit Umbrellas, Diplomatic Disappointments, and 
the Bomb,’ International Security 36, no. 2 (2011): 126. Bharat Karnad, Nuclear Weapons & Indian 
Security : The Realist Foundations of Strategy (New Delhi: Macmillan, 2002), 263-80. 
14 Ganguly, ‘India's Pathway to Pokhran II,’ 160-61. 
15 Kennedy points to: George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 6, 74, 77. 
16 K. Subrahmanyam says Indira Gandhi did authorise a test in 1983, but the US detected it and 
successfully pressured her to defer it. K. Subrahmanyam, 'Indian Nuclear Policy - 1964-98 (a Personal 
Recollection),' in Nuclear India, ed. Jasjit Singh (New Delhi: Knowledge World in association with 
Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis, 1998), 37. 
17 1999 Ganguly, ‘India's Pathway to Pokhran II,’ 163. 
18 Jaswant Singh, Defending India (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), 324; For the text of Gandhi's 
proposal, see: Address by His Excellency Mr Rajiv Gandhi, Prime Minister of the Republic of India, 
Fifteenth Special Session, 9 June 1988. 
19 Ganguly 1999, 165. Kennedy 142-146. 
20 Kennedy, ‘India's Nuclear Odyssey,’ 146; Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb, 340. 
21 Kampani, ‘New Delhi's Long Nuclear Journey,’ 81. 
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The mid-1990s became a critical period for the nuclear nonproliferation regime as the 
expiry of the NPT’s 25-year life led to a Non-Proliferation Treaty Review and 
Extension Conference in April-May 1995. The NPT extension was approved by all but 
four of the 178 parties to the treaty, without a vote, on 11 May 1995. India was 
disappointed by this approach, and its October 1995 statement to the UN declared that 
the NPT’s indefinite extension had “legitimized for all time. . . [the] division of the 
world into nuclear haves and have nots.”23 The passage of the NPT extension also had a 
significant effect on India’s attitudes toward the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban 
Treaty (CTBT). Just as it had helped draft the NPT in the 1960s, India had co-sponsored 
the CTBT with the US in November 1993. However, India was concerned that the Entry 
Into Force (EIF) provisions of the CTBT, tabled in June 1996, required all 44 nuclear-
capable states (so measured for their possession of relevant reactors) to ratify the treaty 
before it could take effect. India was angered by this, stating that it had the “strongest 
objections” and that the provision amounted to denying India’s sovereign right to 
voluntary consent on an international treaty.24  
 
Concurrent with the arms control negotiations, India began to perceive increased 
security threats from China. This took the form of missile shipments to Pakistan, and a 
Chinese nuclear test explosion only four days after the NPT vote, which India deemed 
to be highly provocative.25 In late 1995, Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao reportedly 
told Atomic Energy Commission head Rajagopala Chidambaram to prepare for a series 
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of nuclear tests.26 Before they could be conducted, however, on 15 December 1995 the 
Pokhran site preparations were publicly revealed in the New York Times.27 Rao opted 
not to proceed with the tests and was voted out of office in May 1996. 
 
The general election of 1996 resulted in a hung parliament, but the nationalist Bharatiya 
Janata Party (BJP) formed a government with A.B. Vajpayee sworn in as Prime 
Minister on 15 May, subject to securing a parliamentary vote of confidence within two 
weeks. Vajpayee is reported to have immediately directed nuclear science chiefs to 
prepare for nuclear tests, and one device was actually lowered into a test shaft. But 
Vajpayee felt it would be inappropriate to bequeath the implications of the tests to a 
successor, so he held his order to test until after the confidence vote.28 On 28 May, 
facing defeat, Vajpayee resigned and was replaced by H.D. Deve Gowda. On nuclear 
issues, Gowda was initially focused on resisting American pressure on the CTBT and its 
contentious Entry Into Force provisions, and on 10 September 1996 India voted against 
the treaty in the United Nations. By early 1997, Gowda was had reportedly given orders 
for new nuclear test preparations, 29 but he was forced to resign in April that year. 
Gowda was briefly replaced by IK Gujral, before Vajpayee’s BJP returned to power.   
 
Experts believe that soon after Vajpayee returned to office in March 1998, he again 
ordered Kalam and Chidambaram to prepare for tests.30 A public pretext for testing also 
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existed in the form of a Pakistani nuclear-capable missile test in April 1998.31 With 
preparations this time successfully concealed from US observation, and only five weeks 
after Vajpayee is believed to have given the order, the tests were successfully carried 
out on 11 and 13 May 1998. Altogether, India tested thermonuclear, fission and low-
yield devices (43, 12, 0.2 kilotons) on 11 May, then two low-yield devices on 13 May, 
with the tests altogether being known as “Pokhran II.”32  
 
The tests were followed by diplomatic reproaches and the imposition of sanctions, but 
also a rapid restoration of relations with the United States. The latter began with a series 
of talks between Indian defence minister Jaswant Singh and US under-secretary of State 
Strobe Talbott, and were followed with a visit by President Clinton to New Delhi in 
March 2000. At around the same time, conflicts and stand-offs between India and 
Pakistan between 1999 and 2002 – now that both sides were overtly nuclear armed – 
attracted greatly increased US and global attention.33 What followed was an incremental 
process from 2004 under what was known as the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership, 
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Most of the literature about Pokhran II cites reasons of national security, the pursuit of 
prestige, domestic politics (including party politics and bureaucratic interests), or some 
combination of the three as the reason for the decision to test.35 This corresponds to the 
wider literature on nuclear proliferation. As Scott Sagan notes in his study of why states 
build nuclear weapons:  
Nuclear weapons, like other weapons, are more than tools of national security; they are 
political objects of considerable importance in domestic debates and internal 
bureaucratic struggles and can also serve as international normative symbols of 
modernity and identity.36  
To put the Indian tests’ literature in the wider context of that on nuclear proliferation, 
the latter distinguishes between states’ technical capacity to construct nuclear weapons 
(the “supply-side”) and the motivations of governments to acquire them (the “demand-
side”). While initially it was assumed that states that developed the requisite technical 
capacity would soon seek nuclear weapons, by the late Cold War the literature 
increasingly focused on the puzzle of why there was such a wide gap between the 50 or 
so technically nuclear weapons-capable states, and the small number of actual nuclear 
weapons states.37 India became a perennial subject of interest, because it had 
demonstrated it could detonate a nuclear device in 1974, yet was not a declared nuclear 
weapons state until 1998. As such, in the following literature the Indian tests have very 
much been seen as a case study of wider debates about nuclear proliferation. Status 
concerns are debated as a possible cause of the tests, just as the former is debated as a 
driver of proliferation in general. However the 1998 tests have been studied far less as a 
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The first explanation of the nuclear tests is that they were intended to enhance India’s 
security, situating the tests as a case study in security explanations of nuclear 
proliferation. As one essay put it squarely, this explanation holds that “the fundamental 
motivation to seek a weapon is the perception that national security will be improved.”38 
These explanations have evolved considerably in the course of the nuclear era. It was 
initially assumed that those who could acquire the bomb, inevitably would.39 But by the 
end of the Cold War it was necessary to explain the gap between technical capability 
and actual nuclear weapons acquisition. A more nuanced view then predicted that states 
would seek nuclear weapons only on the condition that they faced serious military 
threats but lacked alliances with a nuclear state.40 Scholars argued that nuclear states’ 
extended security guarantees explained why many other states did not seek nuclear 
weapons of their own.41 With the end of the Cold War, an implication of this argument 
was that the decline of superpower rivalry would weaken these guarantees. As one 
scholar put it at the time, the international system was expected to revert to a “more 
unvarnished form of anarchy”, and “the accelerated proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction will be an early and noticeable consequence of this change.”42  
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41 Benjamin Frankel, ‘The Brooding Shadow: Systemic Incentives and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation,’ 
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National security reasons remain the most prominent explanation in the literature on the 
Indian tests, whether in accounts by scholars or by Indian policy practitioners. TV Paul 
notes that for the Indian elite, nuclear weapons represent “hard power”, and he cites the 
code-name “Shakti”, or “power” given to the testing program.43 Among the key 
examples, Sumit Ganguly argues that “the evolution of the nuclear program and the 
1998 tests were the product of calculated political choices based upon considerations of 
national security.”44 Specifically, Ganguly contends that the long-term security threat 
from China was “the most compelling underlying factor that drove India’s nuclear 
weapons program,” while the specific timing in 1998 was driven by the extension of the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and US efforts to conclude a comprehensive 
nuclear test-ban treaty.45  Even before the tests themselves, K. Subrahmanyam 
described the “coercive” Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) as “a major 
deterioration in our security environment” and as a result, “India was compelled to go 
for nuclear armaments because of Chinese support to the Pakistani nuclear-weapons 
program and the tacit US connivance of that effort.”46  
 
Also referring to the significance of the CTBT, Ashok Kapur argues that the key threats 
to India in 1998 were the challenge to Indian interests by China’s policies towards both 
India and Pakistan, Pakistan’s nuclear program, and the US turning a blind eye to 
Chinese and Pakistani flouting of the nonproliferation regime. But in terms of specific 
timing, like Subrahmanyam, he calls the CTBT the “straw that broke camel’s back”.47  
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Arguments against the security explanation include the lack of immediate security 
threats, leaving a puzzle about the timing of the tests, and the argument that declaring 
nuclear weapons status actually worsened India’s security. As Dinshaw Mistry puts it, 
concerns about China were an important long-term consideration in Indian security – 
and kept India from joining the NPT, and ensured it maintained its nuclear option – but 
Sino-Indian relations were improving in 1990s, with confidence-building accords in 
1993 and 1996, a strengthening of Indian conventional forces, and a moderation in 
Beijing’s transfer of nuclear technology to Pakistan.48  The other side of the coin, 
Mistry continues, was that India’s nuclear declaration may have worsened its security 
position relative to Pakistan: “Overt nuclearization then negated New Delhi’s 
conventional force edge, enabled Islamabad to obtain strategic parity with India, and 
gave it greater confidence in its ability to confront India on Kashmir.”49 Similarly, 
Gaurav Kampani argues that while India’s decision to acquire nuclear weapons (he 
estimates as early as 1988) aimed to hedge against security threats, in 1998 India's 
security environment was unchanged from the late 1980s, or even improved.50 As he 
puts it, these arguments “are not meant to dismiss India's security concerns. India has 
real conflicts with its neighbours. But security concerns were not behind the recent 
tests.”51 One analysis puts the security issue in a wider context, focusing on New 
Delhi’s concerns about Chinese interference Myanmar, its military activity in Tibet, and 
its support to Pakistan. The result was that “India’s tests were in fact a manifestation of 
the country’s deep-seated rivalry with China, which goes beyond questions of security 
                                                
48 Mistry, ‘The Unrealized Promise of International Institutions,’ 120-21. 
49 Ibid., 122. 
50 Kampani, ‘From Existential to Minimum Deterrence,’ 16. 
51 Ibid., 13-14. For the 1988 date, see: Raj Chengappa,’ The Bombmakers,’ India Today, August 3, 1998 
(http//www.india- today.com). 
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per se.”52 This is an approach that links security explanations to prestige and status, 
which are discussed next.  
 
Prestige and status explanations 
 
Taking nuclear proliferation literature generally, many scholars place prestige and 
normative explanations second after national security as an explanation for states 
acquiring nuclear weapons.53 As Jacques Hymans puts it, going nuclear is a big 
decision, and “big decisions are likely to stem from something other than a 
straightforward material cost-benefit calculation.”54 A prevalent prestige-based model 
for nuclear proliferation is a sociological one, in which nuclear weapons serve a 
symbolic role meeting national ambitions. For example, McGeorge Bundy notes that 
the British and French nuclear programs were not ultimately motivated by the need for 
deterrence, but they wanted “to meet their own standards of their own rank among 
nations.”55 Likewise, Scott Sagan sees nuclear weapons performing a social function as 
one of the accepted attributes of a “modern” state: 
From this sociological perspective, military organizations and their weapons can 
therefore be envisioned as serving functions similar to those of flags, airlines, and 
Olympic teams: they are part of what modern states believe they have to possess to be 
legitimate, modern states.56  
As nonproliferation has developed as an international norm, however, the question has 
arisen as to whether nuclear acquisition can still be assumed to be prestigious.57 The 
                                                
52 Hilary Synnott, ‘Why Test in 1998?,’ The Adelphi Papers 39, no. 332 (1999): 14-15. 
53 Writing in 1993, Lavoy already put prestige as the second most-cited reason for a state to go nuclear. 
Lavoy, 'Nuclear Myths and the Causes of Nuclear Proliferation,' 197. 
54 Jacques E. C. Hymans, The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation: Identity, Emotions, and Foreign 
Policy (Cambridge University Press, 2006), 17. 
55 McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (Random 
House: 1988): 501, cited in Lavoy, 'Nuclear Myths and the Causes of Nuclear Proliferation,' 197-98. 
56 Sagan, ‘Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?,’ 74. 
57 Lavoy, 'Nuclear Myths and the Causes of Nuclear Proliferation,' 198.. 
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sociological approach also may not explain the timing of proliferation, or why many 
states with an interest in prestige do not necessarily acquire nuclear weapons.  
 
The literature specific to India’s 1998 tests frequently uses prestige and status 
explanations. As the introduction and literature review explained, this thesis 
distinguishes prestige and status for analytical purposes. However, due to their similar 
meaning, scholars may use either term and sometimes they are used synonymously. For 
this project, we are interested in explanations that refer to status-seeking behaviour, 
which incorporates beliefs that the tests built prestige or influence, or that nuclear 
weapons are prestigious.   
 
Among the status-related explanations, Karsten Frey contends that India was more 
interested in the display entailed in its tests than in the full-scale development of a 
nuclear deterrent, as it was “conceptualizing nuclear weapons as devices to demonstrate 
national power rather than as elements of military power.”58 J. Mohan Malik notes 
“From India’s perspective, its nuclear tests have served notice on the international 
community that the post-World War II, US-led, European-dominated power structure 
does not truly reflect the diffusion of power in the international system.”59 And Varun 
Sahni notes the high level of public opinion support for nuclear tests to “enhance India’s 
international status”: “As India gropes its way toward modern nationhood, which 
implies a modern state and a modern society, the bomb can easily become a proud and 
seductive symbol of national achievement.”60 John D Ciorciari writes that the tests were 
more about India’s frustrated aspirations for recognition as a major power: “More about 
                                                
58 Frey, India's Nuclear Bomb and National Security, 18. 
59 Jag Mohan Malik, ‘India Goes Nuclear: Rationale, Benefits, Costs and Implications,’ Contemporary 
Southeast Asia 20, no. 2 (1998): 201. 
60 Varun Sahni, 'Going Nuclear: Establishing an Overt Nuclear Weapons Capability,' in India and the 
Bomb: Public Opinion and Nuclear Options, ed. David Cortright and Amitabh Mattoo (University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1996), 88. 
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demanding attention and respect than meeting any military necessity, they reflected 
both India’s mounting aspirations and a continuing streak of defiant independence in its 
foreign policy”61 Likewise, Jason A. Kirk says that while regional security 
considerations are crucial, India’s nuclear programme “has always been related to its 
search for recognition and respect in the eyes of the world.”62 These illustrate the 
common theme that the nuclear tests were prestigious for India because it hoped to be 
recognised as a major power. This is well summarised by Kampani, who writes that 
“[the tests] depended on underlying assumptions that nuclear weapons are a unique key 
to prestige and influence in international politics, and only by brandishing them openly 
can a state attain great power status.”63 
 
Some critics of prestige explanations simply declare that the structure of the 
international system trumps other causes. Discussing nuclear proliferation in general, 
Frankel, for example, states that one can dismiss factors such as domestic politics, 
psychology, or national culture, because “these factors are secondary to structural 
incentives.”64 However, much of the debate over India’s nuclear weapons focuses on 
the perceived constancy of prestige motivations compared with the variable of 
proliferation. This is encapsulated by Hymans’ argument that India and France had 
“always pursued international prestige, yet their nuclear weapons policies shifted from 
abstinence to acquisition at a certain moment in time. A constant cannot explain a 
variable.”65 Likewise, Ganguly rejects those who explain the decision in terms of 
“unrequited goals for prestige and status,” because:  
The tests, it is contended, were designed to confer on India great power status. ...But 
this argument fails to explain why previous regimes had not taken the same decision. If 
                                                
61 John D. Ciorciari, ‘India's Approach to Great-Power Status,’ The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 35, 
no. 1 (2011): 73. 
62 Jason A Kirk, 'The Evolution of India’s Nuclear Policies,' in India's Foreign Policy: Retrospect and 
Prospect, ed. Sumit Ganguly (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2010), 295. 
63 Kampani, ‘From Existential to Minimum Deterrence,’ 21. 
64 Frankel, ‘The Brooding Shadow,’ 37. 
65 Hymans, 'Why Do States Acquire Nuclear Weapons?,' 143. 
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India's ebbing prestige had so concerned its elites, the tests should have come much 
earlier, especially in the waning days of the Cold War, when the country found itself 
adrift in the international order.66   
Thus both national security and prestige proponents have evidence for their preferred 
motivation, yet both motivations have been criticised for failing to explain the timing of 
the 1998 tests. 
 
Domestic political explanations 
 
The third main body of literature on the tests explains them in terms of the literature of 
nuclear proliferation caused by domestic political factors. This is typically attributed 
either to the influence of scientific and bureaucratic lobbies and elites, or to domestic 
party politics and public opinion. The bureaucratic approach was typified by Morton 
Halperin’s 1974 observation that  government officials “often develop their position 
largely by calculating the national interest in terms of the organisational interests of the 
career service to which they belong.”67 The approach is conceptualised by Graham 
Allison as ‘Model III’ of foreign policy making (the other two being the ‘rational actor 
model’ and the ‘organisational process model’) in which policies emerge from struggles, 
competition and bargaining between bureaucratic players.68 A good deal of literature 
also deals with the influence of party politics on foreign policy. Key influences include 
Robert Putnam’s analysis of ‘two-level games’, Gourevitch’s study of domestic 
influences, and Solingen on nuclear proliferation itself.69 
 
                                                
66 Ganguly, ‘India's Pathway to Pokhran II,’ 174. 
67 Morton H. Halperin, Priscilla Clapp, and Arnold Kanter, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy 
(Washington,: The Brookings Institution, 1974), 62. 
68 See: Christopher M. Jones, 'Bureaucratic Politics and Organizational Process Models,' in The 
International Studies Encyclopedia (Blackwell Publishing, 2010). 
69 See: Robert D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,’ 
International Organization 42, no. Summer 1988 (1988); Peter Gourevitch, ‘The Second Image 
Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics,’ International Organization 32, no. 4 (1978); 
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In the case of the 1998 tests, writers such as George Perkovich and Itty Abraham 
exemplify the ‘strategic enclave’ hypothesis. For Abraham, the progress of India’s 
nuclear program has represented the rise of ruling cliques within the Atomic Energy 
Commission, shows off “the virtuosity of Indian scientists”, and is a way for the 
“postcolonial state” to demonstrate its ability to modernise the country.70 George 
Perkovich similarly points to the earlier 1974 test as more based on “intuition, 
bureaucratic and technological momentum” and personal calculations of a Prime 
Minister under political pressure.71 The other face of domestic politics is party politics. 
Some argue that these are a key explanation, giving the tests to the BJP’s ideological 
vision and domestic political priorities. This explains the puzzle of why the Congress 
Party did not test earlier.72  
 
An additional domestic politics explanation is advanced by Hymans, who rejects 
national security, prestige, and bureaucratic explanations for all failing to explain the 
timing of the tests. Instead, he argues that a specific psychological explanation that he 
calls “oppositional nationalism” was a driving force. Hymans argues that some national 
leaders see their state inevitably at odds with others, but also conceive the fundamental 
identity of the state as having a special role or standing in the international system.73 To 
explain why the BJP under Vajpayee was so certain in its decision to go ahead and test, 
he says Vajpayee and the BJP’s oppositional nationalism “provided it with the 
emotional motivation to embrace what earlier governments had deferred or shunned,” 
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71 Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb, 178. 
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and, as a result, “not mere prestige-seeking, not bureaucratic politics, but a combination 
of fear and pride on the part of top leaders drives nuclear weapons decisions.”74  
 
Domestic politics explanations have also been criticised, especially on the grounds that 
the nuclear program spanned decades – far too long a term for the tests to be determined 
by the BJP’s election. Ganguly, for example, accepts that the BJP made its decision for 
chauvinistic reasons, but points out that the BJP also inherited a long-running scientific 
program, and was responding to long-term security threats which at the time were 
highlighted by a provocative Pakistani missile test.75 In downplaying the causal 
significance of Vajpayee’s election, other scholars emphasise that successive Indian 
governments had declined to join the NPT,76  and the previous Congress Party 
government had come close to testing under Narasimha Rao.77  Likewise, Dinshaw 
Mistry sees Vajpayee’s decisions reflecting the elite view that “India’s nuclear program 
was a sign of technological prowess, prestige and great-power status, and thus the BJP’s 
desire for recognition of India as a nuclear weapons state simply reflects this long 
standing perspective.78” Andrew Kennedy adds that even though the nuclear tests are 
associated with BJP’s return to power, “India’s disappointments on the diplomatic front 
had undermined the rationale for restraint even among India’s other parties.”79 Hymans 
also criticises the bureaucratic explanation from the party politics perspective: Despite 
the existence of an Indian ‘bomb lobby’ since 1964, Indian leaders maintained that non-
weaponisation was best not only for security but for India’s international standing.80 
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Assessment of the literature 
 
Prestige and status appear with frequency in the literature on the 1998 tests, and at one 
level this is adequate reason to select this case as a “most likely” example of status 
playing a causal role in foreign policy decisions. The literature alone, however, does not 
provide much guidance on how to begin to study status’ role. Many of the prestige-
related accounts above assume that nuclear weapons are symbolic of major power 
status, so India conducted the nuclear tests in order to cloak itself in such symbols. 
More information than this is necessary to carry out an analysis of status’ role. This is 
partly because simply stating that nuclearisation is prestigious does little to answer the 
timing question. It is also because the literature about the tests does not tell us enough 
about what value India placed on prestige, or indeed what constituted valuable prestige 
for India. We need this in order to judge the extent that prestige and status may have 
played causal roles, compared with other causes such as national security. To counter 
this, it is worth reviewing broader literature about Indian status-seeking. This helps us 
identify the kind of prestige and status that India sought, and what value was placed 
upon them. 
 
Several aspects of India’s beliefs about status help to explain the importance of prestige 
and status in the nuclear tests. First, India had a strong belief that, based on its 
historical, cultural, and demographic significance, it would eventually achieve 
recognition as a great power. Second, India’s history ensured that its pursuit of status 
would have unique qualities: among these, were the belief in maintaining national 
autonomy, and a strong normative aspect to foreign policy. Third, atomic research was 
important to both of these aspects. On the one hand, a nuclear research program 
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(including its civilian aspects) kept open the door to future great power status. On the 
other, nuclear weapons might not only provide material security, but also maintain 
India’s political autonomy. At the same time, normative aspects of nuclear arms control 
were also important. For India, normative concerns could both slow down nuclear 
development, yet also make international arms control efforts an especially sensitive 
political concern. These factors combine to paint a picture of India’s status concerns at 
the time of the case study. 
 
India’s aspirations to great power status 
 
Indian beliefs about a special status for the country can be traced at least to the political 
traditions established with the struggle for independence. Jawaharlal Nehru wrote that 
“it will be well for the world if India can make her influence felt.”81 He came to power 
with the central belief that India had “special rights and duties in the management of 
international society based on its status as one of the world’s major 
civilisations.”82 Nehruvianism remains the mainstream current of Indian international 
thought, encompassing a belief in essential national unity, independence from other 
states, and “the belief that the greatness of Indian civilisation must and will eventually 
be recognised by others.”83 One of Nehru’s core beliefs was that India could play a 
significant role promoting international cooperation, and could establish new 
international norms.  
 
John D. Ciorciari notes four reasons for India seeking major power status: ensuring 
policy autonomy (which as noted above, has reflected India’s post-colonial status); 
                                                
81 Nehru, Discovery of India, cited in Singh, A Call to Honour, 46-47. 
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maintaining security from internal and external threats; raising living standards; and 
winning diplomatic recognition as a leading nation – as Vajpayee put it, securing “a 
meaningful role in world affairs.”84 The last element is a distinctive aspect of Indian 
foreign policy. Stephen Cohen notes: “Whether a realist or idealist, almost every 
member of the Indian strategic community thinks that India’s inherent greatness as a 
power is itself a valuable diplomatic asset, and that others must become cognisant of the 
moral quality of Indian foreign and strategic policy.”85 Indian scholars observe that from 
Nehru’s time on, Indian international thinking has continued to emphasise normative as 
well as material bases of power. “Then and to some extent, even now, India tended to 
place an inordinate amount of importance on attaining international status. In turn, India 
still seems to place a good deal of stock on its ‘power by example’ as a way of gaining 
global status.”86 In other words, the consistent theme is a combination of material and 
moral power. India’s aspirations to major power status are based on both: “Its capacity 
to utilise power directly; and its capacity to shape the rules and institutions through 
which states interact in important ways.”87  
 
Autonomy and non-alignment 
 
The principle of autonomy and non-alignment has been a central debate in Indian 
international thinking. This was not only thanks to Nehru’s personal beliefs in 
multilateralism and global transformation, the legacy of Gandhi, and India’s national 
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experience of colonialism, but also because of the structural factor that nonalignment 
would allow a relatively weak state such as India to play a greater than expected role 
internationally.88 Related to this was the belief that India could not align its fate with 
any one power. In Nehru’s words, it was: “Not a wise policy to put all our eggs in one 
basket…purely from the point of view of opportunism…an independent policy is the 
best.”89 As other scholars note: “to join any of the two superpower blocs was seen as 
mortgaging India’s eventual emergence as a future major player.”90  
 
Nevertheless, Nehru’s successors were criticised for uncritically adopting superficial 
aspects of the doctrine, especially an excessive reliance on idealism in foreign policy. 
The criticism fuelled alternative strains of Indian international thought, including moves 
to merge Western realpolitik with Indian traditions, and a championing of the Hindu 
nationalist outlook on international relations.91 From the realpolitik perspective, some 
Indian scholars saw India’s 1962 defeat by China as evidence that India had ignored the 
constraints of power politics “to pursue an explicitly ideational foreign policy… with 
mostly disastrous consequences.”92 Meanwhile, nationalists such as Jaswant Singh have 
claimed that far from Nehruvianism boosting India’s international role, “what it did 
confer as a legacy was ambivalence, ambiguities, and an uncertain and apprehension-
filled future.”93 The implication of this criticism is that post-Cold War moves to 
strategic autonomy, and indeed the acquisition of nuclear weapons, marked a major 
change.  
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Despite the criticism, a strong case can be made that Nehru’s more genuine legacy is a 
close alignment of power and values in Indian thinking. Nehru himself had been keenly 
aware of India’s power position. Andrew Kennedy explains that “because he anticipated 
that India would be a relatively weak power after it became independent, [Nehru] 
believed that it would need to pacify its environment through an active diplomacy that 
promoted military restraint and disarmament.”94 This is not, however, to imply 
hypocrisy in Nehru’s normative values. While Nehru genuinely supported such 
apparently idealistic goals as supporting the United Nations, non-alignment, and 
disarmament, this cannot be separated from his pursuit of the national interest — 
seeking the resources of the UN to assist national development, avoiding entrapment in 
superpower rivalries, and believing disarmament would constrain India’s rivals95. 
Srinath Raghavan adds: “His (Nehru’s) commitment to norms of international behaviour 
stemmed not from an airy idealism but from a shrewd understanding that power should 




Along with great power aspirations and national autonomy, nuclear energy has played 
an important role in Indian understandings of its international status. In both its civilian 
and military applications, nuclear research represents an overlap of national interests in 
security and status. The ability to field a nuclear deterrent in itself was symbolic of 
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major power aspirations. At the same time, if nuclear weapons provided security 
benefits, this would also contribute to India’s autonomy, which in turn was a pre-
requisite of its status. Possibly a way to understand the importance of nuclear weapons 
is to see them as a quality, like autonomy, that was commensurate with recognition for 
major power status. This means it is important to distinguish between the possession of 
a nuclear research program, which achieved status ambitions in certain ways, from the 
1998 nuclear test decision, which achieved related but distinct status goals.  
 
Nuclear research has long symbolised India’s independence, national purpose, and 
modernity. Itty Abraham has written that nuclear energy programs provide legitimacy to 
a post-colonial state, and for decades it has been vital to Indian perceptions of national 
prestige: “Atomic energy was national strength, uniqueness, and security all wrapped up 
in one package.”97 Gaurav Kampani, who sees a broadly realist explanation for India 
seeking weapons for security reasons, argues that in reality organisational and technical 
difficulties, especially those due to the need for such secrecy, caused significant delays 
in the tests.98 But despite those organisational failings, as Kampani puts it: “For 
conservative Hindu politicians, nuclear weapons are a muscular symbol of an 
increasingly assertive and resurgent Hindu society.”99 Above all, they were in train from 
the earliest days. Tests marked continuation of longstanding policies, “set in motion 
from almost the earliest years of independence.”100 Nuclear research was also important 
to confirming and protecting the key value of autonomy, which in turn helped guarantee 
India’s right to seek major power status. Stephen Cohen argues that whatever pro-
testing advocates have said about the principled qualities of an Indian weapons 
program, “their primary perspective is that these devices bring status, power and 
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military capability to India vis a vis its neighbours and other states, especially the 
United States.”101  
 
Indian perceptions of nuclear weapons reflect the literature about nuclear proliferation. 
As Ashley Tellis notes of nuclear arms, “their mere presence may suffice to express 
threats, convey signals, enlarge freedom of action, and bestow psychological advantages 
on their possessors.”102 For India to abdicate its nuclear role, would make it dependent 
on policies of others, limit its freedom of policy action, and could limit its choice of 
allies, he adds. Tellis concludes that the nuclear focus is “a function of New Delhi’s 
perceptions of India’s size and potential power, which, taken together, reinforce its basic 
beliefs about the country’s greatness and claims to recognition… Since the beginning of 
modernity, great-power status in the international system has been defined primarily by 
a state’s possession of comprehensive military capabilities, which today include, among 
other things, the possession of nuclear weapons.”103 All in all, to renounce nuclear 
weapons would be to renounce any claim to global pre-eminence. 
 
Putting these together, as Priyanjali Malik says, nuclear assets help define a political 
image: “India’s atomic arsenal defends a certain idea of India — that of a modern, 
independent but above all, sovereign state occupying a position of global influence on 
the international stage.”104  It also allowed India to demonstrate security self-reliance, 
commensurate with being a major power. The nuclear tests, in turn, have been described 
as Nehruvian as they let a weak India maintain its autonomy in the face of Chinese or 
US threats; they bought time for economic and military reforms; and for all their 
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provocation they also demonstrated considerable policy restraint.105 The factor that we 
are going to look at is the timing of the tests, and the interaction of external pressures on 
existing Indian beliefs. For India, as George Tanham pointed out, “external recognition 
and validation of India’s place” is almost as important as actually having the material 
attributes or roles that would underpin high status.106  
 
Several writers also note that security and prestige explanations are intertwined and 
often indistinguishable. There is a basis in the proliferation literature for this, as Stephen 
Meyer argued that prestige and political power were a single reason states sought 
nuclear weapons. “A country may pursue its nuclear option to enhance its status and 
position in the eyes of other countries… the belief that such weapons somehow magnify 
a nation’s image.”107 Baldev Nayar and TV Paul write that the 1998 tests were 
conducted for security reasons, but also for an underlying reason: “The enduring and 
deep-rooted aspiration of India for the role of a major power, and the related belief that 
the possession of an independent nuclear capability is an essential prerequisite for 
achieving that status.”108  
 
 
Gaps and next steps 
 
This review of the literature on the case has shown that prestige and status have been 
frequently cited as reasons for the 1998 nuclear tests, but a significant gap remain 
because the literature is inconclusive about the role status played in the episode. Putting 
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the test literature in the context of the wider literature about Indian status ambitions 
helps to better understand the kinds of prestige and status that were being sought. 
Longstanding beliefs in India about the country maintaining its independence and 
eventually emerging as a major power underpin the several status roles that India has 
pursued since independence. This helps show a degree of consistency in Indian 
international thinking from Nehru to Vajpayee, as India has pursued status roles such as 
non-aligned leader, strategically autonomous actor, technically advanced state, and 
moral leader. From this we can see that India was likely to allocate resources to 
prestige-building projects ensuring autonomy, demonstrating technical prowess, and 
burnishing normative credentials. The simultaneous pursuit of a nuclear program and 
advocating for arms control in international forums are examples of how this prestige-
building would be carried out. 
 
The findings of this survey of the literature provide a useful starting point for an 
analysis of the case. A key point is the contradiction inherent in India’s status goals. 
Even from the start of the nuclear era, but compounded by the development of 
nonproliferation norms, the pursuit of nuclear weapons conflicted with maintaining 
recognition as a moral exemplar. Raghavan’s analysis of Nehru, as noted above, is 
valuable, as it highlights that for India power and legitimacy have always been 
intertwined. The importance of this is that it means that any analysis of Indian status-
seeking must be about trade-offs. At times India’s pursuit of a nuclear program would 
be traded off against strengthening its normative authority, and vice-versa. The analysis 
of this case will therefore very much be about the factors that would cause one prestige-
building track to be favoured over another. This is an approach that may also help to fill 
that outstanding puzzle of the case, the timing of the nuclear tests. 
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SECTION B: CASE ANALYSIS 
 
Analysing the case 
 
The 1998 nuclear tests still generate intense emotions among India’s close-knit foreign 
policy establishment.109 Former officials will fiercely defend the decision to test, and 
they express a range of reasons for it. But they frequently place a conspicuous emphasis 
on a defensive aspect, according to which India was forced to conduct the tests to resist 
what they recall as barely disguised international coercion. For example, India’s former 
ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency, Sheel Kant Sharma, says of the 
tests that “we were not going to be bullied or pushed around… They felt India wouldn’t 
have the guts to do it [but] it took two tests to show it was no mistake. Thus far and no 
more!”110 This recurrent theme suggests that even if we accept from the literature that 
status and prestige were one likely factor in the tests, there appears to be a process in 
action that made them especially important factors in 1998. Analysing the way status 
concerns might have become more sensitive at a particular time is the starting point for 
this case analysis. 
 
The review of the literature provides a starting point for this analysis. The review 
concluded with the observation that Indian status-seeking involved the pursuit of several 
status roles, often simultaneously, such as normative exemplar, leader of the Non-
Aligned Movement, regional hegemon, and prospective great power. Prestige could be 
built pragmatically along parallel tracks and these status goals did not need to conflict. 
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This demands, however, policies of moderation on any one track, and this can at once 
be seen in the slow time line of India’s nuclear development. In line with this approach, 
a key turning point for India’s nuclear program was likely to be developments that 
disrupted this set of trade-offs in Indian status-seeking. A major focus of this analysis is 
therefore the point where perceived pressure from the mid-1990s arms control treaties 
was judged by New Delhi to make the defence of independence and autonomy outweigh 
longstanding normative status goals.  
 
The three-phase process of status-seeking that is used in each of the case studies of this 
project appears to be particularly pronounced in the Indian case. As noted, India was 
balancing a variety of status roles, and at the time of the case was holding open its 
aspirations to major power status, while keeping normative leadership as a major goal 
as well. This compromise suggests that a phase of normal status-seeking would involve 
a cautious and incremental advances on controversial matters such as the nuclear 
program. This caution would keep the gateway open to nuclearisation, assumed to be a 
quality of future major-power status, but would equally postpone risky decisions such 
as openly declaring the nuclear capability. The phase of status crisis was triggered when 
arms control treaties threatened to deprive India of prestige commensurate with its self-
perceived status as a regional power and potential major power. This ensured that in the 
third phase, an enhanced drive to acquire prestige overcame concerns about the risks of 
the tests. Indeed, the following section will show that India was pushed into testing 




Normal status seeking: India’s pre-crisis pattern of behaviour  
 
Up to the mid-1990s, Indian status-seeking continued the broad pattern observed 
throughout its post-independence history. India pursued a number of status roles 
relatively consistently, and leaders in New Delhi continued to identify avenues for 
building prestige that would reinforce those roles. Even as roles as post-colonial, moral, 
or non-aligned world leader lessened in priority as Indian foreign policy was marked by 
a greater public emphasis on realism, India did not deviate from its role as an aspirant 
great power. A representative scholarly view is that, “for India, these aspirations have 
been based upon a consensus of ensuring India’s emergence as a Great Power that is 
fully autonomous, influential, and respected in the global comity of nations.”111 
However a colourful snapshot of the view was given in a remark by retired senior 
diplomat Kanwal Sibal, who said, “When we say we want to be a first-rank power, it’s 
more in the sense of not being treated as a second-rank power.”112 This comment may 
sound offhand or contradictory, but it captures the standpoint of many Indian officials. It 
implies that the overarching goal is to maintain the open door to major power status, 
rather than a specific vision of major power status itself. As this section sets out, many 
elements of Indian policy built strands of prestige that would help ensure India could 
gain recognition as such a prospective major power.   
 
In the leadup to 1998, India pursued a normal phase of prestige-building marked by 
continuity with its post-independence history. India continued to value independence as 
a key to its international relations, even as the favoured terminology shifted from “non-
alignment” to “strategic autonomy”. Alongside this, notions of moral prestige remained 
important to Indian policy calculations. These policies were steadily pursued even as 
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India faced greater pressure on its security after the collapse of the USSR in 1991. 
Despite this mounting pressure, India maintained an incremental approach to its nuclear 
policy, which progressed consistently as the country took into account gradual changes 
in security conditions. The crisis of status would come in the middle of the 1990s, and 
would disrupt this steady progress of prestige-building. 
 
Elements of prestige building 
 
In the leadup to 1998, key elements of Indian foreign policy remained consistent. These 
included international relations based on a balance of pragmatic autonomy and moral 
legitimacy; elements that have typically been much more complementary than 
contradictory. A key to assessing these objectives is that they are both intersubjectively 
defined, requiring recognition by other states in order to carry any weight. This has 
meant that for India, considerations of security and status are closely intertwined. Assets 
for national security can help ensure the autonomy of India’s foreign policy, which is 
considered important to status, while recognition as a major power, or at least as an 
aspirant thereto, helps India’s perceptions of security. As a result of this, nuclear 
weapons are a part of both India’s status and security. In addition, autonomy is an 
especially important goal, because of the colonial legacy, and the belief that Indian 
culture and destiny require it.  
 
The current views of Indian elites indicate a continued belief that positions such as non-
alignment or support for disarmament have both normative and pragmatic aspects. For 
example, a nationalist such as Jaswant Singh accepts that non-alignment was “an 
appropriate response which gave India the needed flexibility.”113 Hawkish retired 
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official Rajiv Sikri says that: “What is insufficiently appreciated: is that strategic 
autonomy or non-alignment was not about equidistance but about taking decisions on 
our own.”114 Former Foreign Secretary Lalit Mansingh declared that prior to the nuclear 
tests, “there was a conviction we couldn’t trust anyone to help us… [You need] 
recognition of the total isolation of India - there is no great power that is going to help 
us when we need them. We are not going to give up our autonomy and enter 
alliances.”115 Similarly, Kanwal Sibal noted that “we are a big country, and we have a 
very old civilisation and culture, therefore we cannot be an appendage of anyone.” 
Autonomy was closely linked with the idea of eventual recognition as a major power, as 
it was a prerequisite for future great power goals as well as being a good in itself. This 
helps us understand that by the 1990s, power and values combined remained the core of 
Indian international thought.  
 
The nuclear program during normal prestige-building 
 
While a national nuclear weapons program is an inherently risky and costly venture, it 
may still be compatible with a state’s normal phase of prestige-building. The main way 
this is possible is if the program remains bounded by defined cost and risk parameters – 
defined in the sense that a state only pays costs for its prestige commensurate with the 
value of relevant status goals, but not so much that it impinges on other goods that the 
state may wish to enjoy. This is very much exemplified by Aabha Dixit’s observation 
that for New Delhi, status was consistently a national priority, but was equally 
consistently balanced against cost and risk calculations: “Indian public opinion wanted 
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to see the nuclear weapon as part of the country’s ‘prestige’, but this attitude was 
tempered by a sense of realism over the potential economic costs of such a policy.”116 
 
In line with this approach, the Indian nuclear program remained cautious even after 
China’s nuclear test of 1964. It was not solely rhetoric to call the May 1974 “Smiling 
Buddha” nuclear test a “peaceful nuclear explosion.”117 While some Indian officials 
described the device as a weapon,118 it was likely it was unwieldy and far from 
deliverable as a bomb.119 In any event, India was still far short of a fully weaponised 
nuclear program.120 Indian attitudes toward acquiring its own deterrent were 
characterised by serious concern about the costs. This is summarised by former Indian 
Foreign Secretary Salman Haider, who emphasised that in the years between 1974 and 
1998 New Delhi decision-makers did not assess the costs of a changing India’s posture 
to rely on nuclear weapons would be justifiable. “It was deliberately decided we didn’t 
want to pay a heavy economic price, nor change our defence strategy by integrating a 
nuclear deterrent,” he says.121  
 
In addition to balancing the material costs of the nuclear program, any prestige gained 
from the program also had to be balanced against the concurrent value of legitimacy. 
This also demanded a highly conservative cost and risk appraisal of nuclear initiatives. 
Simultaneous with a nuclear program, India had continued to build up prestige in areas 
that would reinforce recognition of the country as a normative or moral leader. In the 
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republic’s early years, Nehru had recognised that its relative weakness could be offset 
by diplomacy promoting peace and disarmament, alongside decolonisation.122 An 
unexpected outcome was that this emphasis on disarmament had an important influence 
on India’s decisions to acquire nuclear weapons of its own. This was first hinted at after 
the 1974 test, when Indira Gandhi cited India’s strenuous efforts for disarmament as one 
reason the country was dissatisfied with the NPT.123 
 
The continued policy of nuclear gradualism is well illustrated by major Indian nuclear 
decisions in the 1980s, some of which are recounted in a first-hand account by former 
senior official and high-profile strategic commentator K. Subrahmanyam.124 After the 
first major publications in India about the Pakistani nuclear program in 1979, and the 
US arms sales to Islamabad that followed the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, there were 
demands for the Indian government to publicly respond. Subrahmanyam writes that in 
1983, Indira Gandhi ordered preparations for another nuclear test. However, this was 
detected by US satellites and after pressure from Washington, Gandhi cancelled the 
plans.125 A notable aspect of this is that the decision was that at the time Indian 
scientists had been encouraging Gandhi to test a more advanced boosted fission 
device.126 Not testing it meant that India would forego another prestige aspect of the 
nuclear program – the chance to demonstrate technical leadership in the developing 
world. While the 1974 Pokhran I test had been seen as a key example of this, it was 
conspicuous that India did not follow this with demonstrations of more advanced 
nuclear devices. As Benjamin Frankel says of the 1974 test, “The benefits of 
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demonstrating India’s technical ability were garnered, and India’s willingness to defend 
its nonaligned status was demonstrated.”127 It was therefore not urgent for India to take 
the risk of further tests to demonstrate greater technical capabilities.  
 
Another instance of gradualism was visible in 1987, when security concerns about 
Pakistan reached crisis level during the “Brasstacks” military standoff.128 Pakistani 
nuclear scientist AQ Khan gave an interview that was widely interpreted as signalling 
Islamabad’s possession of nuclear weapons.129 Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, 
who took office after the assassination of his mother in 1984, chose not to escalate the 
situation. Instead, he appointed officials associated with peaceful atomic energy 
research, promoted a nuclear test-ban treaty, and at the UN in 1988, he launched his 
Rajiv Gandhi Plan for comprehensive nuclear disarmament. Mansingh recalls that at the 
time, the “moral stance” was still an important counterweight to the nuclear “enclave” 
and those others in New Delhi who urged testing. Mansingh notes considerable 
disappointment in New Delhi when Gandhi tried to gain international support “but 
found nobody was interested.”130 The rejection by the established nuclear powers was a 
“bitter disappointment” to Gandhi, Subrahmanyam writes.131 Gandhi then gave the 
green light for final weapons development around 1989-90.132 This represents a key step 
forward in the nuclear program, but it was also a measured response compared with 
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options such as further nuclear explosions or an open declaration of India as a nuclear 
weapons state. 
 
Subrahmanyam argues that India then played for time until about 1994, when a number 
of nuclear devices may have been weaponised, and nuclear testing was feasible.133 Even 
after the 1990 Kargil crisis, India did not opt to test, even as it continued its 
weaponisation efforts.134 Overt assembly and declaration of nuclear weapons was 
avoided, partly, Perkovich argues, because the countervailing effect of India’s moral and 
cultural ambivalence towards them.135 An end result of this was that up until 1998, India 
had kept its nuclear options open. Gradual nuclear development was kept separate from 
any decision to test weapons and declare the formal status of being a nuclear weapons 
state. The final step in the process was when India, which had been an initial sponsor of 
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The status crisis: India reacts to arms control treaties 
 
The status crisis described here was a sequence of events in which challenged India’s 
status aspirations, and threatened to undo the steady process of prestige-building. This 
challenge came to a head in the form of the mid-1990s nuclear arms control processes. 
These had a profound effect because India was already in a vulnerable position but the 
treaties, including the 1995 extension of the NPT and the 1996 CTBT, appeared to New 
Delhi to be so intrusive that India would be unable to gain recognition as a major power. 
This chapter therefore outlines Indian perceptions about the international environment; 
its expectations regarding the arms control treaties; and its beliefs after those treaties 
were negotiated.  
 
The situation leading up to the tests 
 
By the mid-1990s, India felt vulnerable in terms of both its security and its prestige. 
Over the course of several years, India had seen its Soviet security guarantees weaken 
as the Gorbachev regime sought détente with China; the withdrawal from Afghanistan 
improved Soviet-Pakistani ties; and faced with Pakistani nuclear advances, from around 
March 1989 Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi had approved nuclear weapon production.136 
Likewise, Prime Minister Vajpayee had described India’s “deteriorating security 
environment”, likely referring to China aiding Pakistan, militarising Tibet, aiding 
Myanmar, and being courted by Washington.137 As K. Subrahmanyam put it: “India was 
compelled to go for nuclear armaments because of Chinese support to the Pakistani 
nuclear-weapons program and the tacit US connivance of that effort.”138 However, 
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debate continues about whether India’s actual security situation worsened at this time. 
Stephen Cohen proposes that India’s strategic situation is better seen as fluctuating, and 
any deterioration from New Delhi’s perspective was mostly only relative to excessive 
Indian optimism about the end of the Cold War. “If a disadvantaged security situation 
was the critical factor, then India should have tested much earlier than 1998,” Cohen 
argues. 
 
Alongside security concerns, many factors combined to cause New Delhi decision-
makers to perceive an ongoing decline in India’s prestige. This feeling was particularly 
acute because India had held high hopes for the post-Cold War world, believing a new 
world order of multipolarity would emerge, with India to play a major role. Instead, it 
faced the decline of the Non-Aligned Movement, its credibility undermined by the 
intractable Kashmir conflict, and a glaring lack of leverage in Washington.139 As one 
former Foreign Secretary noted: “Our leverage in the global political power play is 
limited and our options are getting increasingly narrower.”140 Pratap Bhanu Mehta saw 
it as a “quiet, but evident, crisis of confidence”, writing in 1998: 
The last two decades have been trying ones for India. A spate of secessionist 
movements, a widespread sense of declining importance in world affairs, and a 
realisation that many of its highest hopes remain substantially unredeemed have 
underscored India’s insecurities and vulnerabilities.141 
George Perkovich adds to the above list the serious economic and social concerns that 
preoccupied New Delhi at the start of the 1990s.142 But it is important that neither 
security nor prestige concerns can solely explain the timing of the nuclear tests. They, 
along with the other factors, are best considered as establishing the environment of 
vulnerability which allowed India’s status aspirations to be threatened. 
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The onset of the arms control treaties  
 
Amid the security and status concerns noted above, the early 1990s renewal of nuclear 
nonproliferation negotiations came at a difficult time for India. India had helped draft 
the 1970 Non-Proliferation Treaty, but had refused to sign due to its dissatisfaction that 
the nuclear powers neither agreed to share peaceful nuclear technology, nor commit to 
disarmament. In addition, commentators such as K. Subrahmanyam argued that 
“although India's argument was couched in moral terms, a more pragmatic 
consideration—namely, keeping its nuclear weapons option open—guided its decision 
not to sign the treaty.”143 India both expected to play its moral role on this issue, and had 
strong expectations that the established nuclear powers would reciprocate with their 
nuclear technology. Instead, the setback was that the NPT constrained only non-
weapons states such as India, but did nothing to constrain the established nuclear 
powers.144  
 
The critical timing for the nuclear nonproliferation regime arrived as the expiry of the 
NPT’s 25-year life led to the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review and Extension 
Conference held in New York in April and May 1995. For India, the leadup to the 
conference was marked by missed opportunities and disappointments. In early 1994, the 
Clinton administration had proposed a new agreement controlling production of fissile 
material and missile deployments, overseen by the major powers in combination with 
India and Pakistan. Talks between new Prime Minister Rao and US Deputy Secretary of 
State Strobe Talbott were promising, with suggestions that the American position 
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indicated “a willingness to live with India’s nuclear weapon capability and not actively 
seek a rollback in the foreseeable future.” However, India’s scientific establishment 
pushed back hard, scuttling the option.145 India also lobbied the Non-Aligned 
Movement in favour of an NPT extension including time-bound disarmament 
commitments from the nuclear powers. But a conference of the Non-Aligned Movement 
in Bandung in April 1995 gave India little comfort, as many NAM states stood to 
benefit from nonproliferation, if it prevented regional arms races, and perceived India as 
motivated less by their interests as by its self-interest in maintaining freedom of 
manoeuvre.146 Facing this, and not wanting to lose support for other key goals in the 
UN, India chose not to fight the extension process.147 
 
The NPT extension was approved by all but four of the 178 parties to the treaty, without 
a vote, on 11 May 1995. India was left disappointed by the approach taken in the 
consensus “Principles” adopted by the NPT conference.148 These left India isolated and 
under more pressure over international demands to ban nuclear tests and further 
fissile material production.149 The result followed heavy lobbying by the Permanent 
Five for the indefinite extension, which reflected the way the conference was dominated 
by the Five’s security interests. Indeed, one study observed that the conference 
“demonstrated yet again that on vital national security issues, the ‘realist’ or power 
politics paradigm still reigns supreme.”150 India’s October 1995 statement to the UN 
declared that the NPT’s indefinite extension had “legitimized for all time. . . [the] 
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division of the world into nuclear haves and have nots,” and that this was a “serious 
development that is bound to impact on all disarmament negotiations.”151 As Jaswant 
Singh put it: “The forcing of an unconditional and indefinite extension of the NPT on 
the international community made 1995 a watershed in the evolution of the South Asian 
situation. India was left with no option but to go in for overt nuclear weaponisation.”152 
Ganguly adds that India felt serious security concerns due to foreign inspection regimes, 
as a result of the US achieving its goal of NPT extension: “The US success came as a 
dramatic shock to the Indian security policy establishment, which now realized that 
India would come under acute pressure to sign the NPT or at least to agree to full-scope 
safeguards on its nuclear power plants, including those of indigenous origin.”153 A 
further implication of the NPT extension was that it left the CTBT as India’s only 
remaining chance for a legally binding arms control commitment.154 India’s Foreign 
Secretary at the time, Salman Haider, said: “We felt the NPT was directed at us in many 
ways. We were excluded, pushed into a secondary position.”155 Ganguly notes that as 
New Delhi reflected on its impotence at the NPT conference, and considered the 
upcoming CTBT: “It is reasonable to infer that the Indian government believed that its 
window of opportunity was rapidly closing.”156 
 
In a parallel with the way it had helped draft the NPT in the 1960s, India had co-
sponsored the CTBT with the US in November 1993, but the extension of the NPT left 
India with a change of heart.157 This was partly due to the bitterness over the ‘haves and 
have-nots’ inequity in the NPT, but also because the NPT extension brought the CTBT 
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on in 1996, much quicker than India had expected.158 Most concerning for India was 
that the formula for the Entry Into Force (EIF) provision of the CTBT was tabled in 
June 1996, requiring all 44 nuclear-capable states (so measured for their possession of 
relevant reactors) to ratify the treaty before it could take effect. India was furious over 
this, stating that it had the “strongest objections” and that the provision amounted to 
denying India’s sovereign right to voluntary consent on an international treaty.159  
 
The logic of India’s objection to the EIF provisions was that it was forced into a corner, 
unable to withdraw from the process without vetoing the entire treaty. The only 
remaining options for India were to sign, leaving itself open to foreign inspectors and 
(as it saw it) espionage; to not sign, and likely suffer sanctions mobilised by the 
international community against ‘rogue states’;160 or to reject the process entirely by 
testing. From the perspective of Indian officials, maintaining an undeclared nuclear 
capability was running out of credibility. As the senior Indian diplomat and negotiator 
Sheel Kant Sharma put it, “the so-called recessed deterrent was a phoney construct to 
cover up an inability to do anything.”161  
 
In addition to the EIF provisions, some specific aspects of the CTBT concerned 
decision-makers in New Delhi. One assessment of the treaty’s impact is given by a 
former Indian arms control negotiator and strategic commentator, Ambassador Rakesh 
Sood. Sood recalls that by 1996 there were serious security concerns in New Delhi due 
to China’s delivery to Pakistan of M9 and M11 missiles, as well as manufacturing 
facilities for further weaponisation. This, he judged, indicated a large improvement in 
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Pakistan’s delivery capability at the time. But a larger factor, he recalls, were the CTBT 
negotiations, and particularly the definition of scope. He argues that the definition of 
‘comprehensive’ as zero-yield would have the greatest effect on non-testing states such 
as India. With New Delhi perceiving itself to be unable to sign the treaty due to its Entry 
Into Force provisions, Sood recalls: “This made it apparent across the whole of the 
political leadership in India that things were coming to a pass, and a decision was 
inevitable, and sooner rather than later.”162  
 
As the CTBT loomed, Indian elites began to consider the impact of being relegated to 
the status of lesser relative power. For example, Karsten Frey has tracked a sharp 
change in the debate within the Indian elite, as few discussions of nuclear weapons in 
the 1996-98 period were primarily concerned with security; the majority were about the 
country’s perceived status as an emerging power, relations with the US, and the 
nonproliferation regime as a vehicle for both. “In the period between 1996 and 1998, 
two-thirds of all nuclear-related analyses drafted by the strategic elite deplored the 
negative effects of the international regime for India’s status,” Frey writes.163 Indeed, as 
one study puts it, if New Delhi is unable to gain recognition as a major power, “China is 
likely to view India’s power position with contempt and continue to treat it as a power 
equivalent to Pakistan, while placing itself in the category of major powers with 
special rights to involve itself in the management of South Asian security affairs.”164 
This is echoed by a former Foreign Secretary, Kanwal Sibal, who said: “There was a 
feeling it was absolutely the last opportunity for India, and we must not miss the bus. It 
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[the CTBT] was relegating us permanently to a second degree power status. We would 
be a second rate power.”165 
 
Deepa Ollapally calls the situation “a moment of reckoning for India”: “The logical 
corollary was that if India did not take the drastic step of testing at that critical juncture, 
the long-held nuclear option would no longer be a real option.”166 Ashok Kapur sees the 
CTBT as the “final straw which broke the camel’s back”, alongside other straws such as 
the Chinese and Pakistani strategic threats and apparent US tolerance of their conniving 
in nuclear proliferation.167 It was also important at that time that India’s economy had 
recovered and, aside from generally making the nuclear program more affordable, the 
threat of international economic sanctions was less acute than it had been even in 
1996.168 India’s Foreign Secretary at the time, Salman Haider, said simply: “The EIF 
gave us no option, and the result was we had to veto the process, which is never 
comfortable.”169  
 
Implications of the treaties 
 
What this section has shown is that India by the early 1990s was sensitive to threats to 
both its security and its prestige. While one response to the security situation was likely 
to have been the decision by 1990 to develop nuclear weapons, neither security nor 
prestige considerations by themselves explain the timing of the nuclear tests in 1998. 
However, India’s impotence in the face of the NPT extension, combined with the 
imminent arrival of the CTBT, left the country facing what it saw as a rapidly closing 
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window of opportunity. Decision-makers at the time were keenly aware that the 
situation was becoming a final chance for action for India, and they were equally aware 
that a relegation to low status would leave India vulnerable to both China and the 
United States. This leaves us set to examine what action India did take in response to 
this crisis. 
 
A number of key lessons can be observed in the effects of the arms control treaties on 
India. First was the way in which they imposed unusually severe time pressure on India. 
The statements by interviewees that a “window” was closing highlight the way that the 
treaties inadvertently left New Delhi with perceptions that its responses had to be 
urgent. This is an interesting case of a status crisis precipitating sudden action from 
what had been a steady, long-term process.  
 
Another lesson of the case is the way the crisis served a functional, information-
disclosing process. The way that the NPT was extended left India with little confidence 
in the international nuclear regime. It showed that the existing nuclear powers would 
pay low costs for the regime, while India would pay a high cost. The negotiations over 
the CTBT only reinforced this. The CTBT revealed that India’s existing, incremental 
policy would no longer be effective. It forced a functional reassessment of existing 
policies. In particular, it showed that the costs of inaction had become very high. India 
faced the prospect of becoming an international pariah, or facing inspections that would 
carry severe penalties. With the costs of not acting now revealed as high, it became a far 





Enhanced status seeking: The nuclear tests 
 
This section aims to show that status concerns were an important factor in the decision 
to test, and not peripheral to other explanations such as national security. Specifically, 
this section aims to show that status concerns were more pressing in terms of timing 
than national security considerations or other explanations appearing in the existing 
literature. The mechanism in play was that status considerations helped to overcome the 
sense of risk about the tests – India was pushed into testing despite the risks, not in 
pursuit of the benefits. In addition, this section addresses domestic political 
explanations. The argument is that the pro-testing policies of the BJP and Prime 
Minister Vajpayee’s personal decision to test were the result of the above factors. In this 
sense, the key variable remains status, rather than Indian domestic politics.  
 
Rao nearly tests 
 
India’s decision came in stages, as the impact of the arms control treaties began to be 
felt, and decision-makers gradually shifted their calculus on the desirability of the tests. 
As late as May 1994, Indian Prime Minister PV Narasimha Rao held a cordial meeting 
with US President Clinton, in which the US promised its help to stop the supply of 
Chinese missiles to Pakistan, and offered nonproliferation inducements such as major 
investments in India by US firms.170 But matters moved to a new stage after the May 
1995 NPT extension resolution. As well as the impact of the NPT decision, India 
perceived increased security pressure from China. This took the form of missile 
shipments to Pakistan, and a nuclear test explosion only four days after the NPT vote, 
which was taken as an indication that the nuclear weapons states would exploit their 
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status to the full and “lord their arsenals over the rest of the world.”171 In late 1995, Rao 
summoned Atomic Energy Commission head Rajagopala Chidambaram and told him to 
prepare for a series of tests, including both hydrogen bomb and sub-kiloton devices.172  
 
By August 1995, the Pokhran test site was being prepared – indicating Rao had 
continued his general indication to scientists to proceed with testing – but Perkovich 
assesses Rao’s mind was not finally made up, and during late autumn 1995, the main 
factors in a test decision remained the domestic political calculus.173 However, as Rao 
delayed, on 15 December 1995 the Pokhran site preparations were publicly revealed in 
the New York Times.174 The United States brought great pressure to bear, and Rao’s 
feelings were that he had to wait until the economy improved.175 The perception in New 
Delhi was that, so soon after the economic crisis of the early 1990s, the threat of US 
economic sanctions was considerable.176 The implication was that in Rao’s mind, testing 
would not meet the risk-benefit equation. Rao opted not to proceed with the tests and 
had little time to reconsider, as he was voted out of office in May 1996. 
 
The view of first-hand participants of the 1995 period were revealing. Rao was not 
known as a decisive prime minister, and indeed the crisis might have been avoided had 
he accepted the Clinton compromise in 1994. However, participants were clear that 
urgency about testing emerged after the NPT decision. The Chinese nuclear test of 15 
May 1995 was telling. It made no difference to India’s security situation, other than 
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telling India that China would test at a rapid rate right up until a test ban treaty was 
ready to sign. But it did send a message that China considered itself in a separate class 
of country – as a legitimate nuclear weapons state it would take full advantage of its 
privileges under the NPT: privileges not available to India, and a class distinction that 
was now extended in perpetuity. The approach of Rao was also important: Rao had 
become conscious of an important value to India of testing, and ordered preparations for 
this reason. But against this, Rao was also continually weighing cost-benefit equations. 
One Indian insider argues that in contrast to his predecessor, “He (Rao) could not stand 
up to US pressures, even though carrying out a test would be popular and help boost his 
image.”177 By the time the preparations were exposed in December 1995, the tests were 
firmly on the table but the costs were still too high to go ahead.  
 
The CTBT and the transitional period 
 
As the arms control treaties were being finalised, it was possible to observe a greater 
range of views from New Delhi calling for a sharp break with the past, rather than a 
continuation of cautious and incremental policies. While the immediate timing of the 
tests was influenced by the leader in office – with Vajpayee’s BJP more hawkish than 
other parties – external factors drove the consensus that started to develop in New Delhi 
about testing. The pressure was mounting as experts argued that India had to test for 
technical and demonstrative reasons, before the test ban came into effect, after which 
tests would be difficult or impossible. Former Cabinet Secretary Naresh Chandra 
recalled that he was urging the government to test while France and China were still 
doing so, because “we would be in good company – or bad company – and thus we 
would get through.”178 As Indian expert Brahma Chellaney argued, the feeling was 
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growing that to wait any longer would be to surrender the “long held holy cow” of a 
nuclear capability.179 But at this crucial time, India was presented with a period of 
political instability, leading to decision-making inertia. Vajpayee replaced Rao as Prime 
Minister but after just two weeks, on 1 June 1996, was forced to resign due to a 
parliamentary vote of no-confidence.  
 
The two years of transition showed a transformation in Indian cost-benefit analyses of 
nuclear tests. As this chapter’s time line set out, in May 1996, Vajpayee was briefed on 
testing options and gave approval in principle, but officials considered it impossible to 
follow-through without approval from his successor. After Vajpayee was forced to step 
aside, the ensuing period of transition did not see any decision by Gowda or his 
successor in turn, IK Gujral. In his detailed account of events, Raj Chengappa reports 
that Gowda was briefed very early about the nuclear program. However, and reflecting 
the well-established attitude of caution, Gowda and his ministers gave more weight to 
the economy and poverty reduction policies, and so opted to wait and see how the 
CTBT negotiations proceeded.180 Gujral, then External Affairs Minister, even told 
Gowda nuclear tests would be “unbearable for our economy and the social 
infrastructure,”181 and made a similar statement to US Secretary of State Warren 
Christopher in July 1996. However, Gujral also warned Christopher that “with the test 
ban treaty proceeding rapidly towards fruition without respecting India’s concerns”, 
India was running out of options.182 Facing US pressure over the CTBT’s Entry Into 
Force provisions, Gowda built a consensus in parliament to pull out of the treaty, and on 
10 September 1996 voted against it in the UN. “India’s decision meant that sooner 
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rather than later it had to shed its nuclear ambiguity,” Chengappa notes. By March 1997, 
“Gowda appeared to have decided to go ahead with a test as a major diversion from his 
woes,” and gave the nuclear enclave the go-ahead to dig new test shafts.183  
 
In April 1997, Gowda was forced to resign and Gujral sworn in in his place. Gujral was 
against nuclear testing, but not averse to displaying strength through forward missile 
deployments, and made some attempts at negotiations with Washington. In a September 
1997 meeting with President Clinton, Gujral “hinted that India could play ball on the 
CTBT if the US would make it worthwhile. Apart from major technology tie-ups, Gujral 
was looking for India to be made  permanent member of the Security Council.” Gujral 
later told Chengappa: “When we enter the UN, this eye sees a signboard hung up 
outside the Security Council which says: You can come in only if you have the money 
or a bomb.”184 This raised the intriguing possibility that Gujral wished to swap the 
prestige of a nuclear weapons capability for the prestige of a permanent Security 
Council seat. But before the idea could be explored, in early 1998 Gujral’s premiership 
was then cut short, as his government was reduced to a parliamentary minority.185   
 
The BJP victory and the decision to test 
 
With the BJP’s election victory of March 1998, Vajpayee returned to office having stood 
on an explicit platform of nuclear testing. Some experts believe Vajpayee’s 
determination was strengthened because he had made concessions on many policy 
issues, so he was under pressure to show that he could fulfil at least one plank of the 
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party platform.186 However, by early 1998 a number of factors had come into alignment: 
the Indian economy had stabilised (reducing the perceived threat of sanctions), while 
the international community lacked clarity, clearing some of the obstacles that 
previously hindered a firm decision.187 Nicola Horsburgh, for example, writes that in the 
late 1990s, “momentum in arms control and non-proliferation began to stall” especially 
as concern mounted in Washington about possible nuclear threats.188 In addition, many 
experts emphasise that the tests were a result of preparation and support across political 
party lines, not just due to the BJP election platform.189 A public pretext for the testing 
existed in the form of a Pakistani nuclear-capable missile test in April 1998.190 
However, former Indian officials recall that while there were convenient pretexts, India 
had become more accepting of the costs of testing, now that the price of not testing was 
becoming more and more apparent.  
 
In this case study, two ways that we can observe enhanced status-seeking in action are 
the distinct prioritisation of India’s autonomy as a status goal, compared with normative 
roles, and in a noticeably changed cost-benefit calculation about testing. These are both 
direct results of the way that the status crisis delivered new information that crystallised 
new beliefs about status-seeking.  
 
The prioritisation of strategic autonomy over normative roles is a telling example of the 
hardening consensus in favour of testing. It is possible to observe that India’s long-term 
commitment to a role as moral exemplar became sharply diminished once the arms 
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control treaties imposed a serious threat toward the goal of autonomy. Raj Chengappa 
emphasised that by 1998, the tests enjoyed consensus support “across the political 
spectrum.”191 Stephen Cohen explains that while Indian elites held a long-term distaste 
of nuclear weapons, the NPT extension and the CTBT were perceived as so hypocritical 
that these elites shifted the burden of moral opprobrium to the established nuclear 
states.192 In a telling example, Cohen refers to the dramatic change in attitudes of 
Vajpayee’s Defence Minister, George Fernandes. Cohen recounts that Fernandes had 
been anti-nuclear his entire career, right up until the parliamentary debate on the CTBT 
in July 1996. But the formulation of the CTBT was unthinkably threatening to almost 
all Indian security experts whose chief goal, Cohen writes, “was to retain the option, not 
to exercise it or abandon it.” While Fernandes was morally opposed to nuclear weapons 
“the pressure from the five nuclear ‘haves’ was even more obnoxious,” Cohen 
observes.193 It was argued above that the need to balance concurrent status goals 
ensured that prestige-building toward any one goal would always be moderated by the 
others. With this balance upturned, India moved rapidly toward a sharp break with the 
past by taking the risk of testing. 
 
Alongside the shift in the balance of status goals, the enhanced status-seeking phase was 
characterised by a new cost-benefit analysis of the tests. Indian experts widely observed 
that the arms control treaties had dramatically increased the cost of inaction on testing. 
Encapsulating the view, C. Raja Mohan notes that India “was paying a price already - so 
it was worth putting a little more pressure to win your place in the international 
system.”194 Former senior security official Leela K Ponappa said the question for India 
was “How are you perceived? If you don’t have a security capacity you are perceived 
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differently.” Status was relevant “not in a simple sense of prestige,” but “[India’s] self-
image and the way others perceived India was the common strand” leading to the 
decision to test. She added: “From the 1980s, the perception was a country the size of 
India must have its economic capacity, and also its security and defence capacity, and 
the nuclear tests were a part of that.”195 Lalit Mansingh said about India before and after 
the tests: “ If we hadn’t tested we’d be a much more modest power; a B-grade version 
of Japan.”196  
 
That the three large nuclear explosions took place on 11 May 1998 was significant, as it 
was three years to the day since the much-resented indefinite extension of the NPT. The 
course of events after the test of 11 and 13 May 1998 were also of relevance, because 
they continued to demonstrate the parameters of the enhanced status-seeking phase. 
Rakesh Sood noted that the testing decision was important “in terms of national self-
perception, it changed the perception [of India] from being a country with the ‘option’, 
to a country with nuclear weapons. It became something like drawing a line.”197 In 
addition, Rajiv Sikri mentioned that while Vajpayee had demonstrated “political will 
and the willingness to take risks”, his moratorium on further tests “showed Vajpayee 
wanted to make a point but didn’t want the situation to escalate or get out of control.”198 
These were useful indications that even the enhanced status-seeking period did not 
mean an unlimited appetite for risk. Decisions were still being taken on a cost-benefit 
basis, simply one that accepted more risk compared with the situation before the crisis. 
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Notes on findings 
 
A key finding of this case study is that crises of status have an effect on status 
calculations which can be quite different from that predicted by the existing literature on 
status in IR. The reason for this can be seen in a summary of the case. In this episode, 
perceptions of the impact of the arms control treaties, especially the entry into force 
provisions of the CTBT, led New Delhi to revalue the prestige qualities of nuclear 
weapons. As noted above, the CTBT in particular was perceived as so unreasonable that 
normative or moral opposition to testing diminished. As a result, relatively speaking, a 
decision to test would no longer carry such a high cost to India’s concurrent ambitions 
of being a moral leader in world politics. In the second effect of the crisis, the entry into 
force of the CTBT was perceived as carrying a high cost, which would be borne by 
India even if it did not test. Again, even if nuclear testing continued to carry the risk of 
international sanctions, their relative cost was reduced when compared with what had 
been revealed about the cost of inaction.  
 
This pattern of events led to specific outcomes. Prime Minister Vajpayee conducted the 
nuclear tests, but then declared a moratorium on further testing. India proved to be 
highly receptive to negotiations with Washington and while the international security 
environment was conducive, both sides moved rapidly to the 2005 bilateral nuclear 
security agreement. To a degree, the tests represented a continuation of Nehruvian 
pragmatism: an abrupt break with international expectations at the time, but in fact 
allowing India to protect longstanding status aspirations. After the tests, these 
aspirations remained alive, and India turned from a protester to a supporter of the global 
 253 
nuclear order, and power and legitimacy remained intertwined at the centre of Indian 
international relations. 
 
The above summary indicates that a status crisis leads to a phase of new status-related 
calculations, but not a complete overturning of the basis for the state’s status-seeking. 
For India, the crisis forced a move to more abrupt and assertive status-seeking, but once 
this was done, India could be seen returning to a similar course to its previous, “normal” 
status-seeking phase. This marks a significant difference from existing literature that 
assumes that states that seek higher status recognition may instigate conflict.199 The 
example of 1998 shows that even a case study of nuclear weapons does not indicate that 
status dissatisfaction need be translated into international conflict. Rather, a dissatisfied 
state may take more assertive and costly policy decisions, but these decisions are still 




The literature on this case extensively canvasses status and prestige, national security, 
and domestic political explanations for the Pokhran II tests, yet remains at an impasse 
over which explanations should be favoured. The case analysis aimed to cut through 
this by addressing puzzles around how status concerns influenced policy decisions, 
particularly around the timing of the tests. The findings showed that India did conduct 
its status-seeking in a normal, cautious phase, balancing not only costs and benefits of 
prestige-building policies, but also balancing different kinds of status ambitions. The 
status crisis around the arms control treaties not only forced a revaluation of costs and 
benefits, but also narrowed Indian status-seeking to concentrate on the sphere of 
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national autonomy. The result was an abrupt phase of enhanced prestige-building in the 
form of the decision to test. It was notable that with the status goal achieved, prestige-
building returned to a more normal pattern. This concludes three case studies, each of 
which have shown a pattern of status-seeking in which states have reacted to status 
crises in ways that meet their unique status ambitions. The following conclusion brings 
together these findings, considers the puzzles and literature gaps and whether they have 







Results of the project 
 
This project began by asking how and when status acts as a variable in policy outcomes. 
It couched that question in the context of contemporary global power shifts, which are 
undermining old certainties and making relative status an increasingly important 
question in IR. Status is particularly important because it is so frequently raised as a 
possible cause of conflict in this uncertain world order. The thesis aimed to provide a 
more operationalised causal chain between perceptions of status and policy outcomes. 
In pursuing this more fine-grained approach, the thesis looked to the role of status as a 
variable, to compare status perceptions with other causal factors, and to examine case 
studies in the Asian region, arguably the epicentre of today’s power transition.  
 
The core finding of this project in a nutshell is that the causal variable is a change in 
status perceptions brought on by a status crisis. Decision-makers perceive the crisis as a 
threat to status recognition, so they then shift their assessments to accept bolder policies 
to protect their status ambitions.  
 
To outline the findings in more detail, the thesis outlined a three-phase approach to 
understanding status concerns. In the normal status-seeking phase, leaders have 
identified the status roles their country should pursue, and effort is allocated to activities 
judged to build prestige in order to secure recognition for the desired status. In the cases 
analysed in the preceding chapters, this process had been established for a number of 
years, and was marked by a conservative allocation of resources and risk-return 
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uncertainty forces a revaluation of the state’s status self-perceptions. The cases 
highlighted that this crisis frequently reveals or highlights key information, which 
further prompts these revaluations. In the final phase of enhanced status seeking, states 
pursue the same status goals but with a greater appetite for risk. The cases showed 
examples emphasising the provocative, assertive, but also sometimes counter-intuitive 
nature of the new approach. 
 
The case studies were used to look for the role of status as a causal factor in events, and 
the research was narrowly focused on this question. As a result, there were many 
puzzles involving status in IR that the project was “not” about: it used cases where 
status concerns was already considered likely to have played a role, rather than trying to 
find out whether status concerns were present; it was about how status worked, not 
whether status was the leading or only cause of events; and it was about self-perceptions 
of status as a factor in policy outcomes, not the effects of the perceptions of others or 
whether the state won or lost status due to the events of the case study. Having set all 
those aside, what the narrow focus did allow was the chance to identify one major 
causal process. The thesis’ central argument about the role of status crises outlines a 
process involving status concerns as a causal factor, that works in specific ways that can 
be empirically analysed and theorised more generally. 
 
 
Review of findings 
 
The following review of findings includes a brief summary of the findings of the three 
country cases, involving Japan, China and India. In addition, two findings are reviewed 
that were observed across all the cases: the importance of medium-term context in terms 
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of the onset of status crises; and the role of conflicting internal and external agendas 
upon the effectiveness of national responses to status concerns. 
 
Findings of each case 
 
Japan and the United Nations Security Council, 1992-93:  
This case built on the idea that Japanese cultural factors, the history of international 
status playing an important domestic political function, and sharp variations in material 
circumstances since modernisation all meant that Tokyo’s status-seeking was focused 
on international institutions. The balance between seeking “dignity”, recognition of 
achievements, and maintaining domestic agendas meant that the prize of a permanent 
UNSC seat was pursued conservatively. The status crisis that arose after the 1990-91 
Gulf War was shown to have revealed significant new information: the ineffectiveness 
of Japan’s strategies to that date; the new power and influence of the UNSC in world 
politics; and the potential for a UNSC role to spearhead wider domestic political 
reforms back in Japan. The case highlighted the more provocative strategy that followed 
during the 1992-93 intensification of Japan’s UNSC bid.  
 
A key finding of the Japan case study was that the status crisis played a critical role in 
revealing information that influenced status perceptions. In line with Rose and 
Friedberg’s conceptualisation of crises as “perceptual shocks”,1 the post-Gulf War crisis 
for Japan’s status forced decision-makers to reassess both the benefits and the costs of a 
permanent UNSC seat. The crisis revealed that the Security Council had become a 
powerful actor in world politics, with its veto-wielding permanent members now 
holding real power over global security. For Japan, permanent membership would 
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rectify the humiliation of being sidelined during the Gulf War, and hand it a major 
international roles which could flow back to encourage a domestic reform agenda. But 
the case study showed that the process of securing status recognition through the UNSC 
seat would also require Japan to accept commensurate international responsibility. The 
latter would be no surprise to scholars in the English School tradition who have long 
emphasised that great powers achieve status recognition by consequence of assuming 
significant burdens, especially the provision of public goods such as international 
security.2 But it was fatal to the bid that Japan’s domestic political system was not yet 
ready for the burden of status. Even though the crisis had caused many decision-makers 
to embrace a more assertive and provocative UNSC bid, the risks were too high for an 
ill-prepared Japanese polity to accept, and the bid was allowed to lose momentum. 
 
China and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 1996:  
This case began with a focus on China’s pursuit of status roles as an emerging great 
power and a leader of the developing world. A key part of the narrative was the way the 
additional role of legitimate nuclear weapons state influenced both the first two roles. In 
the decade from 1979, China had gradually changed its attitude toward arms control and 
the nonproliferation regime from outright rejection to acceptance of nonproliferation 
norms. The effect of the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident on China’s status was 
dramatic, and prompted a much wider engagement with international institutions in 
order to protect the domestic economic reform agenda. The literature on the effects of 
Tiananmen is extensive and addresses concepts such as the greater socialisation of 
Chinese decision-makers, but a gap remained as to why those decision-makers were so 
concerned about international pressure, which had not previously restrained their 
behaviour. 
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The Tiananmen incident was the clear cause of a status crisis, although the effects were 
more drawn-out than in the other cases. Beijing responded at first defensively, then 
around 1993 saw positive signs in the end of the MFN-human rights linkage issue, then 
in 1995 saw a return of acute threats to status. However, the 1995-96 issues showed that 
China’s status roles could be threatened in two ways: the upsurge in “China threat” 
debates due to the tensions on the Taiwan Strait indicated perceptions that China’s 
status role as a legitimate great power were in jeopardy; meanwhile, the unprecedented 
wave of criticism from non-aligned countries over nuclear testing was a similar threat to 
the role of leader of the developing world. The fact that China ultimately agreed to bind 
itself by signing the costly treaty was an action that existing status literature would 
associate with the behaviour of a legitimate major power. John Ikenberry notes that 
newly emerged power imbalances need special efforts to restore order; new major 
powers therefore agree to “restrain power, reassure weaker potential rivals, and 
establish commitments.”3 It was arguably an outcome of the status crisis that China 
recognised the need to behave in this way. The case study therefore contributed to the 
existing literature by demonstrating the role of a status crisis in changing Chinese 
perceptions of its status roles. 
 
India and the Pokhran II nuclear tests, 1998:  
The final case study examined India in the pursuit of multiple status roles, in particular 
those of aspirant great power and of normative exemplar. It emphasised that India had 
pursued various aspects of prestige, including forms of autonomy and a longstanding 
nuclear research program. The case highlighted that the balance between these roles 
ensured moderation in the pursuit of each. The case put the decision in the context of 
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the immediate post-Cold War period, when India was sensitive to status concerns thanks 
to economic difficulties and the demise of the Soviet Union. New Delhi then perceived 
a threat to its status as the indefinite extension of the NPT and the entry into force 
provisions of the CTBT threatened to curtail its nuclear program. Indian elites 
considered this to be tantamount to cutting off India’s future as an autonomous great 
power. The conclusion of CTBT negotiations put urgent pressure on India, and 
demonstrated that there would be a significant cost of inaction.  
 
A key finding of the case concerned the effect that the status crisis had upon domestic 
political opinion and as a result India’s status choices. India had valued autonomy and, 
for a combination of pragmatic and moralistic reasons, had long been a strong voice 
against nuclear weapons. But the status crisis saw a strong consensus emerge in India in 
favour of autonomy represented by a declaration of being a nuclear weapons state. This 
can be conceptualised as a narrowing of status objectives; with status goals no longer 





Two additional themes recurred across the case studies and are detailed here. They are 
not included within the central argument of the thesis, but they may describe permissive 
conditions that allowed status concerns to play the roles observed in the cases. 
 
One general finding was that status crises occurred after periods in which decision-
makers perceived themselves to be operating in a less hospitable international 
environment. The backdrop to each case showed a similar situation where each state 
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was involved in a medium-term (5-10 year) period of international decline, pressure or 
uncertainty. It is true that there is an element of case selection bias involved in this issue 
because one of the reasons the cases were chosen was because of their early post-Cold 
War time period. This was deliberate on account of the significant changes to global 
polarity at that time that could be expected to expose new status roles and situations. 
However, there was consistency in that the states were mostly facing similar negative 
situations. India had experienced the shock of losing its major ally, the USSR, and was 
suffering a prolonged economic crisis which Indian officials close to Prime Minister 
Rao considered to be a real factor in the decision to postpone nuclear tests in 1995. For 
Japan, the feeling that the Gulf War was just a taste of the problems facing the country 
was highlighted in the Ozawa report, which considered that a wholesale policy of 
reform was necessary for Japan to defend its hard-won prosperity. In China’s case, this 
medium-term period of uncertainty was subsumed into the status crisis itself. While the 
case study emphasised spikes in status concerns during 1995-96, it is clear that the crisis 
overall for China began in 1989. Nevertheless, it must be stressed that China’s status 
crisis was so serious because it was brought on by a combination of Tiananmen and the 
fall of the USSR, not the former alone. Looking at all three cases, it is clear that a 
greater context of vulnerability or uncertainty played a major role in making the status 
crises so serious. 
 
A second general finding concerns internal and external influences on national 
responses to the status crisis. The cases revealed interesting contrasts between these 
influences: in Japan, efforts to enhance pursuit of the UNSC bid ran into not only 
external opposition, but also internal resistance. India’s situation was the reverse, with 
international opposition to its nuclear testing outweighed by what became strong 
domestic consensus in favour. China, meanwhile, enjoyed both domestic (the backing 
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of most bureaucratic actors including the scientific establishment, although not the 
military) and international support for signing the CTBT, which made it easier for 
decision-makers to accept a treaty that carried security costs. The detail of the findings 
helps address the question of why, given the zero-sum nature of status, status-seeking 
ever encounters domestic opposition or wins international support. Domestic 
opposition, in the Japanese case, arose because the status crisis was so effective at 
revealing information and forcing a revaluation of the UNSC seat’s value that domestic 
constituencies concluded that the prize came at too high a price. International support 
for China’s bid occurred because China had become established within a status role as a 
leader of the developing world and as an aspiring legitimate great power. It was not 
only in the interest of the developing world to encourage China to continue in that role, 
but also for the West to encourage China to continue on a path to “responsibility”. 





The status crisis is the central event that forces the revaluation of status perceptions. As 
an independent variable, this change in perception of status is what drives outcomes in 
the form of new policies on status-seeking – in these cases, in the form of enhanced 
status seeking to rectify the negative impact of an unexpected shock. In the three cases 
studied, the change of perceptions took multiple practical forms. These included: the 
effect of clarifying the multiple status roles that a state might simultaneously pursue; 
serving to reveal new information that significantly affects values and choices regarding 
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status-seeking strategies; and shifting domestic political factors to make new 
calculations of status interests possible. 
 
Clarifying multiple roles 
 
A key finding is that states’ multiple status roles made a significant difference to the 
outcome of the cases. It was noted earlier in the thesis that recognition for status may 
come in the form of membership of various privileged groups.4  These groups represent 
countless role identities, and many are associated with status ambitions. For example, in 
one study K.J. Holsti counted no fewer than 17 types of “national role conceptions,” 
such as regional leader, “bastion of revolution-liberator”, “active independent,” and so 
on. Holsti recognised that states could have multiple roles and, for example, assigned 
five roles to Canada.5 Indeed the fact that states may have multiple simultaneous roles 
has been theorised as “role strain”: “Social actors often exhibit role conflict when they 
hold multiple social identities and there are contrary expectations attached to some 
positions in a social relationship.”6  
 
In this study, however, the outcome of multiple status roles or identity-holding did not 
appear to be strain so much as conservatism. It would be inevitable that some of the 
roles proposed by Holsti would be thrust upon states somewhat unwillingly. But this 
study was focused on valued status roles that states chose to pursue with some 
deliberation. The result was not contradiction but an apparent awareness of the trade-
offs required in order to work toward multiple roles concurrently. This became a self-
                                                
4 See the list by Clunan at p.10, and discussion of major powers at pp.53-57 above. 
5 K.J. Holsti, ‘National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy,’ International Studies Quarterly 
14, no. 3 (1970): 256. 
6 Bruce Cronin, ‘The Paradox of Hegemony: America's Ambiguous Relationship with the United 
Nations,’ European Journal of International Relations 7, no. 1 (2001): 111. 
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moderating activity as states would not allow the pursuit of one status goal to drain 
resources from another or put another at risk. This helps to explain the risk-averse and 
incremental nature of the normal status-seeking phase. 
 
The status crisis disrupts this naturally self-balancing process.7 Decision-makers find 
their state’s interests more sharply clarified by the crisis, helping to define which status 
goals should have priority. Gradual or long-term changes are suddenly revealed, 
indicating whether longstanding goals should be jettisoned or reprioritised. Internal 
disagreements are subdued and actors become more willing to innovate in status goals. 
As with other aspects of crises, the threat of loss makes decision-makers more acceptant 
of risks.8 As an example, in the Indian case study it was remarkable to see rival political 
parties, and even individual politicians with a lifetime of anti-nuclear activism behind 
them, swing behind support for the single goal of Indian autonomous status. Once the 
crisis had overtaken trade-offs and balance, the state could pursue a single goal far more 
boldy than before. 
 
Crisis as a discovery process 
 
One of the most interesting findings of the project concerned the importance of the 
status crisis as a point of information discovery. It was explained in the conceptual 
framework that a crisis can be expected to act as a “perceptual shock”, revealing 
preferences, crystallising long-term changes in circumstances, and forcing new 
valuations based on more clearly demonstrated action. What was interesting was the 
finding about just how many kinds of information would be involved. These included: 
forcing revaluation of prestige-building strategies, including whether the objectives 
                                                
7 For the status crisis, see p.19, and for characteristics of crises see pp.95-98 above. 
8 See the discussion of prospect theory below. 
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carried high costs as well as benefits; revealing the extent of threats brought on by the 
status crisis, and therefore the costs of not taking action; the ineffectiveness of existing 
strategies; the actor’s changed status roles; and the position of different bureaucratic 
players. This was particularly important considering that the independent variable of the 
study, changed perceptions of status, did not require discovery of a state’s exact status – 




That domestic politics should be a significant intervening variable is not a surprise to 
the scholarship on status, or indeed in IR in general. The surprising aspect was the 
specific role that domestic politics played. The existing literature assumes that national 
status is felt by domestic audiences in the form of positive feelings, so they should 
encourage prestige-building policies. Pu and Schweller’s chapter on conspicuous 
consumption as an example of a two-level game is typical of this. Instead, domestic 
constituencies behaved in different ways. To be sure, the China case was not surprising 
on the issue. The case study noted that most domestic constituencies had lined up 
behind the CTBT, smoothing the way to the decision to sign. However, the Japanese 
and Indian cases showed interesting roles of domestic politics. 
 
In the Japan case, the crisis around the Gulf War caused an overall revaluing of a 
permanent UNSC seat. It had a complex interaction with domestic politics. First, 
politicians saw the opportunity to continue a longstanding practice of using external 
political pressures as justification for contentious reform programs at home. As the Gulf 
War revealed the Security Council to be, compared with during the Cold War, a more 
significant actor in world politics, it was held up as a major vehicle for far-reaching 
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domestic political reform. Second, the same revelations about the Council’s role 
convinced many in Japan that membership would not simply deliver diplomatic 
privilege, but would also demand a high level of responsibility in the form of 
contributions to peacekeeping operations. As noted above in regards to national role 
conceptions, to be a permanent member of an activist UNSC would indeed bring 
significant status, but the status role would also have to be emphatically performed for 
status recognition to be maintained. This was a case where the information-revealing 
aspects of the status crisis caused domestic audiences to deem a status goal no longer to 
meet a cost-benefit equation. Third, behaviour appeared to be influenced by 
bureaucratic politics. The Foreign Ministry had argued for the UNSC bid for many 
years, yet the Gulf crisis revealed that its strategy in the UN had been quite ineffective. 
Stung by the criticism, the Ministry became the strongest advocate for the bid and 
pushed it hard during 1992-93. It was an interesting example of the prestige of a 




Implications of findings 
 
Implications for scholarly IR 
 
There are several implications of the findings for IR scholarship. These concern the 
study of prestige and status themselves; concern about authority and hierarchy; 
clarifying instrumental or inherent motivations; and the field of social identity theory 
(SIT). There were also several concepts that the findings showed could be valuable but 
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were not topics of this project, and they are discussed below under the heading of 
potential future research. 
 
The use of prestige and status as causal factors immediately encountered the debate 
about whether these are measurable, or indeed are simply references to other IR 
concepts such as power. The key distinction is that while both are intersubjective ideas, 
prestige is a higher order of belief and is arrived at through judgements about the beliefs 
of others, not a single actor’s assessments. This has significant implications for the way 
the subject is studied in IR. For example, the case findings were broadly in line with the 
concepts outlined from the existing literature about states trying to attain prestige 
related to diverse positive attributes. Each of the three case studies showed that there are 
as many forms of prestige-building as there are status roles to claim. The question 
therefore is not whether a particular policy actually delivers perceptions of positive 
value, but whether observers think the community of observers is likely to view the 
policy as delivering positive value. This means that the subject of investigation is not 
only the merits of the policy, but how easily it can be observed, and whether observers 
believe that it can be easily observed.  
 
Some scholars, such as Renshon, highlight war as a “public, dramatic, and salient” 
event, which makes it a particularly strong candidate for an action that will alter status.9 
However, this thesis has studied a wide range of non-conflictual policies being 
employed in the pursuit of status. We have seen that status recognition is a form of 
negotiation, which states can influence through many prestige-building means such as 
their own claims to status, expenditure on costly status symbols, acquiring institutional 
privileges, or through policies other than war that are still public and communicate a 
                                                
9 Renshon, ‘Status Deficits and War,’ 534. 
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clean break with past positions. An overarching finding of the project is that this 
prestige-building normally involves trade-offs with other state goals, or indeed among 
competing status goals. Put this way, it is clear that war is a dramatic policy solution 
that involves enormous costs and risks. There is no doubt that states have historically 
accepted such a gamble in the pursuit of status. However, we should consider that in the 
contemporary world, where war is increasingly uncommon, states would consider a 
very wide range of possibilities before embarking on war for status purposes.10 The 
thesis demonstrated just a few of the possibilities that are available. 
 
The findings provide one way to address the major claim in the literature that “the 
search for status will cause people to behave in ways that directly contradict their 
material interest in security and/or prosperity.”11 The major finding was that status-
seeking was consistent with a model in which status is sought because it establishes 
general expectations about deference. In each of the case studies, the status goal sought 
would come at some economic or national security cost. To take just the Indian 
example, a good deal of literature argues that nuclear testing was harmful in national 
security terms.12 But decision-makers saw a clear national benefit: for instance, the 
former Indian Foreign Secretary Salman Haider said that thanks to the tests “we are 
now members at the top table… people feel more confident.”13 It was clear that India 
had pursued non-alignment and normative leadership under some guise since 
independence as a pragmatic way for a poor, developing country to guard its 
sovereignty. 
 
                                                
10 For a study of the decreasing occurrence of war, see: John Mueller, ‘War Has Almost Ceased to Exist: 
An Assessment,’ Political Science Quarterly 124, no. 2 (2009). 
11 Discussed at p.62 above. Wohlforth, ‘Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War,’ 35. 
12 Discussed at p.207 above, see: Mistry, ‘The Unrealized Promise of International Institutions.’ 
13 Salman Haider, interview by the author, 14 September, 2016. 
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Similar points could be made about the other cases: Japanese interest in prestigious 
institutional roles stemmed from the need to active promote what it believed to be its 
“achieved status”, because Japan’s material circumstances changed so rapidly; likewise, 
China needed to neutralise the “China threat” issue in order to maintain unimpeded 
domestic economic growth, vital to regime survival.  
 
Overall, this finding suggests that IR should consider the pursuit of prestige and status 
as complementary rather than contradictory to security and prosperity. Establishing 
favourable expectations of deference is one way states would ensure long-term security 
and prosperity. This is no different from the way that any state guards its security to 
ensure prosperity and vice-versa. All form part of the trade-offs that are necessary in 
any kind of foreign policymaking. 
 
Addressing the key theme of social identity theory (SIT), the thesis found the various 
status-seeking strategies the theory proposes to be quite useful. Much of the behaviour 
observed in the cases was consistent with SIT concepts such as social competition, 
emulation and creativity. Creative approaches to status indeed appeared to be the main 
way that states looked to overcome major status obstacles. India, for example, had 
pursued the creative strategy of non-aligned leadership for many decades, avoiding 
either subordination to or direct competition with the major powers.  
 
On the other hand, the study did not find specific support for SIT’s propositions 
regarding the motivations for seeking status. In each of the case studies, the prospect of 
establishing expectations of deference appeared to be more immediate motivations for 
status-seeking. In addition, SIT proposes that people are motivated by gaining self-
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esteem from attaining high status for their group relative to others,14 but some of the 
findings contradicted this. For example, SIT suggests that domestic audiences would be 
strong proponents of status-seeking policies. In the Japan case study, however, domestic 
audiences proved to have the reverse role. Rather than strongly advocating for Japan to 
win recognition with the prize of a UNSC seat, domestic constituencies were concerned 
about the costs involved, and their pressure was a reason why Japan shrank from its bid.  
 
The explanation for this finding can be found when we place status in the wider context 
with which it has been studied in IR, rather than leaning too heavily on findings in 
social psychology. Rather than just seeing status as a provider of self-esteem, IR has 
long been aware that “with great power comes great responsibility.”15 High status in IR 
is not merely a claim but a recognition, and a community will not surrender privileges 
to a high-status aspirant unless the latter performs services such as building order, 
providing international public goods, and preserving security. It appeared that Japanese 
domestic audiences were capable of assessing both the costs and benefits of the UNSC 
role, which was why it was unable to gain consensus support in Japan at the time. 
 
Implications for policy 
 
Scholarly IR concepts and theories are thoroughly avoided by most policymakers, yet as 
Robert Keohane writes, they are impossible to avoid because “reality has to be ordered 
into categories, and relationships drawn between events.”16 For its part, this research 
project has applied existing scholarly literature on status to three real-world case 
studies, in which policymakers applied themselves to status concerns to the best of their 
                                                
14 See pp.63-64 above. 
15 Quoting David Lake: see p.56, note 68. 
16 Robert O. Keohane, 'Realism, Neorealism and the Study of World Politics,' in Neorealism and Its 
Critics, ed. Robert O. Keohane (Columbia University Press, 1986), 4. 
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ability. The topics that carry the greatest implications for policy are to do with the fact 
that this project has been a study of crises. Policymakers may not be overly concerned 
with IR theories, but they do worry about crises: Lebow refers to the “intense 
psychological strain” of crises; while Allison refers to the way that while learning 
occurs gradually over time, “dramatic organizational change occurs in response to 
major crises.”17  
 
Some lessons from this research could aid policymakers in anticipating or at least 
managing situations of status crisis. The first is that status crises are mostly preceded by 
periods of perceived vulnerability. As examples, the Suez crisis was so serious for 
British and French prestige because both countries had faced a serious decline in their 
material circumstances post-war. For a contemporary example, it is worth noting the 
literature that suggests China believes US prestige has been in decline since the Global 
Financial Crisis.18 Future scenarios could involve a stalling in Chinese economic growth 
or a contraction in the Japanese economy. Security-related concerns could involve a 
Japan left isolated by a less engaged United States, or India constrained between China 
and nuclear-armed Pakistan. These would make the three states again vulnerable to a 
status crisis. 
 
Policymakers need also to be aware that states can be difficult to escape from or ignore 
status roles. The reason for this is that status is conferred by recognition, but as noted 
above, recognition involves the full range of expectations, not only of deference but also 
of responsibility. As Cameron Thies argues, “If states attempt to adopt foreign policy 
                                                
17 Lebow, Between Peace and War, 12; Graham T. Allison, ‘Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile 
Crisis,’ American Political Science Review 63, no. 3 (1969): 698. 
18 David Shambaugh, 'Chinese Thinking About World Order,' in China and the International System : 
Becoming a World Power, ed. Xiaoming Huang and Robert G. Patman (Routledge, 2013), 26; Dingding 
Chen, Xiaoyu Pu, and Alastair Iain Johnston, ‘Debating China's Assertiveness,’ International Security 38, 
no. 3 (2014): 179. 
 272 
roles that are inconsistent with their master status, then socialisation activity will occur 
on behalf of structure to prevent the enactment of these roles.”19 An example in the case 
studies was China’s situation during the final negotiation of the CTBT. While China 
was not yet formally constrained by the treaty, it had developed a status role as a leader 
of the developing world, which was intensely supportive of nuclear nonproliferation and 
arms control.  
 
This topic lends itself to hypothetical policy scenarios. One of the most important in the 
contemporary context would be any crisis that threatens China’s rise. The backdrop for 
such a scenario would likely be a medium-term deterioration in China’s position 
relative to the international environment. This might involve an economic slowdown or 
it could involve a pattern of regional powers shifting to balance or contain China. A 
status crisis would then threaten a key status goal such as the role of regional great 
power in Asia. Nick Bisley has explained that China is unlikely to be satisfied with 
demands it accept US primacy: “The century of shame and humiliation retains strong 
political salience because of its role in the CCP’s domestic narrative. For Beijing, 
finding a regional order with which it’s content requires those deeper issues of prestige 
and honour to be satisfied, as well as its interests.”20 The lessons of this thesis are that 
while the response to a status crisis need not involve war, it is likely to involve more 
provocative and risky policy choices.  
 
The way of avoiding such an outcome, meanwhile, would be a form of status 
accommodation.21 While major power transitions need not be peaceful, there are also 
strong incentives for rising powers not to disrupt the status quo. Ikenberry has noted 
                                                
19 Cameron G. Thies, The United States, Israel and the Search for International Order : Socializing 
States, Role Theory and International Relations (New York, New York: Routledge, 2013), 46. 
20 Nick Bisley, 'Honour, Prestige and Restraint,' The Strategist, 4 August 2014. 
21 See p.66 above. 
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that rising powers may find it attractive to adopt status quo institutions because their 
“stickiness” is just as beneficial for new powers as it is for old ones.22 The key to this is 
to have institutions that are sufficiently open that they can adjust to meet the status 
aspirations of the rising power. Flexible institutions are beneficial for both sides because 
they let the existing hegemon accommodate the rising power’s status concerns.23 
 
 




A key aspect of each of the case studies was a narrative in which crises threatened status 
aspirations. The project noted that these status aspirations are the product of history and 
culture, but further research could go further to try to locate the source of status beliefs. 
Existing IR research programs have looked at beliefs both from the point of view of 
individual mind-sets, and in terms of national cultures.   
 
At the individual level, IR and strategic studies have long studied decision-makers’ 
beliefs under the heading of “operational codes” (which could also be called ‘world-
views’, Weltanschauung, or “cognitive maps”).24 As revised and presented by 
Alexander George, Stephen Walker and others, an operational code is a way a decision-
maker’s beliefs can be classified according to both their broad philosophy of the nature 
                                                
22 Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan. 
23 T. V. Paul and Mahesh Shankar, 'Status Accommodation through Institutional Means: India’s Rise and 
the Global Order,' in Status in World Politics, ed. T. V. Paul, Deborah Welch Larson, and William C. 
Wohlforth (Cambridge University Press, 2014), 175. 
24 Alexander L. George, ‘The "Operational Code": A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political 
Leaders and Decision-Making,’ International Studies Quarterly 13, no. 2 (1969): 197. 
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of politics and conflict, and their more pragmatic beliefs about how to effectively solve 
political problems.  
 
The idea of an “operational code” dates from early Cold War efforts to discover the 
rules followed by Soviet leaders in international conduct.25 In 1969, Alexander George 
revived the term with a much broader meaning, referring to the way that foreign 
policymakers direct policy not so much at the outside world, but at the “image of the 
outside world” that exists in their minds.26 
They serve, as it were, as a prism that influences the actor’s perceptions and diagnoses 
of the flow of political events, his definitions and estimates of particular situations. 
These beliefs also provide norms, standards, and guidelines that influence the actor's 
choice of strategy and tactics, his structuring and weighing of alternative courses of 
action. Such a belief system influences, but does not unilaterally determine, decision-
making; it is an important, but not the only, variable that shapes decision-making 
behavior.27 
George applied the term very generally to politics. It encompassed “central” beliefs 
which, unlike attitudes to immediate problems, “are concerned with fundamental, 
unchanging issues of politics and political action.”28 These codes or “cognitive maps” of 
the world consisted of the policymaker’s core beliefs about history and the nature of 
politics, which regularly intrude upon practical problem-solving. 
 
As described, these cognitive maps take the form of intervening variables between 
events and policy decisions, and in that way correspond to the neoclassical realist 
paradigm. As guides to decision-makers’ thinking about fundamental matters of 
politics, they have considerable relevance to the idea that decisions would fit into 
underlying beliefs about a state’s status roles.  
                                                
25 Nathan Leites, The Operational Code of the Politburo (New York: RAND Corporation/McGraw-Hill 
Book Company, 1951), xi. 
26 George, ‘The "Operational Code",’ 190-91.  
27 Ibid. 
28 Alexander L. George, 'The Causal Nexus between Cognitive Beliefs and Decision-Making Behaviour: 
The ‘Operational Code’ Belief System,' in Psychological Models in International Politics, ed. Lawrence 
S. Falkowski (Boulder: Westview Press, 1979), 99. 
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Indeed the literature states that operational code beliefs are especially relevant in 
uncertain situations where leaders face scarce or contradictory information, and stressful 
situations where decision-makers are pressured or under emotional strain.29 They help 
decision-makers cope with the limits of rational decision-making: assisting them when 
information is incomplete, it is difficult to balance ends with means, or they cannot 
reliably determined the criteria for the best course of action.30 These would all be 
consistent with decision-making under conditions of a status crisis.  
 
Whereas operational codes concern deeply-held beliefs of individuals, an alternative 
approach to beliefs is to say that the behaviour of states is shaped by its culture. With a 
focus on security behaviour, this is known as “strategic culture”, which is typically seen 
as adding another layer of causation to strategic decisions; while traditional variables 
such as material factors and the role of individuals remain important, strategic culture 
gives “context to how elite decision-makers “understand their strategic environment and 
the value, purpose, and limitations ascribed to their national power.”31  
 
The literature on strategic culture proposes that each state has a possibly unique 
“cognitive inheritance”, with sources ranging from macro-societal factors such as 
geography, history and culture, to the nature of the state, such as its regime type, 
economy, and worldview of elites, to intra-state elements such as its institutions and the 
nature of civil-military relations.32 In addition, just as we saw that operational codes 
                                                
29 Stephen G Walker, ‘The Motivational Foundations of Political Belief Systems: A Re-Analysis of the 
Operational Code Construct,’ International Studies Quarterly 27, no. 2 (1983): 180. 
30 George, ‘The "Operational Code",’ 197-98. 
31 Ashley J. Tellis, 'Understanding Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific,' in Strategic Asia 2016-17: 
Understanding Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific, ed. Ashley J. Tellis (Seattle: National Bureau of 
Asian Research, 2016), 7. 
32 Ibid., 8, 18-19. 
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could bound the rationality of leaders in difficult or novel situations, cultural factors can 
help to bridge the gaps between rational choice theories and outcomes seen in real-
world cases.  
 
The major difficulties with both individual-level operational codes and society-level 
strategic cultures is that it is hard to determine causality. For example, it can be hard to 
find any decision that is not explained by strategic culture, or to what extent it is 
determined by that or other variables. Even with considerable methodological work by 
Johnston,33 it remains unclear whether culture can even be separated as a variable in the 
analysis of behaviour.34 Colin Gray, for example, argues that instead it is better to 
simply understand culture surrounding and weaving together all decisions.35  
 
It would simplify the study of status if we could easily use operational codes or strategic 
cultures to predict the kinds of status goals decision-makers will choose. Unfortunately, 
separating these beliefs from other factors may be a fruitless task. In order to better 
understand status decisions, however, it is worth using one scholar’s verdict on cultural 
issues: strategic culture is useful if it “constitutes and gives meaning to the material 
variables that realist theories typically rely on for explanation.”36 There may be scope 
for further research into these topics, but it is likely that beliefs of these kinds are simply 
another way of explaining all foreign policy decisions.  
 
                                                
33 Alastair Iain Johnston, ‘Thinking About Strategic Culture,’ International Security 19, no. 4 (1995): 45. 
34 See: Gray, Modern Strategy, 129, 148. 
35 Ibid., 139. 
36 Stuart Poore, ‘What Is the Context? A Reply to the Gray-Johnston Debate on Strategic Culture,’ 
Review of International Studies 29, no. 2 (2003): 283. 
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National identity conceptions 
 
A more recent take on individual beliefs, which tries to answer questions similar to the 
ones investigated in this project, is Jacques Hyman’s idea of “national identity 
conceptions.” Hymans argues that big decisions, such as the acquisition of nuclear 
weapons, stem from more than just material cost-benefit calculations. Instead, Hymans 
build on the operational code literature to say that decisions – especially non-routine, 
uncertain, high-level ones – are made subject to leaders’ core values and 
“disposition.”37 These dispositions amount to national identity conceptions: “an 
individual’s understanding of the nation’s identity - his or her sense of what the nation 
naturally stands for and of how high it naturally stands, in comparison to others in the 
international arena.”38  
 
The national identity conception, Hymans argues, is not merely a biased perception of 
reality, but a belief about what is “natural”, such as a leader’s instinctive feeling about 
his or her country’s role. For instance, Charles de Gaulle declared an instinctive feeling 
that “France cannot be France without greatness.”39 Hymans sees national identity 
conceptions as both a personal belief that leaders absorb from wider debates, as well as 
(notably in the case of Nehru and India) an influence that they create and disseminate 
within their political community. He in turn argued that leaders consider national 
identity in comparison with other states, and then create a “national role conception”. 
Based on leaders’ beliefs about their nations’ status and competitiveness with the rest of 
                                                
37 Hymans, The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation, 17. 
38 Ibid., 18. Emphasis in original. 
39 Ibid., 19-20. 
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the world, Hymans created a typology of national behaviour on the subject of nuclear 
proliferation.40 
 
The questions that Hymans asks above are highly relevant to the study of status 
perceptions as a causal factor in policy. They outline a basic issue that frequently 
recurred in the fieldwork interviews for this project. Each of the case studies involved 
states that at least aspire to major power roles, yet to ask experts in each country, the 
answer was often similar to de Gaulle’s statement about France. This suggests that at 
some level, a combination of individual “codes”, culture, or concepts such as national 
identity conceptions help to form decision-makers’ mind-sets and influence policy 
outcomes.  
 
It remains, however, difficult to use these mind-sets to analyse decisions. Some scholars 
have commented that Hymans’ gives very similar results to the security model of 
international relations, albeit discussed in social-psychological terms.41 Still, further 





This study found that decision-makers have strong beliefs about their state’s standing as 
a starting point or benchmark that should be maintained. In addition, interviewees 
indicated that any threat to their state’s existing standing is taken seriously – suggesting 
that any fall in status is a serious concern. This immediately suggests a model in which 
                                                
40 Ibid., 21-25. 
41 A point made by Keir A. Lieber in reviewing Hymans. The Journal of Politics, Vol. 69, No. 1 (Feb., 
2007), pp. 254-256. 
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decision-makers seem much more concerned about losses than about gains, and this 
suggests links to the psychology literature about prospect theory. Prospect theory is a 
psychological model suggesting that actors value their existing goods more highly than 
goods they do not yet possess, so that they are relatively averse to losses. It is a theory 
that “individuals tend to be risk-averse in a domain of gains, or when things are going 
well, and relatively risk seeking in a domain of losses, as when a leader is in the middle 
of a crisis.”42 Relative to an actor’s reference point, the theory predicts that a 
prospective gain will seem of less value than a prospective loss, even if a so-called 
rational valuation of each should be the same.43  
 
Research in political psychology suggests leaders will take more risks to protect their 
international positions, including their reputations, than they would do to enhance these 
reputations. Indeed after suffering losses, leaders “have a tendency not to accommodate 
to those losses but instead to take excessive risks to recover them.”44 Meanwhile, Levy 
notes, states expend greater resources trying to defend a status quo against a particular 
loss, than they would trying to enhance their position by the same amount.45 The 
psychology behind this is simply that “losing hurts more than a comparable gain 
pleases.”46  
 
Prospect theory has already attracted considerable interest in areas of security studies 
such as coercion and deterrence. It is mentioned in discussions of contemporary Asia-
Pacific security problems such as North Korea’s nuclear arsenal or disputes over the 
                                                
42 Rose McDermott, Risk-Taking in International Politics: Prospect Theory in American Foreign Policy 
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998), 18. 
43 Jack S. Levy, 'Interstate War and Peace,' in Handbook of International Relations, ed. Walter Carlsnaes, 
Thomas Risse, and Beth A Simmons (SAGE Publications Limited, 2013), 595. 
44 Jack S. Levy, ‘Prospect Theory, Rational Choice, and International Relations,’ International Studies 
Quarterly 41, no. 1 (1997): 93. 
45 Jack S. Levy, ‘Applications of Prospect Theory to Political Science,’ Synthese, no. 135 (2003): 225-26. 
46 McDermott, Risk-Taking in International Politics, 29. 
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East China Sea.47 However, there are obstacles to using the theory as a tool of analysis. 
The main problem is that the theory centres on actors’ beliefs about reference points, 
which change based on the actors’ gains and losses. Thus Levy notes: “If we cannot 
identify the reference point independently of the behaviour we are trying to explain, 
then prospect theory and its key hypotheses cannot be tested and have no explanatory 
power.”48 Nevertheless, the strong indications given by the interviewees, and by the 
research of this project generally, suggest that the ideas behind prospect theory are 
particularly relevant to status concerns. There would therefore be value in developing 





This project, focused as it is on prestige, status and perceptions, is essentially a 
discussion of ideas. It has discussed situations where states are forced to change their 
basic thinking about their role, purposes, and circumstances. Such basic thinking is 
difficult to change, involving the full range of international relationships, domestic 
political pressures and bureaucratic agendas. It requires a crisis to change such thinking; 
indeed, as one recent study of the role of ideas in politics said, “change comes when 
conditions make it possible for new ideas to trump both vested interests and long-held 
beliefs.”49  
 
                                                
47 For example, respectively: Gary Schaub, ‘Deterrence, Compellence, and Prospect Theory,’ Political 
Psychology 25, no. 3 (2004); Christensen, The China Challenge, 106. 
48 Levy, ‘Prospect Theory, Rational Choice, and International Relations,’ 99. 
49 Wayne A. Leighton and Edward J. López, Madmen, Intellectuals, and Academic Scribblers : The 
Economic Engine of Political Change (Stanford, California: Stanford Economics and Finance, an imprint 
of Stanford University Press, 2013), 7. Emphasis in original. 
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Possibly the most important contribution of this research is to bring forward the notion 
of a status crisis. The action of the crisis in turn highlights three key ideas that relate to 
the process by which status perceptions have causal effect.  
 
The first major idea is that prestige, which is a central good being sought in order to 
achieve status aims, is a higher-order belief – a belief about what is generally believed 
in the group as a whole, not an assessment of the beliefs of each individual observer. 
This frees a great deal of complexity from efforts to study how it is measured, valued or 
changes. Rather than having to judge whether a policy is “best” for delivering positive 
values to the state, decision-makers need only select policies that they consider are 
generally thought to be valuable. It means that the process of normal prestige-building 
needs to be as much about “advertising” prestige as it is acquiring it. 
 
A second major idea is that in response to the crisis, and in order to change self-
perceptions of their state’s status, decision-makers do not need to make absolute 
valuations, but need only observe change. This project studied examples of this aided by 
the role that crises play in exposing information and crystallising long-term trends. The 
way that the case studies showed that crises deliver a wide range of information 
suggests that self-perception of changed status is rapid. It was also clear that change is 
perceived across a range of constituencies and causes revaluations of a wide range of 
status objectives. 
 
The third major idea is that decision-makers may actually think differently about status 
objectives once the crisis forces them into action. The project assumed that normal 
status-seeking was driven not by emotions or irrationality, but a “deliberative” mind-set 
that is conservative and pursues status within bounds of cost-benefit analyses. In a 
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status crisis, the information delivered, and pressure from key constituencies have 
combined to press decision-makers to enhance their prestige-building, an “implemental” 
mind-set allows determined and concerted action. The result is the increased appetite for 
risk that was observed in each of the case studies.    
 
This research project sits in the context of a distinct “turn” to the study of status in IR. 
This has created a considerable discussion of status, yet even with the addition of 
notable books and papers that have appeared since the project began, there has remained 
a lack of work to operationalise status as a concept. IR has lacked a causal theory of 
how status concerns may influence results. This study provides one conceptual 
framework, where cause was observed over a three-phase mechanism of normal status-
seeking, status crisis, and enhanced prestige-building. Certainly, this thesis deals with a 
limited number of case studies situated in a specific time and space. However, the 
project has applied the empirical findings to broader conceptual discussion, to draw out 
factors that are more generalisable than the historical outcomes alone. Based on this, we 
can expect that in situations where states encounter crises of status, those states are 
likely to respond by embarking on new, unexpectedly assertive and even provocative 
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